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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the patterr* and level of unemployment in 
the British Economy from 1855 to 1913. The structure of and variations 
in supply and demand for labour and unemployment are examined using data 
mostly from published sources. Various models are discussed and tested on 
the data using the standard techniques of regression analysis.
It is found that the pre first world war labour market can be 
described as free of major institutional and structural distortions, 
adjusting via a series of short run equilibria to a long run equilibrium. 
It is argued that the interwar labour market should be depicted as 
failing to adjust and suffering continuous excess supply of labour. In 
this context, the supply side role for the effect of unemployment 
benefits is limited and the maldistribution of unemployment across 
industries and regions is a consequence, rather than a cause of 
unemployment. It is argued that, under such conditions, there would 
have been scope for demand management policies and these would have 
involved both public spending and exchange rate policies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The following chapters of this thesis study various aspects of the 
aggregate labour market in Britain from 1855 to 1939. They represent 
an effort to examine topics which are, or should be, important to economic 
historians using the tools of the applied economist. Despite the 
considerable advances made in quantitative economic history in the last 
few decades, this is an area which is in need of considerably more 
research. It is also an area in which the gap between historians and 
economists is still embarrassingly wide.
One of the points often put forward by leading "cliometricians" 
is that the old style economic history used theory and assumptions 
covertly and tested hypotheses only by implication. By contrast, their 
efforts have been devoted to framing historical questions in the context 
of explicit models devised from basic theory and testing formally using 
a variety of quantitative methods. (Fogel, 1967, McCloskey, 1978). As 
this approach has developed, it has not only provided new answers to old 
questions but also raised fresh questions which emerge as the result of 
empirical enquiry.
This approach has been increasingly applied in the context of British 
Economic history and some of the results of this enterprise have recently 
been brought together in two volumes by Floud and McCloskey (1981). It 
is notable, however, that recent surveys of the British labour market 
before 1914 find very little work of this nature to draw upon (Pollard, 
1978, Baines, 1981, Hunt, 1981). There are two possible reasons for 
this. The first is that the new economic history has been based largely 
on neoclassical models, which are used as maintained hypotheses. This 
approach has lacked appeal to those interested in the labour market who 
have therefore been reluctant to apply them.
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The second is that the existing historical literature has largely 
been aimed at answering questions which are, on the whole, different from 
those which would be asked by the applied economist. Labour history 
has emerged very largely as a branch of social history rather than of 
economic history. Its concerns have been with the development of particu­
lar institutional structures, the growth of ideas and the interpretation 
of various aspects of the labour movement in this context. Thus the growth 
of trades unionism, industrial conflict, the development of collective 
bargaining and the evolution of various aspects of social policy are 
all major topics of study. Though some outstanding work has been done 
in these areas, it has often stopped short of using economic analyses 
to tie the threads together.
There is, however, a considerable amount of quantitative work aimed 
at modelling features of the labour market but this has often been done 
by economists with a view to testing the robustness of models over long 
periods of time rather than modelling the distinctive characteristics of 
particular historical periods. This has, in consequence, remained 
largely outside the mainstream of historical literature. Furthermore 
there is beginning to emerge work on the labour market which is both 
historical and quantitative in nature and it seems likely that this 
trend will gather pace in the next few years.
The object of this thesis is to make a few tentative steps along 
this path and to perform some preliminary and exploratory work which it 
is intended will be continued in the future. Ideally work of this 
nature should display of an appreciation of primary and secondary material, 
an understanding of its wider historical implications together with the 
appropriate use of theory and quantitative methods. The exact blend 
depends on the type of question being addressed (as well as on the competence
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or lack of it, of the researcher). The analysis presented here is 
partial and incomplete and falls short of the standards aspired to but 
it attempts to provide a general interpretation within which certain 
specific questions can be answered.
One important aspect is to survey and interpret the existing 
literature in an effort to bring some of the results of different kinds 
of historical work together and provide a back-ground to the empirical 
work. The period covered is a long span of more than 80 years and 
divides naturally into two parts: the period before 1914 and the inter- 
war years. It is traditional to view these periods separately and 
probably for good reason: the type and quality of information available 
is quite different between the two eras and so are the types of questions 
addressed in the literature. More fundamentally, there were important 
changes in the economic structure relating to the labour market which 
mark these periods out as distinct. The evaluation of the characteristics 
and nature of the periods under study is therefore important from the 
point of view of choosing the appropriate model or paradigm with which 
to work.
The major focus of the thesis is on explaining variations both in 
aggregate unemployment over time and across various groups at a point 
in time. This is one of the central questions of macroeconomic analysis 
and a wide range of theories and empirical models have been produced to 
explain various aspects of the issue. Many are variations on a particular 
theme but two major paradigms can be identified. The first is often 
termed the equilibrium approach and can be said to derive from the 
development of the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics represented 
in the seminal volume of Phelps (edj(1970). The other is the disequilibrium 
or non-market clearing approach originating from Keynes General Theory 
and pioneered in its modern form by Barro and Grossman (1976).
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Though these are often seen as competing theories, one is likely 
to be more appropriate than the other in different historical periods 
when economic structures and institutions would have been different. 
Furthermore, when used for prescriptive purposes or for evaluating 
policy counterfactuals, the models will often lead to different 
conclusions. This is illustrated in the case of the possible impact of 
unemployment benefits on the rate of unemployment. This issue, raised 
recently for the interwar period by Benjamin and Kochin (1979) is taken 
up at various points and it is argued that such effects differ, depending 
on whether an equilibrium or disequilibrium approach is taken. Similarly 
for other aspects of economic policy concerned with public spending or 
exchange rates, the outcome depends on the model used which must, there­
fore, be appropriate to the case.
In Chapter 2 a wide range of literature on the labour market from 
1855 to 1913 is reviewed. In this there are three motives. First, 
to bring together a variety of material and to provide a picture of the 
main features of the labour market before 1913. Second, to interpret 
it and evaluate the economic implications of this literature as a guide 
to modelling fluctuations in unemployment and wage rates. Third, to 
closely scrutinize the available data which is subsequently used in estima­
tion. Chapter 3 sets up a basic and relatively simple model of 
unemployment based on the neoclassical approach. This is subjected to 
a number of tests and various supplementary hypotheses are examined.
In Chapter 4 we turn the attention to the changes and developments 
in the economy and institutions relevant to the labour market occurring 
between the prewar decade and the 1920s. Some of the difference between 
the prewar and interwar periods were profound but were not always attribu­
table solely to the effect of the war. Many of the changes, especially in
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the expansion of the role of the state in such areas as social 
insurance and collective bargaining could be traced back to before the 
war. The war did, however, alter fundamental economic relationships, 
imposing a pressing need for adjustment and structural change. Yet, in 
many respects, economic institutions were ill adapted to meeting this 
challenge and, despite the expanded role of the state, policies of 
economic management were slow to emerge.
Thus things had changed but the implication of this did not become 
immediately clear and the interwar period saw the desperate search for 
theories within which new policies could be framed and was marked 
most notably by the appearance of the General Theory in 1936. In 
Chapter 5, it is argued that a Keynesian approach is the appropriate para­
digm for the interwar period and several important policy issues are 
re-examined in this context.This includes an examination of the possible 
causal links between unemployment benefit provisions and unemployment 
in a Keynesian framework as well as the more traditional policy issues: 
public spending and the exchange rate.
Chapter 6 is devoted to further examining the underlying structure and 
determinants of employment and unemployment. The issue of the relation­
ship between output, employment and real wages originally highlighted 
in the debate between Keynes (1939) and Dunlop (1938) is re-examined 
at.the industry level. In order to achieve further insight into the 
operation of the labour market, the rates of flow of workers between 
employment and unemployment and into and out of the labour force are 
examined. Further time series models are tested, using quarterly data 
not previously used in empirical work. In all this, the potential 
impact of unemployment benefits is kept firmly in the picture
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as is the issue of what appropriate policies for lowering unemployment 
might have been.
One of the most striking features of interwar unemployment was the 
diversity in the experience among different industries and regions. To 
many observers, this is a central feature in the diagnosis of the causes 
of unemployment which carries important policy implications. Fundamental 
to this is the relationship between the regional and industrial composi­
tion of both unemployment and the growth of employment. Whether regional 
and industrial maldistribution leads to structural unemployment depends 
both on the overall level of activity and the degree of labour mobility. 
Chapter 7 examines these issues afresh and attempts to relate them back 
to some of the questions raised in earlier chapters.
Finally, some of the conclusions which emerge in the course of the 
analysis are drawn together in Chapter 8. Though many questions remain 
unanswered and the answers to others remain in doubt, it is argued that 
some insights can be drawn at this stage. In many areas, however, 
further enquiry and more detailed analysis is still required before the 
various features of the labour market can be fully understood and placed 
in a consistent framework.
2.1
CHAPTER 2
A SURVEY OF THE LABOUR MARKET IN BRITAIN 1850 - 1913 
2.1 The Structure and Dynamics of the British Economy 1855 - 1913
By the middle of the nineteenth century Britain had become the 
world's first truly industrialised economy and, in the 60 years after 
1850, the economy developed along a path which had been largely esta­
blished by the profound changes of the previous 60 years. This 
development had far-reaching effects on the labour market and, in 
particular, for the institution of wage labour upon which growth and 
prosperity was largely based. The rise of factory industry, the growth 
of urbanisation , specialisation of skills and occupations produced an 
increased dependency of workers and firms upon each other which 
focused on the relationship between them. In the 1851 census the 
urban population for the first time exceeded the rural population and 
43Z of the occupied population found their employment in industry, 
compared with 22Z in agriculture. From this time the numbers in 
agriculture fell not only relatively but absolutely. Proportional 
expansion was concentrated in extractive and service industries such 
that, although the agricultural proportion fell to 8.3Z by 1911, the 
manufacturing proportion remained about a third while industry as a 
whole rose to 46.4Z (Deane and Cole, 1962, p. 142).
This distribution reflects the pattern of domestic demand in an 
economy with historically high income levels and the pattern of inter­
national specialisation which resulted from becoming the "workshop of 
the world". This also finds expression in the fact that trade and 
transport category occupied some 20Z of the working population. While 
domestic consumption averaged about 85Z of GNP from 1870 onwards,
exports and domestic capital formation accounted for approximately a 
third. The latter consisted of a high proportion of industrial output 
and gave rise to the dominance of the staple industries which are an 
important characteristic of the period.
The three broad sectors of niining and quarrying, textiles and 
dothing and engineering and metal manufactures are estimated to have 
accounted for more than 22Z of national income in 1907. Within these 
groups some 70Z of textiles, 30Z of iron and steel and 30Z of coal 
output was exported. The specialisation which this implies was 
reflected regionally as well as industrially. Cotton textiles focused 
on Lancashire, coal on South Wales and Northumberland and Durham, 
shipbuilding on the Tyne and Clyde, iron and steel in Cleveland and 
'fc.MitlMShire. Other industries which were based more on the home market 
were more evenly distributed - the best example being the building 
industry which, although reflecting the pattern of economic activity 
in different regions, was widely dispersed and the food processing 
and service industries of which the location reflected more the con­
ditions of demand than of supply.
This distinctive structure which characterises the economy condi­
tioned the pattern of economic fluctuations. According to Rostow, it 
was about the middle of the century when the minor cycles generated 
by agricultural fluctuations and an inventory cycle in textiles gave 
way to the deeper rhythm of cycles dominated by long term investment 
either at home or abroad. (Rostow, 1948, p. 39-50). There has been 
considerable intereat in long waves in prices and activity of some 50 
years in duration and, more recently, a substantial literature has
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grown up on long swings, with a periodicity of some 20 years^. But 
the most prominent systematic pattern seen in the raw time series 
is the 7 - 1 0  year fluctuations sometimes known as the Juglar cycle. 
Table 2.1 lists the cyclical peaks and troughs in real GNP distinguished 
by Aldcroft and Fearon.
Table 2 .1
The Trade Cycle 1850 - 1913
Peak Trough
1856 1858
1859 1862
1865 1869
1874 1879
1883 1886
1890 1894
1901 1904
1907 1909
1913
Source: Aldcroft and Fearon (1972, p. 9)
There is a wide measure of agreement about the dating of peaks 
and troughs which reflects both the distinctiveness of the cycle and 
the strong synchronisation of the various time series used as indica­
tors. Comparing the pattern of peaks and troughs in Table 1.1 with 
the pattern of industrial production, for example, gives the same
The twenty year swings have been examined most prominently by Brinley 
Thomas (1954, 1973) in the context of the "Atlantic Economy" hypothesis. 
The effects on economic activity come largely through the alter­
nation of home and overseas investment which gave rise to offsetting 
swings in domestic investments exports. The implicstion of this for shorter 
cycles in activity has been widely discussed (Rostow, 1948, Cairncross 
1952, M^ghews, 1959, Ford, 1965, 1969, 1971)
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number of cycles only differing in turning points by one year at the 
most. (Beveridge, 1944, p. 28, Rostow, 1948, p. 33, Aldcroft and Fearon, 
1972, p. 12).
While each cycle has its distinctive features, leading indicators 
tend to follow similar patterns over the course of each cycle, leaving 
a strong impression that similar forces operating through a stable 
mechanism were responsible for each. Most of the postwar literature 
is Keynesian in flavour and concentrates on the most volatile components 
of expenditure as the proximate source of fluctuations. Ford has 
concluded that "the immediate cause of fluctuations in British money 
incomes was fluctuations in export values aided or impeded by 
fluctuations in home investment"(1965, p. 94-5). As regards timing, 
both exports and domestic investment appear to have led or coincided 
with CNF at peaks and troughs in most cycles but exports were 
more closely associated with GNP than investment. If these were the 
proximate causes, then the true causes depend on the determinants of 
exports and investment, though these are often designated "autonomous 
expenditures".
If exports were sensitive to relative prices, then they might, 
in part, be determined endogenously but a more important contention 
is that they were largely determined by fluctuations in British foreign 
lending which displays cyclical fluctuations leading exports at 
peaks by one to two years (Ford, 1963, 1965, 1969). This suggests that 
exports were, in part, determined at home, though the lack of corres­
pondence between exports and lending when disaggregated, suggests 
that both may have been jointly determined by domestic and external 
forces. Similarly, home investment has often been regarded as depending
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largely on realised profits, sometimes construed as an indicator of 
expected profits (Tinbergen, 1951, Saul, 1969, p. 41, Church, 1975, p.40). 
Like many other variables, profits are strongly procyclical and the 
share of profits in total income shows a strong tendency to move in the 
same direction as total income. However, the level or share of profits 
has no more claim to be a truly exogenous variable than any other.
An alternative view put forward is that cycles were essentially 
monetary in origin. Like the other variables, the money stock moves 
with the cycle and a number of attempts have been made to distinguish 
between the money hypothesis and the spending hypothesis by the econo­
metric estimation of reduced form multipliers^ (Barret and Walters,
1966, Walters, 1969, Sheppard, 1971). In levels, both autonomous 
spending and the money stock contribute to the explanation of income 
and consumption over the period 1881 - 1914. Autonomous spending 
generally explains more of the variance than the money stock, though 
there is a high correlation between them as well as with income. But 
when first differences are used to abstract from the common trends, 
autonomous spending appears to be considerably more powerful (Sheppard, 1971, 
Tables 5.2 - 5.4, pp. 76 - 83).
It is likely that the money stock is even more of an endogenous 
variable than autonomous expenditure and the evidence from tests for 
the direction of causality is as yet inconclusive (Mills and Wood, 1978, 
Huffman and Lothian, 1980). There are good reasons to doubt the 
independence of the money supply since there is a great deal of evidence *
* This technique of running a "horse race" between the autonomous 
spending and monetary hypotheses derives from Friedman and Meiselman 
(1963).
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that the monetary authorities essentially followed the advice of Bagehot 
in adopting an accommodating role which may account, in part, for the 
diminution of monetary crises, particularly after 1870 (Hicks, 1974)
A more contentious argument recently put forward is that the theory 
of the monetary approach to the balance of payments is appropriate, in 
this period, so that even if the authorities had been willing to pursue 
an independent policy, excess demand or supply of money balances would 
have been brought into equilibrium by international gold flows. (McCloskey 
and Zecher, 1976).
Even if endogeneity is ignored, monetary based macro models, which 
admittedly include more recent periods in the data set, fit rather badly for 
the thirty years before 1914 and exhibit implausibly long adjustment 
speeds (Jonson, 1976, Smith, 1977). The most complete macro model 
estimated for the prewar economy remains that of Tinbergen (1951). It 
is too complex to describe in detail* but the most important characteristic 
of the model was that, in both goods and money markets, "demand is 
almost everywhere [priced inelastic" (1951, p. 94). This suggests that 
expenditure decisions will generally be a more important source of 
fluctuations than supply factors , including money supply. On the income 
side,' a key feature of tbe model is the distinction between the wage bill 
and non-labour income. Spending out of the former is devoted almost 
wholly to consumption while the latter is divided between consumption 
and‘investment. An interesting feature is that Tinbergen eventually 
closed the model to make all variables dependant on other endogenous 
variables, current or lagged. This gave rise to a second order difference 
equation in non-labour income which was capable of generating endogenously 
cycles similar in duration to those actually observed. 1
1 A useful survey of the model is given by Nerlove (1965).
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These macro models have inevitably paid scant attention to the labour 
market inspite of the emphasis placed on it in theoretical models of 
macroeconomic adjustment. Thus in Smith’s model, the aggregate wage bill 
was related directly to the money supply and in Johnson's model, employment 
and wages were not considered directly at all. While hypotheses about the 
labour market may underlie the equations for the adjustment of prices 
and output, these are not made explicit. Though these models shed light 
on the proximate causes of fluctuations in employment, this is not the main 
focus of attention and the labour market mechanism is subsumed or specified 
in an ad hoc manner.
The major exception to this is in the model of Tinbergen who 
experimented with a variety of equations. Employment was simply demand 
determined but a variety of different variables were tried in the equation 
determining the wage level. Among these were the cost of living index, 
the relative price of consumption and investment goods, cumulative past 
employment and the level of union membership. All these were rejected, 
however, in favour of the price of coal as the sole explanatory variable.
In some respects Tinbergen’s work foreshadows that of the later investigations 
of Phillips (1958), Lipsey (1960) and subsequent writers. This relationship 
is regarded as fundamental to the adjustment of the macro economy and 
the task of Chapter 3 is therefore to develop and reinterpret this relation.
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2.2 The Record of Unemployment
Unemployment is a feature of the labour market which normally appears 
under capitalism and is associated with the establishment of factory 
industries and the development of urbanisation. Though the distinction 
between this and the under employment of pre-industrial economies is 
rather arbitrary, it is the former, reflecting the cyclical fluctuations 
of the industrial sector which is of primary concern here. Unemployment 
only became a topic of major concern to contemporaries in the 1880s 
and the term itself did not come into widespread use until the 1890s*.
This interest was rather different from that which might be taken today 
since it focused on the conditions of poverty and was spurred on by 
discontent among certain sections of the workforce. It concentrated 
therefore largely on the problem of casual labour particularly in 
London's dockland which might be regarded as a rather underdeveloped
C w )sector of the economy (Tomlinson,^Ch. 1). These aspects are discussed 
in more detail in section 2.6.
Before the figures generated by the National Insurance Act of 1911 
and subsequent Acts became available, the only source of continuous 
information is that compiled by the Board of Trade from the returns of 
Trade Unions who paid out of work benefits to their members. Though the 
enumerationof the unemployed in these returns is consistent with that
* Thus an enquiry set up in the early 1890s was designated the "Committee 
on Distress from Want of Employment". However it has been noted that the 
word "unemployment" first appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary in 
1888 and the word "unemployed" in 1882 (Creedy, 1981, p.2).
used in later official statistics, it has been described as a "pitifully 
small" sample (Feinstein, 1972, p. 225). Not only is it small relative 
to the aggregate labour force, less than 1Z in 1870 reaching 3JZ by 1910, 
its composition reflects the trade union membership from which it was 
drawn. Thus the original index was simply obtained by weighting the 
unemployment percentage for each union by the proportion of its 
membership in the total of reporting unions. Some idea of the composition 
can be obtained from the following table
Table 2.2
Percentage Weights of Reporting Trade Union Membership by 
Industrial Groups
1894 1908 1913
Building
, 21
9.4 8.3
Woodworking & Furnishing 5.4 5.1
Coal Mining 19 19.5 18.5
SEngineering 25.2 ^ 32.2
Shipbuilding 46 9.0 J
Other Metal Trades 4.9 7.1
Printing and Bookbinding 10 8.7 'i 7.1
Paper - J
Textiles 3 14.5 14.1
Clothing - - 6.2
Miscellaneous 1 3.4 1.4
Source: Beveridge (1930), Table IV, p. 20 and 425.
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The dominance in the returns of engineering, shipbuilding and 
metals was even greater in the earlier years comprising about threequarters 
in the 1860s and not falling below half until the 1890s. Given that 
the average unemployment percentage for this group is nearly double that 
for the rest, the Board of Trade reweighted the index giving them a weight 
of a half throughout and the series given by Feinstein> which is used 
subsequently»adopts this index until 1880 and the crude index thereafter.
The extent to which the index reflects the true unemployment rate 
in those industries to which it applies is not clear. The average rate 
for the index as a whole from 1861 to 1913 is A.45 per cent and it shows 
no long run trend. Over this period the average rates across the main 
industrial groups classified by the Board of Trade is shown in Table 2.3
Table 2.3
Average Unemployment Percentage for Main Industrial 
Groups 1861 - 1913
Engineering, Shipbuilding 
and Metals
6.0
Building 3.8
Woodworking and Furnishing 3.3*
Printing and Bookbinding 3.7
Other Trades 1.9*
. * 1867 - 1913
Source: Board of Trade, British and Foreign Trade & Industrial Conditions,
1904.
Though the level of unemployment of the metal using trades is 
exceptionally high and that of other trades exceptionally low, this is 
largely accounted for by the differences in the range of variation. This 
range might be too small for all groups if unemployed unionists tended
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to let their membership lapse at times of high unemployment and the evi­
dence of procyclical movements in membership might be used to support 
this.
Though there is little evidence of it, if unionists were able to 
command wage rates higher than non-unionists, their unemployment rates 
might have been higher though, if restrictions to entry were imposed, this 
would operate in the opposite direction. One possibility to be investi­
gated in greater detail is whether the existence of out-of-work benefit 
schemes, a characteristic of all reporting unions, directly induced 
higher unemployment rates among them. There is also a problem of 
inferring unemployment for an industry as a whole from unemployment 
among unionists since these would be largely craft or skilled workers.
Even if unionism itself did not induce distortions, it might be expected 
that unemployment would be higher in less skilled groups, if only 
because of greater variability of employment since employers night be 
more reluctant to lay off skilled workers in the face of temporary 
variations in demand.
Even if the indices were taken as adequate for the industries to 
which they relate the problems of weighting are formidable. A number of 
industries are not represented at all, the weights of the included 
industries are arbitrary and change arbitrarily over time and the geographi­
cal distribution is misrepresented. An attempt to reweight the index for 
1893 according to the industrial classification in the census reduced the 
percentage from 7.0Z to 4.2Z (Committee on Distress from Want of Employment 
Third Report (1895, p. 51) and this led some observers to the conclusion 
that, on average, the figure was too high. Beveridge thought that "It 
is best to give up all attempts to use the Trade Union returns as an index 
of the actual volume of employment in the whole of industry" (1930, p. 21).
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Evidence from the figures produced by the National Insurance system from 
1912 onwards, however, shows that where the two series overlap, from 1912 
to 1926, they are not seriously out of line in terms of overall levels. 
Excluding the year 1919, the average over thirteen years is 6.4Z for the 
Trade Union figures compared with 7.1% for the Insurance series (Booth 
and Glynn, 1975, Appendix 1) and Beveridge later concluded that, in this 
light, the Trade union average of 4.8% between 1883 and 1913 should be 
raised to about 6% (1944, p. 72). However, this comparison may be 
affected to some extent by the peculiarites imposed by the structure of 
interwar unemployment and the National Insurance scheme itself and this 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
It is possible to conclude that, given the importance in the pre-war 
labour market , of casual and unskilled groups with irregular employment 
and high turnover rates, that average unemployment was very much higher 
than the figures indicate. Thus many observers have concluded with 
Hobsbawm (1964, p. 129) that "At the very least we must assume a much 
greater volume of constant, if concealed, unemployment than the indices 
show". But even if no accurate impression of overall levels can be 
gained, it is unlikely as far as the industrial sector is concerned, that 
the figures conceal a secular trend in unemployment though such an inten­
sification of the problem in the 1880s is sometimes claimed (Burgess, 1980, 
p. 49)
While there remain doubts about the overall level of unemployment, 
the year to year fluctuations can be approached with more confidence. Figure 
2.1 plots the unemployment percentage showing the distinctive pattern 
ofeight full cycles with unemployment ranging between extreme values of 
over 10% and less that 1%. These fluctuations conform closely in timing 
with other evidence on the labour market although the extent to which
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they give a true picture of the underlying amplitude is more open to 
question. Where the Trade Union and Insurance figures overlap they always 
move in the same direction except for 1922 and there is evidence of greater 
variation in the former^. For earlier in the period Llewellyn—Smith,
Director of the Labour Department of the Board of Trade testified in 
1895 that "it is a very good index of changes in employment generally 
because the trades included are chiefly those which are affected most 
violently by cyclical fluctuations and hence, as far as that kind of 
fluctuation is concerned, our index numbers afford a very sensitive baro­
meter of this kind of change in the labour market; of course the fluctua­
tions for the very reasons I have mentioned, would be exaggerated in our 
index number" This, of course, refers to the uncorrected index and 
the Board of Trade later commented on its corrected index that some 
groups not included would probably have fluctuated more and other less 
than the index . Hilton's suggestion that the Trade Union percentage 
over estimated unemployment in years of depression has recently been 
criticised by Garside who in a detailed examination of the available 
statistics concluded that the series is "fairly representative of 
conditions generally over a period of years and not only in the trades 
directly represented"^
* Easton (1978) regressed the Insurance percentage on the Trade Union percen­
tage for the overlapping years and obtained a coefficient of 0.89, signifi­
cantly smaller than one, on the latter. This conclusion supports the conclu­
sions of the earlier statistical investigations of Bowley (1912) and Hilton (1922)
2 Committee on Distress from Want of Employment (1895), Minutes of Evidence, 
p. 50. Q.4562.
Board of Trade Memorandum on British and Foreign Trade and Industrial 
Conditions, 1904, p. 90.
4 Hilton (1922, p. 182), Garside (1980, p. 23). Some writers have been 
inclined in the opposite direction; Rostow (1948, p. ) was unwilling to 
conclude that even the uncorrected percentage overestimated the true ampli­
tude of fluctuations.
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The reason for divergence of opinion is the differences in 
amplitude of fluctuations between broad groups of industries and, 
as before, the metals group stands out. This has led some observers 
to argue for making a distinction between the"fluctuating"and the 
relatively stable industries^. The unemployment rates in four broad 
industrial groups are plotted in Figure 2.2 and that of the metals 
group is clearly more volatile than the rest although this feature 
largely disappears after 1895. But while each group has its 
distinctive pattern, the broad cyclical pattern is common to all.
The cycles of 1873-1882, 1882-1891 and 1906-1913 all reveal a hierarchy 
of amplitudes rather than a dichotomy with the widest fluctuations 
in the metals group followed by building, furniture and furnishing 
and lastly, printing. Moreover, the pattern and timing of unemploy­
ment in these cycles is closely similar between groups, all peaks 
falling in the same year. In the remaining cycles patterns diverge 
somewhat but there is still a strong correspondence between the three 
less fluctuating series.
This pattern can be readily explained with reference to fluctua­
tions in broad sectors of the economy which are reflected quite 
accurately in the unemployment series. The metal;industries have often 
been taken as indicative of victims of the trade cycle because of 
their concentration in exports and their characteristic as largely 
"instrumental trades". Hence this sector can be regarded as an 
indicator for the industries which bore the brunt of cyclical expan- 
1 Beveridge (1944) p. 293. For an earlier reference to this distinction, 
see Llewellyn Smith, Committee on Distress from Want of Employment 
(1895, p.. 47. Q. 4535-7).
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sions and contractions which were communicated to the rest of the 
economy. Figure 2.3 plots for comparison the share of investment plus 
exports in national income and the share of exports alone. From this 
it can be seen that when all unemployment series were at similar low 
levels at the peak of a boom such as 1871 - 3, 1881 - 3 and 1888 - 90, 
the share of exports in national income reached a cyclical peak . As 
the unemployment profile in the metals group rose above the others in 
recession, the export proportion generally fell but in two prominent 
cases 1875 h 9 and 1901 - 7 it rose. In both cases the downswing was 
longer and was marked by a relatively sharp rise in all the unemployment 
series. These appear to have been cases where domestic recession con­
tributed disproportionately to the downturn in activity although in 
both cases activity was sustained for a while by home investment marking 
the only major times when the upper graph of domestic investment plus 
exports differs substantially in pattern from the export share alone*
This phenomenon is particularly striking after 1900 when the export share 
rises by a full eight percentage points, while the combined share rises 
by less than half of this. The unemployment series reflect this change 
in that, as previously noted, the metals group does not rise significantly 
above the other groups particularly in the cycle from 1904 - 1906. After 
this the distinctive pattern of the hierarchy of unemployment rates in 
recession reappears though at a slightly different level, as does the 
conformity between the two shares of national income.
That the unemployment series reflect not only the aggregate fluc­
tuations but also the structure of them is surprising in view of the 
partial nature of the statistics. It might be thought that the relative 
exclusion, particularly of coal mining and textiles in the earlier 
years, might vitiate such comparisons. However, the uniformity of
2.16
cyclical movements, particularly of different classes of exports is 
much closer in the years before 1900 and, hence, the omission of key 
sectors is not too misleading.
In their enquiry of 1909, Chapman and Hallsworth investigated 
how far a change in total man-hours of labour was divided between changes 
in hours per worker and number of workers employed from one year to the 
next. From their data the change in hours as a percentage of the change 
in total man hours was calculated for certain industries:
Table .4
Percentage of change in total Manhours met by 
~ Change' in hours per worker_________
Trade Nov 1906 - Nov 1907 Nov 1907 - Nov 1908
Iron and Steel 32 29
Cotton 36 65
Woollen 43 71
Worsted 59 68
Hosiery 44 7
Boots and Shoes 79 -
Glass 6 8
Source: Chapman and Hallaworth (1909) p. 49-50.
It is clear from these figures that particularly in textiles, short 
term variations in activity were met largely by changes in hours. Chapman 
& Hallsworth suggested from this data that a shrinkage of the wage bill 
of 8.2Z would be met by the dismissal of 4.4Z of workers and a 3.8Z increase 
in short time working (1909, p. 53). Rowe found that variations in shifts 
worked per week at the mines were equivalent to between 2Z and 17Z of unemploy- 
ment. In textiles, variations 5-10Z^were absorbed by short time working
while, in railways, shipbuilding and engineering, the combination of 
short time and overtime was used (Rowe, 1928, pp. 60-63).
There is also evidence that the incidence of unemployment fell 
disproportionately among a small proportion of workers even amongst union 
/»•A^ers. From Union records Beveridge found that among shipwrights, over 
the period 1894-1903, between 202 and 402 of the membership became unem­
ployed in any year and similarly for members of the Associated Society 
of Engineers. It should be remembered that these were among the most 
fluctuating trades but even in these, most unemployment tended to be 
concentrated among a small minority (1930, p. 70, 73). Of 2268 members 
of the London Society of Compositors who drew out of work benefit from 
the union in 1904, 742 claimed again in 1905, 622 in 1906 and 442 in 
1907 and 8.62 of the membership in all four years1.
There is little evidence on individual durations of unemployment 
though the results of enquiries in Manchester in 1904 and 1906 suggest 
about half of the unemployed had durations of less than three months 
(Chapman, 1908, p. 332.) It seems likely that those experiencing 
repeated spells would tend to have longer durations per spell of unem­
ployment. These would often be the less efficient or older workers 
and, among A.S.E. members in 1895, average days lost increased sharply 
above age 45 to double that of younger age groups (Chapman and Hallsworth, 
1909, p. 77). Some additional evidence of the distribution of unemploy­
ment across age groups can be obtained from the age distribution of 
applicants to local distress committees in London for relief under the 
Unemployed Workman Act of 1905. The number of applicants is expressed
1 A similar pattern was found among members of the Consolidated Society 
of Journeyman Bookbinders: of 572 signing on for out of work pay in 1903, 
662 also signed in 1904, 492 in 1905 and 522 in 1906 with 122 of 
members signing in each year.
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as a ratio of the relevant total population but, since this would give 
only a small fraction, the rate for each age group is expressed as a 
percentage of the 35-44 group.
Table 1.5
1 Distribution of Applicants to Distress Committees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age Group London London Manchester Manchester
1906/7 1910/11 1907/8 (Census) 1909
15-19 12.4 23.5
119.5 71.1*
20-24 54.8 51.0
25-34 83.0 78.8 108.7 81.5
35-44 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
45-54 91.9 90.3 86.8 85.3
55-54 64.4 59.8 - 97.8
Sources: Cols. (2), (3) Beveridge (1930) Table XIX, p. 119 and 440;
cols. (4), (5) Chapman and Hallsworth (1909) p. 74, 75.
The final column is for the Manchester census of unemployment 
of 1909. The asterisk indicates that the age group in the 
census was 14-24.
This evidence gives rather conflicting results. For London there 
is a sharply rising profile of unemployment up to age 35-44 which is 
absent in Manchester. It is likely that the London figures underestimate 
and the Manchester figures overestimate the unemployment amongst those 
under 25 relative to the group aged 35-44 and that the incidence of 
unemployment was smaller among the younger age groups^1. The distress
1 The two sets of figures probebly reflect the extremely different labour 
market structures and the national average would probably fall in between. 
Furthermore the Manchester figures may be biased by the use of Lancashire's 
population as the denominator.
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committee applicants, however, reflect a very small portion of the 
industrial population and mainly those who were chronically unemployed. 
Most would have had repeated spells of unemployment and employment*.
In Manchester and Salford in 1908, 40Z of applicants had held their 
previous employment for less than a year (Chapman and Hallsworth (1909 
p. 81).
2 .20
2 .3 Wages and Wage Changes
Several indices of average money wages are available for the second 
half of the nineteenth century, most of which are based on the pioneering 
work of Bowley and Wood (1898-1906). Two indices given by Feinstein are 
given in Figure 2 .4. One is an index of average weekly wage rates which 
is Wood's index for "workmen of unchanged grade" working a full week and 
is an unweighted index of constituent standard wage rates (Wood, 1909, 
p. 102-3). This "does not reflect changes in earnings due to such factors 
as changes in the composition of the labour force ..., changes in unemploy­
ment or changes in the earnings of piece workers and others paid by result 
which are due to changes in output"(Feinstein, 1972 , T.140-1). The 
alternative earnings series is essentially that compiled by Bowley (1937, 
p. 30) which is a weighted index taking into account compositional changes 
and variations in hours and employment. While these series are, in some 
respects, incomplete, they have acquired considerable authority.
The wage rate series indicates an overall rise in the average wage 
from about 23 shillings per week in 1855, to 37 shillings in 1913 and the 
earnings series gives a rather more rapid rise due largely to the increasing 
weight of high wage industries. The pattern displayed by these series 
is of weak cyclical movements superimposed on rapid advance to a major 
peak in the early 1870s, decline and recovery to the mid 1890s and then 
fluctuations about a slowly rising trend. When this profile is compared with 
that of selected price indices given in Figure 2.5., it is clear that 
times of rising nominal wages were not always times of rising real wages. 
Indeed the period during which nominal wages rose relatively slowly, from 
the mid 1870s to the mid 1890s was the time when real wages rose most 
rapidly. Though the precise magnitudes depend on the price index used,
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it is particularly marked when the cost of living index is used for 
comparison (Bowley, 1937, p. 30; Phelps Brown and Browne, 1968, p. 160).
The individual wage histories of different industries are far from 
uniform but from 1880 to 1914, most wage series rise by about 20Z. Some 
sectors such as printing and railways fell somewhat short of this but the 
most striking divergence is in coal mining where a 607. increase took 
place (Bowley, 1937, p. 8; Rowe, 1928, p. 9). Rowe found that the 
divergences between different industries were more marked than those 
among different classes of labour connected with one industry. Like 
Bowley, he concluded that "wages in each industry are greatly influenced 
by factors peculiar to that industry as well as by factors common to all 
industries."(Rowe, 1928, p. 44; Bowley, 1937, p. 10).
The degree of year to year variation differs widely among industries 
and, again, coal mining provides the extreme example of a volatile wage 
rate which was hardly ever constant between two years and sometimes varied 
by as much as 20Z in a single year while, at the other extreme, wage rates 
in printing and railways remained constant for as much as a decade at a 
time and, when changes did take place, they were only by one or two percent*. 
It has often been suggested that differences in wage variation reflects 
the division between sheltered and unsheltered trades. In addition to 
coal, the metal trades, textiles and building were at the forefront of 
wage changes. Clegg Fox and Thompson consented that from 1893 to 1900,
"they held undisputed leadership both in the period of cuts dowito the 
end of 1895 and in the increases of the last five years of the century,
* This is most graphically illustrated in the wage indices produced by Wood 
(1899, pp. 664-5). Wood's original data were for trades in particular 
localities and the year to year stability is quite striking. However, 
aggregation for the country as a whole would produce much more variation 
as in the later series produced by Bowley and Wood (1898 - 1906).
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accounting for over nine tenths of the workers affected ... Mining again 
led with 60Z of total, metals had 19Z and building and textiles took 8Z.
The rest were nowhere" (1964, p. 122). Hence, contrary to the view that
relative wage rigidity would give rise to greater instability of employment, 
those industries most severely affected by fluctuations in activity were 
also those which experienced the most frequent wage changes.
The proportions quoted refer to the number of workers whose wages 
changed in a particular year. From 1893 to 1900 the total varied as a 
proportion of the industrial population from 14.9Z in 1899 to 5.6Z in 
1896. (Board of Trade, Report on Changes in Wages and Hours of Labour,
1901). This figure is likely to be biased downwards due to under reporting 
especially amongst small firms and, of course, excluded non-industrial 
occupations like agriculture but, at least, it conveys some impression 
of the lack of pervasiveness across different groups which would be 
implied by small changes in the wage index.
It appears that the industries most subject to wage change were not 
necessarily only unsheltered industries facing the vicissitudes of foreign 
competition but those which, for one reason or another, faced the greatest 
variation in demand. This includes those such as building which experienced 
variations as great as many export industries. On the whole it was indus­
tries connected with exports and investment, the two most volatile components 
of aggregate demand,which exhibited the greatest variations in wages. In 
trades based on domestic consumption, wage rates tended to be less volatile. 
This is also reflected within industries,for example in coal mining, where 
wages in the exporting areas of Northumberland and Durham and South Wales 
varied more than those of the Midland coalfields^-.
* This also had profound effects on the organisation of the industry, causing 
friction between the different areas and contributing to the fragmentation 
of national collective bargaining (Clegg Fox and Thompson, 1964, p. 102).
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The most general explanations put forward for variations in wage rates 
are those which followed Phillips'(1958) famous paper, and which relate 
aggregate wage changes to the unemployment rate and sometimes other 
variables. This econometric literature is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3 where further work along these lines is attempted. Though some 
sceptics have argued that such a simple relationship would not be likely 
to hold at the level of the individual industry (Routh, 1959; Knowles 
and Winston, 1959), the finding that the amplitudes in activity and the 
frequency of wage changes tend to be associated,is some support for this 
approach as a broad generalisation. However, a variety of other variables 
affecting wage rates have been put forward in the historical literature 
and are often thought to have had different force in different industries. 
Rowe argued that the movement of the piece lists governing wages in the 
cotton textile industry were determined by the level of activity and by 
profit margins^. (1928, pp. 116-7). In coal mining ,the strong correlation 
between miners' wages and the price of coal has often been noted . Like 
the iron and steel industry, for at least some of the period under review, 
there were institutionalised links between product prices and wage rates, 
either through sliding scale agreements or less mechanistic methods of 
wage settlement. It is not clear how far these methods of wage setting 
supplanted or altered the competitive mechanism and how far they merely 
transmitted competitive pressures into wage changes in an institutional 
and orderly framework. These arrangements often broke down and some 
further consideration is given to the probable impact of the growth of 
collective bargaining in section 2.6. *
* This relationship was formalised after 1893 in the Brooklands agreement 
(Hutt, 1975, p. 42).
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In general,wage historians have emphasised that, although there was 
short run inertia in the adjustment of wage rates, they were constantly 
conditioned by the inexorable forces of competition. For example,
Phelps Brown and Browne argued that there was constant pressure by workers 
to raise wages in booms and to resist wage cuts in depressions,and the 
degree to which they were successful depended on both economic and 
institutional factors (1968, p. 23-9). They went on to distinguish 
between sheltered and unsheltered trades and suggested that especially 
in the latter, "an international trend of unit wage costs was set up 
that, at any given time, acted as an externally imposed constraint on any 
wage negotiation, such that, so long as profit margins remained unchanged, 
money wage earnings could rise above the international level of unit costs 
only to the extent that productivity rose*. (1968, p. 131) \  As has been 
noted, the unsheltered industries were also among those in which activity 
varied most and it is difficult to distinguish in some cases whether the 
proximate cause of wage changes was price changes or changes in 
activity. That these features tended to go together can be illustrated 
even within an industry. For instance, in coal mining, referred to earlier, 
prices, wages and activity tended to vary more in the exporting areas of 
the North-East and South Wales than in the inland areas.
Though regional wage differentials varied from time to time, over 
the long term, they remained remarkably stable. Within regions wage rates 
were often set by reference to a "leading bargain", one of the best known 
examples of which was the Oldham spinning'list. In the building industry 
wage rates were often set with reference to those in the nearest important 
town. In his study of regional wage variations, Hunt found that in 18S0
* Caimcross also took this view, arguing that nominal wages were largely 
determined by export prices and hence, insofar as the cost of living was deter­
mined by import prices, the real wage for workers varied with the terms of 
trade (1953, p. 207.)
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London and the Northern counties of England as far south as Birmingham, 
were the major high wage areas. In 1914 the same broad structure 
existed though South Hales and central Scotland were also in this 
group. (1973, p. 57). These were the most rapidly growing areas and 
though relative wage rates acted as a signal to migration, this did 
little to erode differentials. Taking into account differences in the 
cost of living and family income as a whole contributes little to 
explaining the persistence of these inequalities. These might indirectly 
be accounted for by differences in industrial structure but it appears 
most closely connected with the degree of urbanisation. In a contem­
porary study, Lawrence found that, in different occupations, wages were 
higher the larger the town and he conc'uded that "where higher wages 
are paid they are merely a higher price for a better article" (1899, p.54). 
This gains support from Hunt's finding that higher wages reflected higher 
productivity. (1973, pp. 204-214).
This argument may, perhaps, be more convincingly applied to 
occupational differentials. The existence and stability of these differ­
entials has been a prominently noted feature of the wage structure and, 
in seme industries such as building, they remained constant for decades 
or even centuries at a time (Phelps Brown and Hopkins, 1952) . In 
general, unskilled wages in a trade were usually between 50 and 70 per­
cent of the wage of skilled workers and, in semi skilled occupations, 
between 70 and 90 percent, depending on the industry concerned. (Rowe, 
192$, p. 49} Knowles and Robertson, 1951, p. Ill) .
In a detailed examination of grades of engineering labour, Rowe 
found that differentials remained relatively constant 1886-1906 despite 
changes in relative skill content. Thus wage differentials could not
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be explained by the demand and supply of skills and the educational 
quality of workers but by the "far reaching effect of sheer custom".
(1928, p. 11). This view has been supported in a number of studies which 
suggest that differentials were unresponsive to variations in economic 
conditions except when there was major upheaval, for example during war 
and its aftermath (Knowles and Robertson, 1951; Routh, 1980). It is 
often cited along with evidence of regional differentialstas evidence 
that wage rates, as a whole, were and continue to be governed by forces 
largely outside those of supply and demand .
I
In recent papers, Williamson (1980, 1982) has re-opened the issue 
by examining a larger set of data which includes non industrial occupa­
tions in services and agriculture. According to Williamson, the results 
"offer little support for the premise of rigid wage structure or that 
pay patterns by skill are determined by non-market forces" (1982, p. 2). 
However, the evidence adduced indicates a gradual decline in the average 
skill differential at census dates but not that individual differentials 
varied from year to year or that the long term changes in the differential 
can be explained by variations in supply and demand for different skills.
The evidence for fixed differentials prevailing for decades or 
centuries at a time is greatest when differentials within an industry 
in a particular locality are examined. It also appears that where an 
industry was unionised, these relativities would be more rigidly adhered 
to. Comparisons with similar grades of labour in other industries would 
be less important than comparison with different grades within the 
industry as criteria for craft unions. This raises the general question 
of the possible importance of the growth of trade unions and in the pro­
cess of wage setting.
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2.4 Trades Unionism and Industrial Disputes
The development and growth of trade unionism is essentially a 
nineteenth and twentieth century phenomenon. By 1850 unionists 
probably numbered only a quarter of a million but, by 1888, when more 
precise information is available, they were three times as numerous and 
accounted for nearly ten percent of the adult male workforce. By the end 
of the period, membership had become much more widespread and amounted to 
nearly a third of adult manual male workers and more than two and a half 
million individuals (Clegg Fox and Thompson, 1964, p. 468).
As was pointed out with reference to the trade union returns on 
unemployment, membership was not evenly distributed either geographically 
or industrially, English trade unionists were largely concentrated in 
the most prosperous and heavily industrialised northern counties, while 
the majority of Scottish trades unionists were to be found in the Glasgow 
area. They were also concentrated in particular industries and dominant 
amoung these were metals engineering and shipbuilding, mining and 
quarrying, textiles, building and transport (Hunt, 1981, p. 251). The 
heavy industries were not quite as dominant among unionists as a whole 
as they were amongst those in the unemployment returns. However, they 
still consist overwhelmingly of workers from the craft or artisan class, 
sometimes referred to as the aristocrats of labour (Hobsbawm, 1964, Ch. 15). 
Nevertheless, despite this concentration, union density even in the most 
heavily unionised of major industries remained, with the exception of 
mining, below 25Z. (Clegg, Fox and Thompson, 1964, p. 486).
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The growth of unionism over time does not rise smoothly but in sharp 
bursts followed by stagnation or decline. Thus most of the growth of 
the whole period from 1850 to 1914 is concentrated in the periods 1871-3, 
1889-91 and 1911-13, each of which saw a doubling of membership. (Hobsbawm, 
1964, p. 127). To almost all students of labour history, they delineate 
phases in the development of unionism which are marked by qualitative 
as well as quantitative change. The mid-Victorian era of the '50s and ’60s, 
was the heyday of the "new model union" both craft conscious and exclusive 
and epitomised by the Associated Society of Engineers which was born in 
the turmoil of the early 1850s. (Burgess, 1975, pp. 17-22).^ The 
turning point of the early 1870s, accompanied as it was by an intense 
boom in the economy and permissive trade union legislation, is less often 
seen as fundamental than other expansions though it saw the extension 
of unionism to such areas as agriculture. The period that followed this 
was viewed by the Webbs (1920, pp. 343-350) as utter defeat for unionism 
of both the established kind and of incipient new areas of organisation. 
However, this has been subjected to criticism which suggests that, while 
members fell, organisation was maintained and unionism remained an 
independent force. (Lovell, 1975, pp. 10-13).
The next upsurge which is probably the most well known came with 
the rise of "new unionism" in 1889. This has been interpreted as an 
abrupt rise of unions whose characteristics were sharply different from 1
1 This image of unionism as exemplified by Hutt (1975, p. 25) has recently 
been criticised as grossly oversimplified because the 1850s and 1860s^ 
also saw the extension of unionism to non craft occupations such as mining 
(Hunt, 1981, p. 260-1). Hunt also argues that the compliance and quiescence 
of new model unions depicted by Hobsbawm and others should be viewed 
differently and that they were "opportunists and shrewd practitioners 
of the art of public relations" (1981, p. 262).
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the existing ones . They organised the unskilled or semi-skilled, were 
general in the sense of being open to different occupational groups, were 
fostered and led by new radicals or socialists, were administered and 
structured less as friendly societies and were therefore more militant 
and more coercive in their tactics. Clegg Fox and Thompson, who described 
the episode as "colourful and baffling", have criticised this simple 
typology on all counts, arguing that these were differences of degree 
rather than kind and, in many cases, new unions were only superficially 
distinct from older forms of unionism. (1964, pp. 55, 84-89). Others 
have suggested that even the differences in characteristics which did 
exist were narrowed as new unions either succumbed to, or retrenched against, 
deteriorating labour market conditions and the counter attack of employers 
which culminated in the Taff Vale judgement of 1901. (Webbs, 1921, p.77; 
Hobsbawm, 1964, p. 190-1). On the other hand, as a movement, its effects 
were probably as great and longer lasting on the old unions who, neverthe­
less, made up the bulk of the increase in total union membership between 
1888 and 1890. (Hunt, 1981, p. 299).
The final upsurge of membership in the three years before the first 
World War saw the re-emergence of unionism similar to that of 1889. While 
this growth had similar characteristics, in so far as ideas were important, 
it was inspired by industrial unionism or syndicalism. Unions became 
more consolidated into large units and centralised in administration and 
new groups such as white collar workers emerged (Bain, 1970).
_ it was also accompanied by increasing solidarity between unions end
* It has been argued that the appearance of new unions was not as sudden 
as is sometimes thought end the movement can be traced back at least to 
the mid 1880s. (Duffy, 1961.)
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mutual support found its ultimate expression in the formation of the Triple 
Alliance of Miners, Railwaymen and Transport Workers. According to some 
writers, the impact of these developments was profound: "Everything 
pointed to a first class political and social crisis in the latter half 
of 1914" (Hutt, 1975, p. 65; see also Da'ngerfield, 1935, p, 400).
Each of these major surges in the growth of unionism was accompanied 
by a rash of strikes and labour unrest which change in nature over time 
and are symptomatic of the underlying phases of development . In the 
peak years of activity, more than a thousand strikes were recorded 
annually and the average number of workers involved doubled between the 
era of new unionism and the labour unrest of 1910-13. These discontinuities 
have been variously described as great leaps or explosions (Cronin, 1979,
Ch. 5; Hobsbawm, 1964, p. 124) but there is little agreement about their 
causes. The Webbs, in their classic work on trade unionism, saw these 
movements as spontaneous developments essentially non economic in origin. 
Others, such as Hobsbawm, argue for the primacy of the cumulative effect 
of the increased intensity of work subject to the delaying mechanism of 
raising the consciousness of "raw" labour (1964, p. 145.) Another 
underlying force which appears at various levels impinging both directly 
and indirectly, is the discontinuity of technical and organisational 
change (Burgess, 1975, Ch. 1’.). In view of the fact that the evidence 
from productivity growth suggests a slowdown in the later part of the 
period, such hypotheses must remain in doubt^. (Cronin, 1979, pp. 96-7).
* Cronin found that higher strike incidence was associated with slower 
productivity growth (1979, p. 85). It is interesting to note that Hobsbawm 
cited the demands for shorter hours as indicative of the increased 
intensity of work. He suggested that, in the case of the gas workers, 
the achievement of the eight hour day in 1889 actually led to technical 
change in the gas industry (1964, p. 137).
2 .31
The timing of these major movements as well as the intervening fluc­
tuations is more easily associated with economic variables. Hobsbawm argued 
that they triggered in the upswing of the trade cycle when prices were 
increasing more rapidly than wages while unemployment was declining 
(1964, p. 135). This is largely supported in quantitative studies which, 
owing to lack of data, generally link up the years from the early 1890s 
with later periods. Bain and Elshiek (1976, Ch. 5) found that the rate 
of change of union memebership could be adequately explained as a 
positive function of the rates of change of both wages and prices, thus 
the effect of the real wage is weak owing to the offsetting effects of 
wages and prices. It was also found to be a negative function of the rate 
of change of unemployment which suggests, at least, that membership is 
a strongly procyclical variable.
For strike activity, the estimated relationships are less satis­
factory but the results are broadly consistent with those for membership 
growth. Bean and Peel (1976, p. 209 ) found strike frequency to be posi­
tively correlated with the rate of change of output but unaffected by the 
real wage and Sapsford (1975, p.245 ), using price change as an indicator 
of monthly variations in activity found evidence of a positive correla­
tion. The most important variable, when it is included, is the rate of 
change of unionisation. As has been pointed out (Cronin, 1979, p. 105) 
the association between strike activity and membership growth is clear 
but .the underlying relationship between the two is less so. In some 
cases, particularly at the time of new unionism and when strikes over 
union recognition were successful, they gave a powerful stimulus to 
unionism, while in other circumstances, substantial growth in membership 
must have been the precondition for a strike.
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These studies imply, but do not test, the hypothesis that the direc­
tion of causality is from economic variables to unionism and labour 
unrest but not the reverse. Since it is hard to conceive of unions 
systematically causing cyclical fluctuations, this seems a reasonable 
presumption but it might not be accepted in the case of wage or, 
possibly, price change. Hines put forward the view that union density 
as a proxy for workers' militancy reflected the upward push to wages, 
independently of market forces. He found, however, that for 1893 to 1912, 
this did not give a satisfactory explanation and that, unique to this 
period, unionisation could be largely explained by unemployment (1964, 
p. 234).
Although the growth of unionism and the development of collective 
bargaining have been extensively studied by historians, Hunt has noted 
in his recent survey of labour history that "Perhaps the most remarkable 
aspect of union influence upon workers' welfare is how little it has been 
seriously considered. Too many union histories are merely descriptive 
and, in many others, the analysis stops short of this central question." 
(1981, p. 287). It was clearly an objective of trade unions to influence 
conditions of employment, hours of work and rates of pay in workers' 
favour and, sometimes, to bring about more fundamental changes in the 
organisation of industry1.
1 In its Final Report, the Royal Commission on Trades Unions of 1867-9, 
defined the objectives of unions as follows:"With respect
to the trade purposes of the unions, one of the most constant objectives 
is to obtain for the members the best rate of wages which they can conmand 
and to reduce the number of hours in which wages are earned. A further 
object is to bring about a store equal division of work astongst the members 
of the trade and its distribution among a greater number of worksten than 
would prevail under the influence of unrestrained competition; and this 
object is sought by attesipting to establish a uniform minimum rate of 
wages"(1869, p. XIV). A range of different objectives in the constitu­
tions of different unions are quoted by the Webbs (1898, p. 145-8).
2.33
Trades unionism was certainly a corollary, if not a pre-condition 
for the development of collective bargaining, through which the aspira­
tions of unionists were expressed if rarely achieved. According to Hobsbawm, 
at least amongst groups of skilled workers, the period after 1850 marked 
a change in these aspirations as workers gradually shook off the standards 
of custom and tradition as guides to wage setting and began to learn the 
"rules of the capitalist’s game" and, from the 1890s, they "began to 
charge what the traffic would bear and, where they ha- . any choice, to 
measure effort by payment" (1964, p. 345^. Prior to this "employers
almost certainly got their skilled labour in the nineteenth century at
2less than market cost" (1964, p. 348) and the growth of unionism in 
skilled trades was both the expression of this change in attitude and 
the means through which it was made effective (Pollard, 1965, p. 111). 
Williamson's evidence for the decline in the economy-wide differential 
cast doubt on the quantitative importance of these changes (1982, p. 16) 
though it might be argued that after 1870 with more widespread access 
to education and technical change, this movement should be regarded as 
attempting to defend craft distinctions and wage hierarchies which were 
increasingly under pressure.
Given that there is virtually no long term trend in the share of 
wage payments in national income, it is difficult to discern any gains 
which trade union policies may have secured in aggregate though it is
Clegg et al. describe the inference that workers systematically 
restricted productivity as "unbelievable" (1964, p. 474).
2
It might be supposed that, if this were the case, there would be chonic 
excess demand for labour but Hobsbawm's argument is more subtle. He 
suggests that the cheapness of labour caused employers to use it 
inefficiently and that when, in the later decades of the century, competi­
tion forced them towards more intensive utilisation, workers resisted such 
changes unless compensating wage increases were made.
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possible that with absence of unions labour's share would have fallen 
(Pollard, 1965, p. 112). But this does not mean that important gains 
were not made; the wage rises such as those achieved by agricultural 
workers in 1872-4, the dockers and miners in 1889-90 and the successes 
of the nine hours and eight hours movements may not be reflected in ag­
gregate data (Hunt, 1981, pp.289-98). Clegg et al. (1964, p. 337) 
suggested that unions' strength did prevent wage reductions after the 
turn of the century but concluded that in periods of boom "it would 
seem likely that economic conditions created the opportunity for the wage 
increase which, in turn, gave trade union organisation its chance" (1964, 
p. 483).
It is possible that the impact of unionism was to change the wage 
distribution without necessarily affecting total labour income. However, 
as has been noted, differentials between different grades of labour within 
industries were notoriously stable and even in the era of new unionism, 
when this might have been expected to narrow, the changes were only 
marginal and temporary (Pollard, 1965, p. 103). But this may not be an 
an appropriate test since unionism was strengthened in all groups and, 
at least among different grades of skilled labour, it is possible that 
differentials which might have changed in the absence of unions were 
maintained in the interests of union solidarity (Rowe, 1928, p. 110).
Sunaning up his survey of the available material, Pollard suggested 
that such gains in wages which might be schisved by an independent thrust 
would only have been transient unless they were broadly consistent with 
that which in the longer term the market might dictate^. "Unions of longer
* Some wage gains were held, such as those made by agricultural workers 
in the early 1870s but Hunt argued that "By 1879 wage levels were probably 
not much different than they would have been without the N.A.L.U."
(1981, p. 257).
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standing among skilled workers, especially where these occupied 
approximately their place within the scale of skill and wages, were 
least able to take any initiative other than to follow, more or less 
faithfully the state of the market. The widespread popularity of sliding 
scales reflects this basic aim faithfully ... where the market itself 
changed rapidly or violently, the 'market component' of the wage deter­
minant was much greater than any possible 'organisational component' 
and the unions themselves frequently appear as little more than play­
things of the market situation." (1965, p. 111).
Thus where these issues have been raised by labour historians, there 
is a strong impression that unions did not have power enough to raise 
wages progressively away from equilibrium levels. But, within those 
limits, the actual size and timing of wage adjustments owed a great 
deal more to the initiatives of trade unions and to the operation of the 
mechanisms of collective bargaining. It is to the latter we now turn.
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2.5 The Development and Impact of Collective Bargaining
The term "collective bargaining" has been subject to a wide range of 
different interpretations. Some writers have viewed it relatively narrowly 
as describing formalised or institutional procedures for the agreement 
of wages and conditions (Webbs, 1898 , Ch. 11) and sometimes only where
such agreements extended beyond the local district (Rowe, 1928, p. 137). 
This is likely to lead to a restricted impression of the diffusion of 
collective bargaining which, before 1914, was conducted at a variety of 
different levels and different degrees of formality. The key feature 
is that agreement or disagreement was by workers' representatives! 
bargaining on behalf of a larger group with employers or their representa­
tives.
This is usually thought to have begun on a significant scale in the 
late 1860s and early 1870s with the rise in popularity of formal procedures 
of concLl L ation and arbitration. The first attempts at such agreements 
among silk weavers, shipwrights and printers date back to the 1850s (Hicks, 
1930, p. 26-7). The Bolton spinning list of 1853 is said to have been 
the first jointly negotiated agreement and this was followed by other 
relatively formal agreements. But one should not overestimate the number, 
durability or uniformity of these in setting wage rates (Chapman, 1899, 
p. 594). At least among the craft industries where unionism was well 
established, such as building, engineering, shipbuilding and printing, 
such agreements, whether ing>licit or explicit ware widely recognised and 
were not without influence in adjoining and less developed areas.
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The growth in number and influence of these agreements is the major 
feature in the development of industrial relations before 1914*. In the 
early years, agreements were few and this led to periodic disturbances 
in some trades, particularly hosiery. According to Hicks, "the main 
difficulty seems to have been that, as a largely exporting industry, demand 
for its products was very variable. Wages formed a large proportion of 
costs and, in consequence, the temptation to make wages bear the burden 
of fluctuations was irresistable" (1930, p. 28). The lead taken in this 
industry in forming a local Board of Conciliation and Arbitration was 
followed by others such as the building trades, potteries and iron 
industry.
The success or failure of these boards depends upon the criteria upon 
which they are judged. The life of each board was, on average, very 
short and disputes often followed the repudiation by one side or the other 
of the agreement (Porter, 1970, p. 467). But the essential process of 
negotiation and collective bargaining, once established, often continued 
even in the absence of formal arrangements (Sharpe 1950, p. 5). Wage 
setting was only one of the issues dealt with by the boards though it was 
often the most important and the criterion most frequently referred to 
in negotiations was the current state of the trade. (Porter, 1970, p.463)
In those industries with relatively homogenous products, the best available
* By-the first decade of the century, according to the Webbs, "whole 
sections of the wage earning class, not included in any Trade Union, 
habitually have their rate of wages and often other conditions of their 
employment settled by Collective Bargaining". They expressed the view 
that, as a result of this, as many aa 90Z of skilled factory workers had 
their wages or their hours of work determined by a collective bargain.
(Webba, 1898, p. 177-8). The influence -of these bargains often extended 
to other grades of labour ao that, although unskilled workers were not 
directly covered, their wage rates would ususally be adjusted to maintain the 
skill differential. (Rowe, 1928, p. 154).
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index of prosperity, as a whole, was the price of key products. "It was 
a short step from this to save argument by agreeing to a scale by which 
wages should change with prices" (Hicks, 1930, p. 37). As previously 
noted, the industries in which there was most urgent need for a means 
of adjusting wages relatively frequently were those which were most 
subject to severe cyclical fluctuations. Thus sliding scale arrangements 
were predominantly found in the iron and steel industry, mining and the 
building trades (Sharpe, pp. 16-17, 58-59; Porter, 1971)1 In iron and 
coal the regions in which sliding scales had long if chequered careers 
were the areas most heavily engaged in exporting (Clegg et al. 1964, p.102) 
In industries such as engineering and textiles, sliding scales were not 
used largely because no single price could adequately represent the for­
tunes of the industry. Yet in many cases the alternative machinery 
produced rather similar results. In engineering, for example, "cyclical 
fluctuations provided the context for numerous local struggles, yet these 
were played out according to mutually acceptable ground rules like the 
'state of trade' and 'what the industry could afford'" (Burgess, 1975, 
p. 4) Where the awards of arbitration were followed, these also showed 
a close correspondence with the index of industrial activity (Porter,
1970, p. 465).
Though these arrangements are often interpreted as implying 
passiveness of unions on wage negotiation, they were important for other 
reasons. The establishment of formal boards were often the first step
^Sliding scales typically indexed wages to prices such that wages were 
inelastic with respect to prices. Thus, for example, under the sliding 
scale for blastfurnacemen in the Cleveland district in 1910 at the standard 
wage the wage rate was related to the price of No. 3 Cleveland pig iron 
with an elasticity of 0.51. (Calculated from Board of Trade Report on 
Collective Agreements, 1910, p. 84).
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in gaining union recognition by employers. According to the Webbs, 
formalised agreements allowed the enforcement of a standard rate over 
the area which both sides found to their benefit. For employers it re­
duced the risk of being undercut by low wage competitors while, for 
workers, it reduced the risk of being undersold by others in the same 
labour market. (Webbs, 1898, p.286-7) Despite the fact that unionists 
were often a minority of workers in the area covered by an agreement, it 
would typically apply to unionists and non unionists alike. In addition) 
although it was usually second in importance to selling prices, the com­
parison between one area or district and another frequently played an 
important part in wage setting (Porter, 1970, pp. 462, 464)
These agreements continued as the most prominent mode of collective 
bargaining arrangement throughout the 1870s and 1880s despite the fact 
that this was an era when prices fell almost continuously. Some writers 
have argued that this reflected the weakness of unionism and steamed its 
expansion but, as Lovell has observed, in the absence of such agreements, 
union membership might have declined even more than it did (Lovell, 1977, 
p. 14). In addition the gearing of the sliding scale, giving smaller 
proportionate changes in wages than in prices or, as in the case of the 
South Wales miners, the minimum set3may have given workers a temporary 
advantage (Morris and Williams, 1960, p. 173). This was enhanced by the 
tendency of foodstuffs to fall in price faster than manufactures.
In the 1890s in the wake of new unionism, sliding scales were 
increasingly repudiated especially in the mines where the notion of a 
fixed minimum wage became influential (Sharpe, 1950, pp. 16-20). But 
the framework of conciliation remained important and was often substituted 
for sliding scales. (Sharpe, 1950, p. 20). The Royal Commission on
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Labour, reporting in 1894, gave strong support to collective bargaining 
and suggested that it was most effective when both workers and employers 
were highly organised. Though the conciliation act which following in 
1896 had little direct effect, it reflected the extent to which conciliation 
was regarded as the means of avoiding disputes. (Felling, 1976, p.122).
In the following decades, commensurate with the growth of both 
unionism and employers'associations, formal collective bargaining was 
extended into industries and areas hitherto little affected. The number 
of conciliation boards expanded from 64 in 1894 to 162 in 1905 and 325 
by 1913 (Felling, 1976, p. 143). The scope of the issues within their 
compass increased while, at the same time, the coverage of individual 
agreements grew in size as bargaining units expanded in size and 
cohesiveness. "Whereas in 1890 few joint negotiating boards covered 
employment beyond a city and its environs, by 1914, numerous trades 
negotiated on a county or regional basis and some boards covered an entire 
industry" (Hunt, 1981, p. 327). A Board of Trade Report of 1910 detailed 
all the known collective agreements in existence at that time which 
amounted to 1696 covering an estimated 2.4 million workers*'.
But even by 1914, the national agreements in existence were largely 
procedural in nature and set out the framework for bargaining at district 
or country level, providing a centralised appeals procedure. In this
* Only 30 of these were sliding scales, 563 were piece lists and 1103 
working agreements of various kinds. In the introduction, it was noted 
that "there are a large number of workpeople whose wages, hours of labour 
and other industrial conditions are, in effect, governed by the Collective 
Agreements in force for the time being in the trades concerned. For 
this reason the total number of work people either directly or indirectly 
affected by the 1696 agreements referred to is very materially in excess 
of 2,400,000 (Board of Trade, Report on Collective Agreements. 1910, 
p. iii)
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respect the Brooklands agreement in cotton spinning provides an important 
landmark and, by 1910, such agreements covered textiles, engineering, 
shipbuilding, printing, iron and steel and footwear, traditionally the 
industries at the forefront of collective bargaining. In some cases they 
also embraced substantive issues such as conditions of work but rarely 
wages and in cases where this was achieved, such as in mining, a national 
agreement was reached which was subject to substantial variation at dis­
trict level (Clegg et al. 466-475). As part of this trend the comparative 
principle in wage setting grew in importance. According to Hunt, compared 
with earlier years where regional wage differentials were more passively 
accepted, these tended to be eroded after 1890 (1973, pp. 334, 347).
It is difficult to judge the impact of these developments on the 
short run wage flexibility and adjustment of the economy as a whole.
The very fact of the effort invested in developing collective bargaining 
and the importance with which it was held suggests that, under such 
arrangements, the outcome would be somewhat different from that which 
would have obtained in their absence. It was clearly an objective of 
unions to reduce wage variation though it is not obvious that this was 
achieved to any great extent (Sharpe, 1950, p. 59). It is not clear that 
this would raise the average of wages over time and it seems highly 
unlikely that this was the case and to the extent that wages were less 
flexible, it is possible that employment varied more than otherwise.
Even so, there are several reasons why this might have been preferred.
The potential costs of regular re-negotiation of agreements could be 
large especially if, due to uncertainty on both sides, there might be a 
range of possible solutions to any negotiation. The use of sliding 
scales and the reliance of arbitration also supports this view. Failure
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to reach an acceptable settlement often undermined union solidarity 
especially where unions only had a partial hold. According to the Webbst 
the functions developed by unions can be seen precisely in this context. 
Friendly society benefits for sickness and unemployment prevented 
unemployed members from undercutting their colleagues and gave workers 
greater motive for loyality to the union. Xn turn this allowed the unions 
greater power to defend the standard rate. (1898, Part' IX, Ch. 10). This, 
however, does not go far towards answering Hunt’s question about the impact 
of unions on the welfare of workers and we turn to discussing this issue 
in a wider context.
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2.6 Work and Welfare
The growth in real income reflected in the rise in real wages 
between 1855 and 1913 represents a substantial advance in welfare derived 
from work. The expansion of higher wage occupations relative to others 
was an important part of this improvement and underlines the fact that, 
while most generations experienced a rise in living standards, this 
would not necessarily apply to each individual or each group. There are 
also a variety of non wage factors affecting welfare, such as changes 
in the arduousness of work which, according to some writers, was 
intensified especially in the 1880s. Though the continued spread of 
mechanisation lightened the physical burden of many jobs, it would not 
necessarily increase individual welfare where machines controlled the 
pace of work previously done by hand and especially where existing skills 
were made obsolete and employment prospects threatened. Even though the 
incidence of death or injury from industrial accidents cannot be inter-
I
preted as a measure of the intensity of work effort as Hobsbawm (1964, 
p. 138) was willing to do for railways, it still reflects one aspect of 
the disbenefits from work. Between 1888 and 1904, the number of fatal 
accidents enumerated in factories and workshops doubled while non fatal 
accidents quadrupled. But this probably reflects increasing mechanisation 
and increasing enumeration since, among miners and railwaymen, the 
fatality rate fell.
The growth of collective action and waves of strikes which might 
be regarded as reflecting increasing disaffection are more likely to 
represent increases in the willingness and ability to express grievances 
rather than increases in the number of grievances or the intensity with 
which they were held. Though the affect on wages is not clear, unrest
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was often accompanied by gains in the form of reductions in working 
hours. These changes were also closely associated with phases in the 
development of Trade unionism and industrial relations. But they were 
also partly a result of government intervention in the extension of 
factory legislation which limited the working hours of juveniles and, 
in the case of railwaymen and miners, of adults (Hunt, 1981, p. 79). 
However,changes by voluntary agreement took place in many organised 
sectors and were soon extended to other industries and areas. These were 
largely a result of the widespread desire of workers for shorter hours 
(Beinefeld. 1973, pp. 82-3, 224). The shortening of normal hours worked 
and, in some industries, the establishment of a standard week between 
1850 and 1890 encouraged the spread of hourly rates of payment and the 
establishment of overtime premia and, in consequence, actual hours 
worked fell by less than normal hours*1. However, in engineering, 
there is evidence that the average number of overtime hours worked was 
not large enough to compensate for hours lost due to unemployment and 
sickness (Board of Trade, 1904, p. 100).
That workers' demand for leisure increased can be seen from the 
growth of participation in sporting activities directly connected with 
the Saturday half day, the rise of various entertainments such as music 
halls and the growth of coastal resorts which could be reached by rail 
even though holidays with pay were exceptional. Although working class 
expenditure became more diverse, the average proportion spent on the 
necessities of life remained high. A survey of 1944 workmen's budgets
* Given that movements for shorter hours were often associated with efforts 
on the part of trade unions to restrict labour supply and force wage 
increases, they cannot be viewed entirely as the expression of an income 
effect of higher wages or , alternatively, as a substitution effect of 
increasing disutility from work.
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conducted by the Board of Trade in the early 1900s, showed that, out 
of an average family income of 36s.10d., expenditure on food accounted 
for 22s. 6d. (61Z) and the bulk of the remainder went to fuel, rent 
and clothing. At the highest end of the scale, those with a weekly 
income of more than 40s., spent 57Z on food while, at the other end, 
those with less than 25s., spent 67.5Z of income on food. (Board of 
Trade, 1904, p. 9). The average income level in this lowest group was 
below the 21s. 8d determined by Rowntree as the minimum necessary with 
judicious purchases for a family of five to maintain physical efficiency 
(Rowntree, 1902, Ch. 5)1. The studies of Booth and Rowntree revealed 
that approximately 30Z of the populations of London and York were either 
in "primary poverty" with income below this minimum line or spent their 
incomes in a way which put them below the poverty line.
Booth and Rowntree also drew attention to the causes of poverty. 
Individuals often moved into and out of poverty as family circumstances 
changed and young children, sickness, widowhood and old age either 
increased need or diminished earning power. The causes directly connected 
with the labour market: were low wages and irregular employment and 
Rowntree found that 55Z of poverty in York was due to the former. As 
the earlier discussion of wage differentials showed, these would 
typically have been the families of the unskilled and labourers, rather 
than the higher paid skilled and semi-skilled workers. Frequently a 
family could only remain out of poverty by supplementing the earnings 
of the main breadwinner and Bowley found that in 1911 some 60Z of working
1 In the sample from the 1911 census analysed by Bowley, the average 
working class family consisted of 1.9 persons occupied and 2.3 persons 
dependent (1921, p. 103).
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class household incomes were made up in this way (1921, p. 106). In 
London, where wages were higher, about half of those in poverty were there 
because of unstable or irregular employment which was commonly associated 
with the casual labour market where unskilled and undifferentiated 
workers were hired by the day or for even shorter periods. The most 
notorious example was in the London docks which was studied in detail 
both by Booth and Beveridge but the essential features of casualisation 
extended to a range of occupations especially in building and transport 
(Stedman Jones, 1971).
This is not to say that workers in more regular and better paid 
occupations were not at risk. Booth found that "while many men in almost 
every trade, work with practically no loss of earnings and some do even 
in the most irregular and uncertain employments, others are habitual 
half-timers". (Booth, 1902, vol. V, p. 280). This observation was 
supported both by Beveridge and, in their survey of the unemployed in 
York for 1910, by Rowntree and Laskar, who found that about half the 
genuinely unemployed were not handicapped for employment by physical, 
mental or moral defects. But, like Booth, they added that this "does 
not imply that they were on the same level with the best sections of 
employed workers, for when demand for labour shrinks, the less efficient 
men are generally the first to be dismissed, ... But our figures show 
very clearly that it is quite a mistake to regard the unemployment 
problem as primarily one of the character and efficiency of workers." 
(1911, pp. 304-5).
Some workers who found themselves continually on the margin of a 
trade would drop down to lower occupations - from skilled or semi-skilled 
to labourers or from regular to casual employment# Booth viewed this
r
2 .47
process with alarm and sought means of avoiding the inevitable 
deterioration that this brought with it. Like him, Rowntree and Laskar 
found that once having become casuals "almost of the men in this class 
are undergoing a more or less rapid process of deterioration" (1911, 
p. 135) and Beveridge referring to conditions on the Docks, concluded 
that"casuals by necessity are always on the way to become casuals by 
inclination" (1930, p.142) . A substantial proportion of those working 
on the West India Docks in the 1880s had previously been in occupations 
like artisans and mechanics, soldiers, sailors and ordinary labourers.
At times of general recession, unemployment would appear in most trades 
but in urban areas such as London, workers unseated in their normal 
occupation, would seek a casual or labouring job, throwing the burden 
of unemployment on the less efficient in the lower groups (Stedman 
Jones, 197X, pp. 74-5). Analysing workers who had once been in regular 
employment among their sample from York, Rowntree and Laskar concluded 
that many had become casuals "simply because when dismissed they had 
no financial reserve to enable them to hold out until a fresh post was 
found" (1911, p. 28).
The ultimate resource for those forced out of even the most low 
paid and irregular employment was the Poor Law. But, despite the large 
numbers living in poverty, only a small proportion appeared at any one 
time among those being given relief. This stood at 4.8Z of the popula­
tion of England and Wales in 1855 and by 1914 had declined to only 2Z.
A largerproportion than this would, at some time, have sought relief 
from the Boards of Guardians but a larger proportion than the 30Z 
of Booth and Rowntree would have faced poverty at various times in their 
lives (Rose, 1972, p. 14). This largely reflects the stringent conditions 
under which poor relief was dispensed and the principle of less eligi-
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bility which reinforced the stigma attached to applicants for relief.
This and the discouragement to outdoor relief for the able bodied poor, 
ensured that a preponderance of those involved were relieved on account 
of age, infirmity or widowhood. The deep dread of the Poor Law compelled 
those who were not too incapacitated, even vagrants, to shun it even 
though they may have faced worse conditions outside the workhouse (Rose, 
1 9 7 2 ,  p p .  1 9 ,  1 7 ) .
Nevertheless there is evidence that the numbers on relief fluctuated 
with economic conditions as revealed in the comparison of the average 
proportion of population on relief with the trade union unemployment 
series in Figure 2.6 . The series of indoor relief in England and 
Wales is used because indoor relief was more prevalent in industrial 
and urban areas because the workhouse, rather than outdoor relief, was 
usually applied to the unemployed as opposed to those among the sick, 
elderly or incapacitated, who could maintain a degree of independence.
The relationship exhibited by the two series is quite close 
except during the 1880s and during the time of the Royal Commission 
in the Poor Laws. From 1870 onwards, there is also some evidence of 
a lag of the poor relief series behind the unemployment series of one 
to two years1.
This relationship, however, should not be taken as a measure of 
the direct effects of unionists being driven into the workhouse but, 
rather, as some confirmation that the trade union series largely 
reflects conditions in all sections of the labour market. For the
1 Easton estimated equations with the number on indoor relief per thousand 
of the population as a function of a string of variables including the 
unemployment rate. Unemployment was highly significant though it did 
not account for a very large proportion of the total variation in numbers 
relieved (1978, p. 46).
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industrial worker normally in regular employment, the Poor Law was 
viewed with abhorrence and he would have suffered considerable privation 
to avoid being tainted by poor relief. Even the high paid artisan thrown 
out of employment would have, at times, to rely on the assistance of 
relatives, credit from local shops or the pawn broker but would rarely, 
if ever, turn to poor relief. Only under exceptional circumstances, 
such as during the Lancashire cotton famine or in the Coventry silk trade 
during the 1860s, would skilled workers be forced into the arms of the 
Poor Law (Hunt, 1981, p. 121; Rose, 1972, p. 7; Harris, 1972, p. 148).
For workers in some trades unions, there was a degree of insurance 
against unemployment and benefits in the event of death, injury or 
superannuation. These friendly society functions became dominant under 
the so-called new model unions but some societies offered no benefits 
at all. Others offered only small allowances for tramp relief to support 
unemployed members as they moved from tovn to town searching for work 
but, like the Provincial Typographic Association, many unions expanded 
this to provide payments without the obligation to travel (Musson, 1954,
P« 275-7). It was frequently recognised that such payments could 
provide a disincentive for some members to seek work and both the rate 
of benefit and duration for which it would be paid depended on the length 
of membership. (Board of Trade Report on Trade Onions. 1912, p. xxxv).
They were also framed to disallow workers unemployed through their own fault 
and those not willing to take any vacancy offered. However, the Webbs 
argued that such benefits were an important tool of trade unionism 
because they supported workers who might otherwise have been forced to 
work below the standard rate, weakening union efforts to avoid a general 
reduction in wages (Webbs, 1898, pp. 161-2). This suggests that, for 
one reason or another, unions might have maintained a larger proportion 
of their members unemployed where out of work benefits were offered.
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The potential effects of such benefit provisions are examined in more 
detail in Chapter 3 where attempts to measure such effects directly are 
made.
The provision of friendly society benefits cannot be seen purely 
as part of a narrow trade union strategy but as part of a more widespread 
movement. Unions often provided schemes for sickness and accident 
and superannuation benefits which, in an average year accounted for as 
much as half of total expenditure . The growth of such schemes in trade 
unions is parallel with the much wider phenomenon of the development 
of self help institutions. Societies such as the Oddfellows and 
Forresters which emerged in mid-century, provided a variety of benefits 
though they were predomimantly for sickness, accident, death and 
superannuation. These overlapped with trade anions to some extent, 
and sometimes offered benefits such as tramping allowances, though 
out of work benefits were rare . Their membership was drawn dispropor­
tionately from among skilled workers and artisans (Gosden, 1973, 
pp. 60, 46) but it extended much further than that of trade unions.
By 1872 it exceeded 1.8 million and the Royal Conmission on Friendly 
Societies estimated that 8 million persons had interests in them as 
beneficiaries (Gosden, 1973, p. 74). There were also parallels in 
the development of the co-operative movement from the 1840s and in 
building societies from the 1830s (Pollard, 1960, p. 109). It has been 
argued that this development was strongly influenced by the desire among 
the artisans of the labour aristocracy for respectability as a measure 
of status which was derived from the independence of credit and charity 
which was afforded (Grossick, 1976, p. 307). Uhile this may explain 
the exclusiveness and ceremonial nature of many societies, it does not 
account for the wider movement. Many societies were not self managed
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by Che members and merely collected subscriptions to provide 
insurance against particular contingencies (Gosden, 1973, p. 120).
While skilled workers were generally better protected, this largely 
reflects their higher incomes which made subscriptions more easily 
affordable. Among all workers in the hierarchy of wages and skills, 
however, the growth of these institutions reflects the desire to provide 
security against industrial and personal contingencies and protect 
their status in the social hierarchy. Nowhere is this more evident than 
in the growth of small savings where many accounts were held by groups 
such as common labourers, agricultural labourers and women and children 
who did not have access to friendly societies (Gosden, 1973, pp. 228-30)* 
These were people for whom regular payments might be difficult but who 
were anxious to protect themselves against the vagaries and uncertainties 
of life and desired to avoid the stigma associated with becoming charges 
on organised charity or the poor law.
By the early 1890s the post office savings bank alone had nearly six 
million deposits with average balances of nearly £15 in addition to which 
there were a range of Trustees savings banks and those specialising in 
small deposits such as the Yorkshire Penny Bank.
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2.7 Equilibrium in the Labour Market
In the next chapter we examine a model of equilibrium unemployment 
and apply it to the series for trade union unemployment before 1913.
Before proceeding with this, some justification of the approach is 
required. It is worth while, therefore, briefly summarising some of the 
main features of the labour market which have emerged in this chapter 
and which suggest that the equilibrium approach is appropriate for the 
pre 1914 period.
The period is characterised by regular cycles in trade union
unemployment and in activity as a whole which can be associated with 
various forces at work in the macroeconomy, both monetary and non-monetary 
but, above all,with variations in exports imposed by the openness of the 
British economy. However, periods of very high and very low unemployment 
were brief, lasting a few years at the most, and the economy fluctuated 
about a roughly constant average level of some 4.5Z with no long run 
trend. This constancy over a long period suggests that there were strong 
equilibrating forces at work in the labour market.
In examining variations in average wage rates, it was found that there 
were regular fluctiona, both upwards and downwards, following broadly the 
cyclical pattern on a gradually rising trend. Though wage differentials 
between grades of labour in an industry often remain fixed or atable, 
wage differences between industries varied over the cycle. Those industries 
which accounted for most of the wage variations were also those in which 
the level of activity and, hence, unemployment varied most. Hence 
unemployment variations were associated with wage flexibility rather than 
with wage rigidity. In some industries most exposed to variations in 
demand, wage flexibility was built in to the collective bargaining 
arrangements which developed during the period.
Though the period saw the growth of trade unionism, from narrow 
craft origins to organising an increasingly large and significant section 
of the workforce, there is little evidence that unions exerted a systematic 
independent influence on the wage bargain. Union policies were constrained 
by strong economic forces beyond their control and unions themselves were 
in the grip of the cycle which determined the ebb and flow of both member­
ship and militant activity. Though militancy sometimes brought rewards, 
the most important function of unions in protecting the welfare of workers 
was in providing sickness and out-of-work benefits to help their members 
avoid the demoralisation of the poor law. There is also evidence that 
where such benefits were not provided or in addition to those that were, 
workers and their families sought protection through other clubs and 
societies and, despite their poverty, through accumulating small savings.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LABOUR MARKET AND UNEMPLOYMENT 1855-1913: AN EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 
3.1 Equilibrium Unemployment and the Phillips Curve
In the light of the findings in the previous chapter, it seems 
appropriate to use a model to describe fluctuations in trade union 
unemployment which assumes that, at least to a first approximation, 
labour market clearing prevails at each point of observation. Unexpected 
variations in demand cause changes in prices and wages which are not 
immediately perceived.or absorbed into expectations of the future. This 
causes the supply curve of labour to shift around its long run level which 
yields the "natural" rate of unemployment. The insights upon which this 
approach is based arise essentially from reconsidering the analysis first 
put forward by Phillips (1958). But in the^approach, wage: and price 
changes are viewed as determinants of variations in the unemployment 
rate rather than the other way round. The literature concerning this 
relation for the British economy before 1913 is discussed further below.
In a more general context, the original Phillips curve approach 
and the developments from it are reviewed at length by Santomero and 
Seater (1978) who critically distinguish between various versions. The 
modern analysis starts with a reconsideration of the microeconomic 
foundations of labour supply decisions when information is incomplete or 
costly to acquire. The reinterpretation derives from the seminal volume 
edited by Phelps (1970) in which a number of alternative models were 
presented, some of which were more "Keynesian" than others but which 
all produced a long run equilibrium level of unemployment. The essence 
of two of the more neoclassical models which have passed into general 
use can be discussed in turn.
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The first was originated by Lucas and Rapping (1969) and is based 
on intertemporal variations in individual labour supply. The individual 
is assumed to attempt to maximise his multi-period utility such that, 
in any period, labour supply depends on current and future expected values 
of the real wage and real assets. Thus there are both intertemporal 
substitution and income effects and, if the former dominates, then 
the effect of a current real wage which is lower than that which is 
expected to prevail in the future, is to lower current relative to future 
labour supply. Thus, although labour supply may be inelastic with 
respect to the "permanent" real wage, it is more elastic with respect to 
transitory variations in the real wage. Only the future is unknown and 
perfect information about the present is consistent with the labour 
market being regarded as in short run equilibrium at each point in time.
This can be illustrated in Figure 3.1 for variations in the wage, W. 
The supply schedule is drawn as an upward sloping function of the devia­
tion of the wage from its permanent or expected value W - W C « If W is 
equal to W e, then employment is at and, assuming for convenience that 
the labour force is fixed at L, unemployment is at its natural level U*.
If the wage is higher than anticipated as at (W - W e)2 demand has 
apparently risen from to D2 which yields the new employment level E2 
and unemployment L - E2 which is below the natural level.
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However, the real demand curve, determined by the marginal produc­
tivity condition need not have shifted if it is which changes. With 
just W on the vertical axis, as in the lower panel of Figure 3.1., the 
change in employment appears as a downward supply shift from to Sj.
This reduces the current wage from W^ to W^ and, hence, implicitly 
(W^ - W®) - (W^ - Wj). If labour supply is invariant to change in the 
"permanent" wage, then the vertical effective supply curve of labour 
can be drawn as S*.
The alternative approach derives originally from papers by Stigler 
(1961, 1962) and was subsequently developed by McCall (1970),
Mortenson (1970) and others. This stresses the dispersion of wages or 
prices in spot markets and the imperfect information available to the 
representative worker on individual prices. Workers hold expectations 
on the mean and variance of the relevant price distribution on the basis 
of which, together with some fixed search cost, a reservation wage is formed 
which determines optimal search strategy^. The unemployed worker 
sequentially searches wage offers rejecting those below the reservation 
wage and accepting the first one sampled which is above it. If the 
position of the wage distribution is misperceived owing to an unexpected 
shift in the mean of the distribution, then the probability of receiving 
an offer above the reservation wage will be different from that anticipated. 
Hence the length of search and therefore the duration of unemployment 
will, on average, be different from expected and hence, the unemployment 
rate will vary around the level that correct anticipations would yield.
This may apply to variations in wages and/or prices if workers are 1
1 The reservation wage is set at the level which equates the marginal 
expected gain-and the marginal cost of search . It is obtained as the 
solution to the following equation
C mf~ (W-A)fWdW where C is the cost of search, W is the 
wage, fW the wage distribution and A the reservation wage
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concerned with their real wage and to the extent that the time 
distributions are not learned of immediately.
Both these approaches are augmented with expectations generating 
mechanisms such that workers revise their estimates of expected current 
and/or future wage rates in the light of past experience. Thus, once 
any trend becomes fully anticipated, unemployment reverts to the 
natural rate even though prices and wages may continue to rise or fall - 
only when they are accelerating or decelerating does unemployment diverge 
from the natural rate. This yields the result that, in the long run, 
there is no trade off between unemployment and inflation.
Both approaches may have relevance to the ninteenth century labour 
market. Market clearing may be an appropriate approximation to the operation 
of the labour market when institutional rigidities were relatively weak.
Lucas and Rappingb model would, perhaps, be more appropriate to casual 
and unskilled labour markets in which there were frequently large seasonal 
and cyclical variations in participation. The search model seems a rather 
more attractive characterisation of skilled labour markets and therefore 
of unemployment amongst unionists. ‘ Hobsbawm has described
how workers in craft societies frequently tramped from town to town in 
search of work, subsisting on the hospitality of local branches or on 
tramp allowances! In the 1860s and 70s especially in depression years, 
tramp cards issued amounted to as much as 30Z of membership for some 
societies but the practice underwent steady decline as unions turned 
increasingly to out-of-work benefits for the static unemployed (1964, pp.
43 - 51). Since search unemployment is essentially frictional, it is often 
thought to imply relatively short average unemployment durations. On the 
basis of a wide range of evidence, Beveridge in his early work on unemploy-
ment stressed the importance of labour market frictions, arguing that 
"There are specific imperfections of adjustment which are the economic 
causes of unemployment"(1930, p. 5). It was this which led him to become, 
in the years before 1914, one of the foremost exponents of the institu­
tion of labour exchanges which would increase the flow of information 
and reduce unproductive job search. (Harris, 1972, p. 285). Under 
unchanged conditions this might have been expected to lower the natural 
rate of unemployment, increase aggregate welfare and reduce poverty. (The 
case is argued in Beveridge, 1930, Ch. 9).
As has been indicated, theories of search or intertemporal 
substitution lead to a relationship which, in the short run, is closely 
analogous to the famous Phillips curve. As is well known, Phillips 
(1958) estimated this relation on data for the U.K. over the period 1861- 
1957. What is not so frequently remembered is that Phillips only fitted 
his curve to the observations from 1861 to 1913 and then simply imposed 
it on the remaining observations. The relation between unemployment and 
wage change is, however, much weaker in subsequent periods and, as will 
be shown in the discussion of the following chapter, it virtually 
disappears in the interwar period alone. In the first paragraph of his 
paper, Phillips argued that the relationship was that wage adjustments 
were caused by disequilibrium in the labour market as reflected by the 
level of unemployment (1958, p. 283). This approach was maintained in 
much of the subsequent work on the Phillips curve and has been followed 
in all the subsequent work on the pre 1914 period.
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In his original function, Phillips found that the relationship was 
highly non linear and that, for wage rates to be stable, the unemployment 
rate would have to remain at about 5.5X but, with productivity growing at 
2 per cent, a rate of unemployment of just over 2 per cent would be consistent 
with price stability (1958, p. 299). He noticed that the observations 
fell in anti-clockwise loops around the curve and that these appeared to 
narrow over time, The loops themselves were attributed to vigorous 
bidding up of wages by employers when unemployment was falling and the 
reverse in the recession as future labour market conditions were anticipated.
He suggested that the narrowing of the loops was due, in part, to the declining 
weight of the sliding scale industries in the unemployment index and the 
growth of arbitration and conciliation which introduced a lag in the response 
of wages to unemployment.
The narrowing loops hypothesis was subsequently rejected by Routh 
(1959) on the grounds that the metal using industries did not have a 
declining weight in the unemployment index and also by Lipsey (1960, p. 7) 
on the grounds that, as measured by the coefficient on the rate of change 
of unemployment which took a negative sign when entered in the equation, 
the loops did not narrow significantly. Routh's main concern was that the 
wage and unemployment indices had different and rather arbitrary weights 
but reducing the weight of the engineering, shipbuilding and metals 
industries in the unemployment index affected the results remarkably little 
though it tended to shift the curve downwards and reduce the sire of the 
loops. Both Routh and later, Gilbert redefined the independent variables 
to avoid the possible spurious autocorrelation introduced by Phillips1 use 
of first central differences but the rate of change of unemployment which 
accounts for the loops remains significant, though serial corelation is 
reduced (Routh, 1959, pp. 308-9, Gilbert, 1976, p. 54).
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Lipsey developed the hypothesis that, if the relationship was non­
linear in individual labour markets, the greater the dispersion of 
unemployment among these markets, the further the curve would be shifted 
outwards to the right. Hence, if dispersion was negatively correlated 
with the rate of change ofunemployment, this would give the appearance of 
anticlockwise loops in the aggregate relation and account for the 
negative coefficient on the rate of change variable in the equation. (1960, 
pp. 17-19). This hypothesis was rejected by Smythe who calculated a 
dispersion variable from the component series of the unemployment index 
and found these to be positively but not significantly correlated with the 
rate of change of aggregate unemployment (1979, p. 231). Thus the mystery 
of the loops remains although Desai (1975) has argued that the rate of 
change of unemployment is not an independent variable but is determined 
as part of a dynamic system by the level of unemployment and the rate 
of wage change^.
Phillips did not include a price term in his equation though he 
suggested that if import prices rose unusually sharply, this might be 
reflected in wage bargaining or the cost of living (1958, p. 284).
Lipsey included the rate of change of the cost of living index directly 
in the equation but this added little explanatory power to the equation, 
giving a coefficient of 0.21 (1960, p. 10). Other putative determinants
Desai suggested that Phillips' procedure in estimating the equation 
implies that he saw the relation as part of a system of differential 
equations. Grouping the observations by level of unemployment so that, 
on average, the rate of change of unemployment would be approximately zero, 
was,therefore, a means of abstracting from short run dynamics. Gilbert 
(1976) has argued that Phillips' method was just a relatively simple wsy 
of fitting a non linear function before it was possible to do this by 
computer.
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of money wage change for 1861 - 1913 have received little support from 
the data. Kaldor suggested that Phillips' results arose from a spurious 
correlation between unemployment and profits and that causality ran 
from high profit levels to high wage increases since high profit levels 
both increased the bargaining strength of labour and weakened it for 
employers (1959, p. 292). This was subsequently rejected by Lipsey and 
Steuer (1961) who could find no evidence of an independent effect for 
profits. As noted earlier, Hines (1964) found only weak support for 
trade union militancy as a determinant of wage change before 1914, as 
compared with later periods.
Though this enquiry is thought to have begun with the work of 
Phillips in 1958, attention has been drawn to the fact that it was raised 
as early as 1926 by Irving Fisher who found that for monthly U.S. data 
the volume of trade was highly correlated with a distributed lag of wholesale 
price changes from 1903 to 1925 and with a lower correlation on quarterly 
data from 1877 to 1899. Discussing the nature of the relationship, Fisher 
stated that "it seems reasonable to conclude that what the charts show 
is largely, if not mostly, a genuine causal relationship; that the ups and 
downs of employment are the effects, in large measure, of the rises and 
falls of prices, due in turn to inflation and deflation of money and 
credit" (1926, p. 792)1. In his book published a year later, Pigou 
examined the relationship put forward by Fisher for year to year changes 
in the Sauerbeck price index and the Trade Union unemployment series from 
1870 to 1913. Pigou did not find the lags adduced by Fisher but a more or 
less contemporaneous negative relationship between unemployment and the 
percentage increase in price over the previous year. He accepted this as 
"persuasive" evidence but denied that the relationship was truly a causal
1 Full details of the relationship, including the novel technique of using 
distributed lags, was given in an earlier paper (Fisher, 1925).
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one (1929, p. 217)^. Fisher's explanation for the relationship was 
that costs of production tended to rise and fall less rapidly than output 
prices leading to increased profits at times of inflation (1926, p. 498). 
Pigou's analysis, nevertheless followed along similar lines but he 
emphasised that the effect of actual price changes was to cause changes 
in expectations but this depended "on the circumstance that prices are not 
merely imperfectly but also unequally foreseen" (1929, p. 178). There 
is a striking resemblance, at least superficially, between the relations 
discussed by Fisher and Pigou and new classicial macroeconomic models 
in which unexpected price changes deriving from changes in the rate of 
monetary expansion, give rise to fluctuations in the level of economic 
activity (Sargent, 1976; Barro, 1976)
In characteristic style Pigou argued that "It is necessary, however, 
to bear in mind the distinction between causes and channels along which 
causes act. In modern mountaineering, there is an almost perfect 
correlation between the possession of an ice axe and the ascent of snow 
mountains; but this does not prove that, if the purchase of ice axes 
were prohibited by law, snow mountains would no longer be ascended. It 
does not prove that the existence of ice axes substantially increases 
the numbers of ascents that are made" (1929, p. 217).
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3.2 "Natural Rate" Models of Labour Supply
In Lucas and Rapping's framework, the household is assumed to maxi­
mise utility V according to the utility function
and N are expected future or normal values of these respectively. 
This is maximised subject to the budget constraint
where P and W are the price and wage level, A is initial assets and r the 
interest rate representing the rate at which current and future income 
can be exchanged. The normal or expected price and wage levels are 
conditioned on information up to and including time t such that 
e.g. W* • Et^Wt+l^*t^ w*lere i* the information set available at t 
which includes Assuming homogeneity of degree zero in each of the
arguments, this leads to a supply function for current labour of the 
form
Taking a logarithmic approximation normalised by the number of households 
or individuals, M gives
V - V(C, C* N, N*), Vlf V2 > 0, V3, V4 < 0 (3.1)
where C and N are current values of consumption and labour supply and C 
-*
PC + C* <_ A + WN + (3.2)
if - r &W W* , P* AsP* P(i+r)' 1* PTT+rT • P} (3.3)
(3.4)
where Sj, B2 B3 and B^ are expected to be positive
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Normal labour supply follows the same form but is only a function 
of normal or permanent variables. If actual values of changes in wages 
and prices were those anticipated for the future in the previous period 
such that » W*-l* t*len actual supply is at its normal level and 3.4
subtracting 3.5 from 3.4 gives an expression for the log of the ratio of 
actual to normal labour supply
where ~ B^ + 8^ - 8^ and thus if asset effects do not outweigh the 
intertemporal substitution effect in labour supply, 6^ will be negative.
Normal labour supply may be regarded as some fraction of the labour 
force which represents the natural rate of employment. Given continuous 
market clearing, actual labour supply is equal to employment, the 
equation can be written in terms of the employment rate
where 3' ia the log of the natural rate of employment. Alternatively, o
following Lucas and Rapping, the unemployment rate may be used in a
becomes
' 6o + B1 In(-P* > -  b 2 m <p|> ♦ e 3
(3.5)
p ^ i - )  ♦ ( b3 + e4) i n f . j j r - )
p
- ln(^)- ln(
t-1 t-1
(3.6)
or alternatively
N W P
(3.7)
W. P
(3.8)
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functional form where
m  ut - go ♦ gl l n ^ ) (3.9)
where g^ is the log of the natural rate of unemployment and is
To make the model operational in observed variables, Lucas and 
Rapping used adaptive expectations to form the generating mechanism for
where X is the adaptive parameter, 0 > X > 1, which is assumed to be 
the same for both prices and wages rates . Substituting this into 3.8 
and 3.9 respectively and applying tha Koyk transformation gives
aupply waa inverted and the absolute value of the unemployment rate waa 
usad to give the function
where g^ is now positive.
Lucas and Rapping also included a constant term which was intended to 
capture any fully anticipated secular change in wage rates and prices. 
Though this would potentially shift as trends became anticipated, no 
allowance was made for this in the subsequent analysis.
1 . .negative giving
(3.10)
W* and P*
(3.11)
in logs this gives
ln W* - Xln Wfc + (l-X)ln W*_x (3.12)
^ In Lucas and Rapping's case the ratio of actual to permanent labour
"t * «. * «1
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W P
In Ut - Xgo + g161 lni^j-E-) ♦ lni^-^-) + (1-X) In (3.14)
Since the labour market always clears in this approach the justifica­
tion given for variations in the unemployment rate as distinct from the 
absolute value of employment is that initially the worker cannot distin­
guish between a change in the wage rate specific to him or his local 
market and that in wage rates in general. He is therefore induced at least 
temporarily to engage in job search over different markets. This approach 
was developed more fully into an aggregate supply function by Lucas (1973, 
1976) and yields labour supply equations which are, at least, structurally 
different from 3.13 and 3.14 and which leads to a different interpretation 
of the coefficients.
This can be set out in a framework similar to that of Lucas and 
Rapping by writing the equations in terms of wages and labour supply rather 
than output and prices. The logarithm of the transitory component in 
labour supply which is analogous to equation 3.6 is written for the 
individual micro labour market, z, as
In nfc(z) - y Q n  Wt(z) - E(Wt/It(z)0 (3.15)
In Wc(z) is the wage in market z at t which is known to the individuals 
in that market and E(ln W^/I^(z)) is the expectation of the mean of the 
distribution of wage rates over z conditioned on current information at 
t. This includes Wt(z) and an estimate of its variance t 2 over 
individual markets. If z is taken to index markets by percentage 
deviations, the local wage can be written
In W fc(z) In Wfc ♦ z (3.16)
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where In Wt is the economy wide (geometric) average wage. An expectation 
of this,ln W fc, is, in turn, formed with variance o2 on the basis of past 
history up to t—1 and based on these two information components, the 
expected wage in market z is
E(lnWt/lt (s)) - E £lnW J(In Wt(z), lnWt>Q= (l-0)ln Wt(z) + 01nWt (3.17' 
where 0 ” t 2/ ( o 2 +  t 2) . Substituting 3.17 into 3.15 gives
In nt(z) - y[ln W ^ z )  - (l-0)ln Wt(z) + 01n iij (3.18)
- YO0Ln Wt(z) - In
Since in this framework workers are assumed to form expectations 
based on available information which are unbiased, though generally in 
inaccurate because of incomplete information, the adaptive expectations 
mechanism will not, in general, be appropriate for generating In W^. This 
will only be the case if the underlying process generating observations 
on the national wage takes the form of a weighted average of past observa­
tions with geometrically declining weights . In a later section the 
hypothesis of rational expectations is examined directly but, for the present, 
it will be assumed that the adaptive process is an adequate characterisation 
for the formation of The wage is thought of as being generated by
the following:
•In Wt 1  X i l - J O 1 In  W . . i-o t_i"1
♦ (3.19)
Though the model was developed in the context of rational expectations, 
Lucas included a lagged dependent variable in the supply function to 
account for "persistence". This was justified by reference to Lucas 
and Rapping who obtained the lagged dependent variable in their equation 
as shown above, through using adaptive expectations (Lucas, 1973, p. 329, 
Note 3).
r
3.16
Thus is the forecast error distributed with mean zero and variance 
a2 . Thus
CO #
In W - l X(1-X)1 In W . , - In W - v (3.20)
C i-o t_1-1 c c
substituting into (3.18) and applying the Koyk transformation gives
In nt (z) - Yejln Wt (z) -(l-X)ln W ^ i z )  - Xln V ] + (1-X) In nt_j
(3.21)
-sc
Aggregating overall markets z gives
In nt - Y0 Q n  - In W tJ  + (1-X) In n t_1 (3.22)
The employment rate can be assumed to be composed of permanent and 
transitory components such that
ln(^) » ' In M + In n (3.23)L t t t
where In is assumed constant through time and hence substituting into 
(3.23) gives
ln(|-) - Xln M + Xefln W - In W_ .] + (1-X) ln(f) (3.24)L t t t-1 L t_j
Alternatively if n£ is related to the unemployment rate by
In U “ g ♦ g In n (3.25)t o 1 t
then on substituting
In Ut - XgQ ♦ y 6 Q n  W£ - In W ^ ]  +fl - X>ln (3.26)
In equations (3.24) and (3.26) tha slope of the labour supply function 
depends on both the slope of the underlying supply function Y and the 
term 0. The latter approaches zero as t 2 approaches zero and unity as
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a2 approaches zero. Thus, as the cross sectional variance of wage rates 
declines, it more closely approximates to the national wage and the 
expectational error is reduced and the slope of the supply function declines. 
If, on the other hand, as the time series variance o2 becomes small, then 
the difference between the national and local wage is more accurately 
predicted. This model may be modified to include a price term giving 
a real wage variant. In this case workers are assumed also to be searching 
as consumers across different product markets. In this case, price terms 
would enter the equation exactly analogous to the wage terms. Thus 
augmented versions of the model would be
ln(f) “ X In M  + y ,6. Ain + Y-S.Aln Pfc + (1-X) ln(f) (3.27)jL»£ I I  t z z t  I* I
In Ut - X gQ ♦ g ^ O j  Ain W t + g ^ ^  Ain P fc + (1-X) In (3.28)
If labour supply is invariant to equal and opposite proportionate 
changes in wages and prices, then y^ ” -y^ . The parameter -Oj.representing 
cross sectional and time series variations in prices will not be the same 
as 0^ even though it is implicitly assumed that wages and prices are 
generated by the same process^. If there are unified product markets 
with no stochastic spatial price differences, then 8^ goes to zero and 
the price term drops out. 1
1 This has bean assumad in ordar to obtain a modal with the common adjust­
ment parameter X as with the Lucas and Rapping model.
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3.3 Estimating Natural Rate Models
In this section we turn to estimating the models specified in the 
previous section on annual data for the period 1855 to 1913. Since this 
is a period of 59 years, in which considerable development of the 
economic structure and institutions took place, it is possible that the 
structure of the model will have changed over the period. The economic 
historiography of the period often divides up into three phases which 
might be termed "the Mid Victorian Boom", the "Great Depression" and 
"Edwardian Retardation". These periods are traditionally marked off 
at 1873 and 1896 and have been widely used over many years as reference 
points for the discussion of growth and fluctuations (see for instance 
Rostow (1948), Crouzet, (1981)). As far as the labour market is concerned, 
Hobsbawm has argued that "the development of the labour movement falls 
into much the same periods" (1964, p. 318).
Several writers have argued in separate studies of these periods 
that, although the Great Depression is traditionally marked out as a period 
of depressed trade compared with the adjacent periods, the periods cannot 
be clearly dissected either in the pattern of fluctuations or structural 
change (Saul 1969, Church 1975). Even if they do not mark fundamentally 
different phases in the development of the economy, they are marked out 
by different trends in wages and prices which, as was pointed out in Chapter 
2, gave rise to different rates of growth of real wages. This suggests 
that such a division would be useful in testing models for structural 
breaks. The period is therefore divided into three segments choosing 
a périodisation which slightly attenuates the Great Depression in order 
to give periods equal in length. These are 1855 - 1874, 1875 ~ 1894 
and 1895 - 1913. From Figure 2.1, it can be seen that the first contains
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three full cycles of unemployment beginning near the peak of a boom and 
ending mid way through the downswing. The second phase marks out two and 
a half cycles with three sharp peaks in unemployment and ending in the 
recovery. The final period covers the milder and more uneven fluctuations 
leading to the peak of activity in 1913. The average unemployment rates 
for the three periods are 3.6%, 5.5% and 3.8% respectively indicating a 
somewhat higher average rate during the Great Depression than in the other 
two periods.
The data used in estimation is that discussed previously in Chapter 2 
and drawn from Feinstein (1972). The Trade union unemployment series, it 
will be recalled, is the adjusted series to 1880 and the unadjusted series 
thereafter. The wage rate series was preferred to that for earnings 
because, although it has fixed weights, it does not depend on an adjustment 
for activity using the unemployment series. For prices two alternatives, 
the GDP deflator (P) which is the most general index,and the cost of living 
(retail price) index (C) are used. The GDP deflator only extends back 
to 1870 and for observations before this, it was extrapolated backwards, 
using the coefficients of a regression on four other price series for 
the period 1870 to 1913^;
A variety of equations were estimated based on equations (3.13) and
(3.14) or alternatively (3.25) and (3.26). Initially the equation was 
triad with both a wage and a price term and then with wage and price 
terms separately. The results for the employment rate and the unemployment 1
1 The four series were the cost of living index C already mentioned, indices 
for import prices (PM ) and Export prices (P^) given by Imlah (1959) Table 8,
pp 94-98 and the Rousseaux index of the prices of Principal Industrial 
Products P. given in Mitchell and Deane (1962), p. 471. The equation 
estimated ¿as logarithmic and included a time trend. This gave the following 
coefficients which were used as weights in gsnerating the composite price 
series for 1855 - 1869
- 1.8 + 0.0016TIME - 0.261 In PM ♦ 0.461 In Px ♦ 0.441 In C
- 0.051 In P,
In P
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rate are given in Table 3.1 for the whole period. The striking aspect 
of these equations is how much of the variation in these rates can be 
explained without reference to quantity variables such as output. In 
the presence of a lagged dependent variable, the DW statistic is biased 
and as an alternative,Durbin's h is given below it in the table. This 
indicates that only when wage change is omitted from the equation, do 
the equations fail to reject serial correlation. The wage change term 
always gives the expected sign and is highly significant but the price
terms tend to give the wrong sign. The cost of living index was included to
be consistent with the Lucas and Rapping model where consumer prices are 
featured and the significance of this coefficient suggests that the asset 
effects of expected price changes dominate which sheds some doubt on the 
model, particularly since it is counter to the coefficient estimated by 
Lucas and Rapping in their own empirical work. One possibility is that 
the cost of living index is acting as a proxy for output prices but when 
the GDP deflator is included in either of the equations, it loses signifi­
cance particularly in the unemployment rate equation where it is clearly 
dominated by the wage term. Some idea of this effect is gained from
the last two equations of each panel where wage change and price change
-2are entered individually. It is clear from the levels of R that using 
the price term involves some loss of explanatory power though not a great 
deal. This and the fact that when both wage and price terms are included, 
the coefficient on the wage tends to drop by an amount similar to the 
coefficient on the price term, suggests that prices may be acting as a proxy 
for imperfectly measured or incompletely perceived wage change1.
This possibility is raised, though discounted by Okun (1981, p. 101).
De
pe
nd
en
t 
Va
ri
ab
le
 I
nU
3.21
m m CM C O m  m r ^ .  n o
CM O m NO 0 0  0 0 m  r - -
m r - « ON ON C " < r  c m
Q N O N O N O m N O  M T < r  o n
»■h H H H H  H H  C M
CM m o CM
O m m ONCO NO M f - d * mS2 Mi 00 ON oo
i n m m
CM r*. 0 0S 0 0 0 0 0 0CM m m «d*1C* N O N O NO mo O O O
i-M H - d - o c * .  c * . C O  o
14-> 8 8 N OON C O0 0 O  CM  O n 0 0 C O  •-« O  O N  
N O  Or? m o •«d- o - d -  OcH o o o O O  O o  os-^ >-/ N»X
/-s■U N O CMo N O CM
0 0 ON
a <r m
< co H
1 s-x
L 4-» ms NO s  s00 •d- *-i2 C O Mf r - t  CM• • • •< CM CM ON  CM1 NmS 1 W
ON /■N $ />“N /-NNO o H 0 0  n o
CM NO d^- CM i-Mts ON m C O  S Oe «d- • ON • CMH CM •d- •< H CM CM f - d  CM
1 1 1 ^
N
H 00 C O ON s s m  n o4J C O O CM N O N  co co« CM CM •d- CM m  c m2 r** H r*». r-d m  *-<5 •O •o •O o • • o  o • • o  o
in NO r* 00
3.22
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is highly signi­
ficant and appears to be quite stable with a value close to 0.5. This 
gives an average lag in the adaptive process of two years which is 
consistent with the results of Lucas and Rapping and others. Using 
equation 3 the implied parameter of the labour supply function gives 
a wage elasticity of 1.04. Similarly the natural rate of unemployment 
can be deduced from the adaptive parameter and the constant term. For 
equation 3 the point estimate is 3.95Z and from equation 7, it is 4.42Z. 
For the other equation similar values are obtained, the equations using 
the unemployment rate always giving slightly lower values^-.
Each of the equations was estimated over the three sub-periods and 
the results given in Table 3.2. indicate considerable stability in the 
coefficients, the wage term is always significant with the expected sign 
as is the lagged dependent variable. Only the coefficient on the price 
term appears to be unstable, changing sign in the last period when included 
with the wage term. The F test for structural stability indicates
that the restriction cannot be rejected for any of the equations 
in Table 3.1 * 2.
The parameters of the theoretical model do not really provide 
testable restrictions other than that the variables are significant 
with the correct signs. The only restrictions on the structure are that 
because terms appear as first differences, the current and lagged 
levels of wage rates or prices should enter with equal and opposite signs. 
Estimates of this unrestricted form for the alternative dependent
* For the other equations the point estimates are (in numerical order)
4.71, 4.90, 4.52, 4.25, 4.37, 3.87.
2
The values of F. .. are very small compared with the critical values.O y  50
The computed values of F were for equations (5) and (6), 0.574 and 0.718 
compared with the critical 5Z value of 2.15 and for equationa (7) and (8), 
Fg ia 0.422 and 0.502 compared with the critical value of 2.29.
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variables are given in Table 3.3. In each case for both wages and prices 
the coefficients on current and lagged terms are individually signifi­
cant with the expected signs. Furthermore the coefficients are 
numerically close and similar to those implied by the restricted form 
and, in other respects, they are little different. In each case the 
restriction could not be rejected when tested against equation 3, 4,
7 and 8 in Table 3.1. A further test was conducted for the structural 
stability of the unrestricted equations across the three sub periods. 
This could not be rejected against the equations of Table 3.3 or against 
those with the additional restriction in Table 3.1.*
The equations estimated in this section give strong support to the 
natural rate type interpretation of fluctuations in unemployment before 
1914. The model is capable of explaining about two-thirds of the 
variation in the log of the trade union unemployment rate. Furthermore, 
the coefficients appear to be fairly stable across sub-periods. This 
provides a different interpretation of the relationship initially explored
Taking as restriction 1 the equation of Table 3.3 against the comparable 
estimates in Table 3.1, restriction 2 as the equations over the three 
subperiods compared with Table 3.3 and as restriction 3 the same 
equations compared with Table 3.1, the resulting F statistics were 
as follows
Restriction
Equation No in
Table 3.3 1(ri,54> 2(F6,46> 3<F7,46
1 3.713 2.147 2.418
2 0.9529 1.988 1.850
3 1.8468 0.393 0.377
4 1.7442 0.696 0.776
Critical value of 4.02 2.32 2.23
F (51)
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by Phillips and Lipsey. One of the unresolved problems in that literature 
the loops around the curve now disappear. The dynamics introduced by 
the adaptive expectations, yields estimates with a highly significant term 
in the lagged unemployment or employment rate. This would be consistent 
with anti—clockwise loops around a curve relating Ain to In 
However, the price term which, from the positive coefficient in the 
Phillips curve, might have been expected to take a positive sign in the 
natural rate model fails to do so.
There are a number of possible defects in the simple single equation
model and difficulties in interpretation which are taken up in the
remainder of this chapter. First the model can only be interpreted as
representing labour market equilibrium if it is set in the context of a
simultaneous system of supply and demand. Lucas and Rapping estimated
supply and demand curves jointly but in Lucas's model where supply of
output was considered, the problems of estimating a demand curve were
avoided by assuming a unit elastic demand curve. Secondly, the model
may be mis-specified if the adaptive expectations mechanism is a poor
representation of the true underlying process and, hence, the alternative
2of rational expectations should be considered .
The single equation model has gained widespread application for a 
variety of different data sets since it was estimated for different
1 Using equation (7) in Table 3.1 and rewriting in terms of wage change
gives Ain In U£ - 0.034A. In U ti( Thus, if the Phillips curve
is viewed as the relation between Ain Wt and In Ut, given the cyclical 
nature of the unemployment series, the negative coefficient on Ain U^givei 
anticlockwise loops around the curve.
2 It is interesting to note that for the six countries examined by Holden 
and Peel (1977), a simple adaptive rule for the formation of expectations 
was found to outperform a rational expectations approach.
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countries by Lucas (1973). It has also been used in attempts to measure 
the effects of unemployment benefits on search unemployment (Holden and 
Peel, 1977, Pederson, 1981). In the following sections the single 
equation model is used on data for individual unions in order to try and 
capture any effects which might have arisen from unions' out of work 
benefit systems. Estimating the model for individual unions is also 
important from the point of view of providing support for the model at 
the disaggregated level .
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3.4 Unemployment, Wage Change and Unemployment Benefits
In a recent doctoral thesis, Easton (1978) investigated the 
causes and effects of variations in poor law expenditures in nineteenth 
century Britain. Rates of relief were found to be positively related 
to numbers relieved both indoors and outdoors and, more surprisingly, 
to the rate of trade union unemployment. As was pointed out in 
Chapter 2 and as Easton later admitted (1979, p. 328) very few, if 
any, Trade union members would have turned to the poor law for to do 
so would be grossly demoralizing. As Harris pointed out "Genuinely 
unemployed workmen shunned outdoor relief because the labour test 
was liable to impair their industrial skill and prevented them from 
looking for work elsewhere. Moreover, the so called "stigma of 
pauperism" involved more than the loss of the franchise; and even if 
the ... proposal for the abolition of disenfranchisement had been 
accepted, it is unlikely that poor relief would even have been 
acceptable to the bulk of the unemployed"(1972, p. 148-9).
Furthermore, as was mentioned in Chapter 2 , the records of trade 
union unemployment are almost entirely for unions who paid some form 
of benefit to their members. Hence, most of those recorded as unemployed 
would have been receiving at least some benefit from their union and 
would have had very little chance of receiving poor relief even if 
they had applied for it. If unionists were induced into more 
unemployment by unemployment benefits, then the relevant variable 
determining this would be the unions' out of work pay and not the level 
of poor relief.
It is sometimes suggested that old or inefficient workers were 
only regularly employed during times of excess labour demand and at
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other times survived on out of work benefits as tacit superannuation^. 
Apart from such exceptions, it is doubtful that unions would have 
allowed members with a preference for leisure to systematically exploit 
their out of work funds (Beveridge, 1930, p. 124; Chapman, 1908, p. 333). 
But as the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission pointed out "the 
power to draw Out of Work pay may, by its subtle play upon motive, 
tend insidiously to slacken effort to get another job as quickly as 
possible and keep the job until it is completed and thus actually lengthen 
the interval between jobs and, therefore, the amount of unemployment" 
(Webbs, 1909, p. 182). As previously mentioned, trade union out of 
work pay was designed explicitly to finance search - in the earlier 
days at least - and it was from this root that out of work pay for non­
travelling workers grew. An unexpected change in the wage might send 
workers tramping the country to see if things were better elsewhere and 
the more easily they were able to finance such travels, the more 
willing they would be to undertake them. The Webbs saw the development 
of benefit systems as an integral part of union policy for defending 
the standard rate of wages. Thus if some workers could be kept off the 
market at times when there was a threat of wage reduction, the 
conditions for the wage reduction would not appear and unionists would
have defended their rate successfully but at the cost of higher 
2unemployment . Thus given the wage, the unemployment rate would be
* This was discussed at some length by Sir Hubert Llewellyn - Smith in his 
evidence to the Committee on Distress from Want of Employment (1893,
Q. 47*1, 4747, 4875).
* They quote a representative of the Flint Glass Makers in 1850: "Our 
wages depend on the supply of labour in the market; our interest is 
therefore to restrict that supply, reduce the surplus, make our unemployed 
more comfortable, without fear of the morrow - accomplish this and we 
have conmuind over the surplus of our labour and we need fear no unjust 
employer", (Webbs, 1898, p. 163).
I
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higher in the presence of unemployment benefits, or alternatively, given 
the unemployment level, the wage would be higher than otherwise.
The effects of an upward shift in the provision of unemployment 
benefits can be illustrated by a modification to the diagram given in 
the lower panel of Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
Here, unemployment is initially at its equilibrium level determined by 
the position of the long run supply curve S*, giving employment E*.
The wage is determined by the intersection of the demand, D, curve and 
the short run supply curve, which, given that the wage is fully 
anticipated, is elso the intersection with S*. This determines the 
long run equilibrium and short run wage at Hj ■ wj. An increase in 
the benefit rate shifts the long run supply curve to the left and, 
hence, a new long run equilibrium emerges. The new long run equilibrium
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is characterised by an upward shift along the demand curve and a new
short run supply curve which yields the higher equilibrium wage ” W2 
and lower ' employment E*. Hence the effect of benefits is to increase 
the natural rate of unemployment from L - E* to L - E£.
In Easton's model which was based on this approach, the natural 
rate of unemployment was taken as a function of the benefit to wage 
ratio (1978, p. 91)
U* - U? + u(B/W) (3.29)
Deviations from the natural rate were proxied by deviations of output 
and the real wage from trend, representing unexpected changes in labour 
demand, the real wage deviations also affecting labour supply. This 
leads to an equation of the following form (1978, p. 92)
ut “ c0 + c1 (B/W)t + c2DRW - c3ADt + c4DVt (3. 30)
where B/W is the benefit to wage ratio, DRW the real wage deviation,
AD the output deviation and DV^ a vector of other variables. Easton 
did not employ an (inverted) Phillips curve and it seems likely that 
deviations from trend of output and the real wage are an arbitrary 
and perhaps a poor proxy for unexpected deviations. Furthermore, with 
both output and the real wage as demand variables, the interpretation 
is not clear. As was pointed out earlier, if firms are in short run 
equilibrium, both output and employment are simultaneously determined 
given prevailing wage and price levels. While it might be legitimately 
suggested that some firms were output constrained or that demand 
determined output affected the level of labour utilisation, this is 
not quite in the spirit of the equilibrium model. It would be inter-
0
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preted in the same way as the equations examined in Chapter 2 as 
disequilibrium^. Hence, Easton’s model does not adequately capture the 
spirit of the natural rate model discussed earlier and illustrated in 
Figure 3.2 for reasons quite apart from the fact that the benefit rates 
are not appropriate to the case.
Returning to the issue of trade union benefits, the total of such 
expenditure of reporting unions was recorded in the Board of Trade 
Reports on Trade Unions together with total membership and the rate of 
unemployment. Benefits per member for various unions up to 1900 were 
calculated and presented by Wood (1900) and Hartley (1904). By applying 
the proportion of the membership unemployed to these figures, a series 
for benefits per unemployed member can be calculated. It follows from 
equation (3.29) that the natural rate of unemployment for a union should 
be positively related to the rate of benefit provided by the union.
Though the natural rate cannot be observed directly, it would not be 
unreasonable to suppose that, over a period of say 20 years, the average 
observed rate should be close to the natural rate. In the following 
table, the average weekly payment of benefits and the average unemployment 
rate are compared for 12 unions for 1871 to 1891.
Easton argued that there would only be a partial response of the real wage 
to its new equilibrium value when labour demand or supply shifted, thus 
admitting disequilibrium into the model. Even in the disequilibrium approach 
an increase in benefits would tend to affect wages by shifting the S curve 
of Figure 2.1 to the left, thereby reducing excess demand for a given level 
of.unemployment and shifting up the Phillips curve. This type of effect 
is considered in more detail with reference to interwar unemployment in 
Chapter 5. Though Easton admitted partial adjustment of the real wage , he 
did not provide the wage adjustment equation which would be the counter­
part to the natural rate equation in the equilibrium model. His model 
therefore seems to be a hybrid of equilibrium and disequilibrium.
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Table 3.4
Trade Union Benefits and Unemployment 1871-1891
Union Average X 
Unemployed
Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
Friendly Society of Ironfounders 
Warehouseman's Philanthropic* 
London Operative Zinc Workers 
Associated Blacksmiths 
London Society of Compositors 
Amalgamated Carpenters & Joiners 
Steam Engine Makers 
Yorkshire Glass Bottle Makers* 
Bradford Overlookers 
Amalgamated Tailors
Boilermakers and Iron and Steel 
Shipbuilders**
* 1871 - 1890 ** 1873 - 1891
Average Weekly 
Benefit Payment 
(shillings)
4.02 9.8
7.13 7.6
1.63 32.0
2.80 6.2
4.45 5.2
2.54 10.4
3.49 8.4
2.63 9.6
5.02 8.4
0.88 16.6
0.39 9.2
8.72 3.4
Sources: Calculated from Wood (1899) Table II, p. 641-2,
Wood (1900) Table 3, p. 89-90, 
Hartley (1904) Table I, p. 56-9.
These figures do not give any indication of a strong positive rela­
tionship between average unemployment and average benefit payment. The 
two extreme benefit rates, for Warehousemen and Boilermakers appear to 
suggest an inverse relation but even when these outliers and the Bradford 
Overlookers with a very low unemployment rate are taken out, there still 
seems to be no systematic relation between the two sets of figures.
However, this cross sectional comparison is not really an adequate 
test for two reasons. First, equation 3.29 shows that it is the ratio 
of benefits to wages which reflects the opportunity cost of unemployment 
and (though this is doubtful) dividing through by average wage ratea 
paid to different groups might produce different results . A second
3.35
problem is that the level of pure frictional unemployment given by the 
term in equation 3.23 may be different for different trades, reflecting 
differences in the density of trades and the organisation of the labour 
market in each. An additional point is that the conditions for benefit 
varied as between unions. For instance, in some unions, especially in 
Mining and the Metal Trades, members were eligible (often depending on 
length of membership) to receive benefits continuously for a year or 
more while in other cases, eligibility might expire in as few as six 
weeks (Board of Trade, Report on Trade Unions, 1912, p. xxxv).
Though cross sectional comparisons do not control for these 
differences, a time series approach is more likely to,since the organisa­
tion of labour markets would not be expected to change from year to year 
and eligibility conditions would be more stable even though the rate 
of benefit would be changing. But it is still necessary to have the 
appropriate wage rate in order to obtain a measure of variations over time in 
the benefit to wage ratio. In the next section, natural rate models 
which include benefits are estimated for a small group of unions for 
which wage and unemployment data can be reasonably matched.
The model used is a modified version of (3.27) or (3.28)
ln(E/L) - lnM>+ Y ^ j U n V ^  - l n W ^ )  - 'Y2e2 (lnPt - l n P ^ )
♦ (l-A)ln(E/L)t_l ♦ S y 3 ln(B/W)t
In  Ut  -  X«0 + gt  V191 (lnWt  -  l n W ^ )  -  ^  Y jO jU n  Pfc -  In  P ^ )
♦ (l-X)ln Ut ♦ gjXYj ln(B/W)t
(3.31)
(3.32)
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It should be noted that, given the model is being applied to smaller 
aggregations of labour markets, the variance of the local wage rate rela­
tive to the national would be different from the aggregate. The slopes 
of the functions would be expected to differ because of different values 
of 6 if for no other reason*. The price term included is the national 
cost of living index to test for the effects found in the aggregate 
equations. If the perverse sign on this variable were the result of 
inadequately matched wage and unemployment series, then it would be 
expected to disappear when the data are more closely matched. If, 
on the other hand, workers used price variations as a guide to 
forming expectations about wages in other markets, then the effect 
should still be observed and possibly enhanced in the equations for 
individual unions.
In tha comparisons made by Lucas (1973) across countries, it was this 
parameter which was assumed to account for the differences in the slopes 
of the functions and the relation between national variances of price 
change supported this assumption.
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3.5 Estimating Unemployment Functions for Individual Unions
Before moving on to estimating equations such as 3.25 and 3.26 
for individual trade unions, several important issues need to be con­
sidered. First, data for individual unions is limited in certain respects. 
It is available for a wide range of unions up to 1891 in the Board of 
Trade's Reports on Trade Unions^ but after this, it was only given for 
major unions and various sub aggregates of the rest. Another important 
point is that some of the rates were computed from applying rates of 
benefit to total expenditure on benefits. Hence, any errors or 
inaccuracy in these computations are likely to distort the true relation 
between unemployment and benefit rates. The sample was therefore restricted 
to those unions for which unemployment percentages were computed from 
actual head counts of the unemployed .
This greatly restricts the scope of possibilities and the choice 
was further narrowed by the desire to focus on unions which faced relatively 
fluctuating rates of unemployment and wages. On these grounds the printing 
unions were ruled out since both unemployment and wage rates varied 
comparatively little and, therefore, contributed little to the aggregate 
variation.
This narrows the range down to five unions, four from the metal 
and engineering trades and one from building. These five are the 
Associated Society of Engineers (A.S.E.), the Friendly Society of 
Ironfounders (F.S.I.), the Associated Ironmoulders of Scotland (A.I.S), 
the United Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipwrights (U.S.B) and the *
* From 1888 most of the unemployed covered in the aggregate figure were 
counted rather than inferred from benefit payments. The two alternative 
methods were discussed in British and Foreign Trade and Industrial 
Conditions (1905), pp. 97-8 where an illustrative comparison was made.
The data actually used for the individual unions was taken from the 
statistical tables on pp. 87-90.
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Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners. It may be recalled that 
the A.S.E. and A.S.C. were the two leading examples of "new Model" unions 
in which friendly society benefits were important both individually 
and collectively from mid century onwards. With the exception of the 
boilermakers, the average weekly benefit payments were typical among 
unions of skilled workers as shown in Table 3.4. Hence, if the effects 
of benefit provisions on unemployment among unionist are to be found 
at all, it is among this group that they should be sought.
The wage rates roughly appropriate to each of these groups were 
taken from Bowley and Wood's detailed tables and, in general, the 
coverage is wider than the membership of the unions involved. This is 
both because only a fracti cn of workers in each trade were union members 
ad because in some cases the wage series extend somewhat beyond the trade 
immediately covered by the union concerned*. The benefit per member 
series were taken from Wood (1900, Table III, p. 89-90) and Hartley (1904, 
Table I, pp. 55-59) in which the maximum period covered is from 1860 to 
1900. The equations estimated are restricted to this period for the A.S.E.
F.S.I and A.S.C for the ALS, 1860 - 1896 and for the USB, where the 
unemployment series starts later, 1872 - 1900.
For the four Metal and Engineering unions, the data was taken from 
Bowley and Wood (1906), Table 1, pp. 158-161. For the ASE the unweighted 
average for Fitters, Turners, Smiths, Strikers and Dullers was used. For 
bo.th F.S.Z. and A.S.I. the individual series for iron-moulders was used 
and for U.B.S. Series D for engineering workers in shipyards was taken. 
For the A.S.C. the aggregate index for wages in the building trades 
taken from Bowley and Wood (1901), p. 112, was used.
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The first step was to estimate the relationship between wage change 
and unemployment alone to compare with the results for the basic model 
presented in section 3.3. The two alternative functional forms given 
by the use of the employment rate and the unemployment rate were estimated 
but since the differences were slight, only the latter are presented.
The results given in Table 3.5 indicate that for four of the five 
unions, the equations are in close conformity with those for the 
aggregates in Tables 3.1 and 3.3. With the exception of the A.I.S., the 
coefficients on the wage change terms are significant }in some cases at 
quite high levelSj and give negative coefficients which are of the same 
order of magnitude and not significantly different from the point estimate 
for the aggregate, similarly the adjustment coefficients obtained on 
the lagged dependent variable,though that obtained for the F.S.I. is 
substantially, though not significantly, lower than the aggregate. These 
must be treated with caution, however, since both for the A.S.E. and 
A.C.J. the equations exhibit serial correlation on the criterion of 
Durbin's h statistic.
When current and lagged wage terms are entered separately, they 
take the expected opposite signs excepting the A.I.S where both are small 
and insignificant. It is clear from these coefficients and from the 
small reductions in the residual sum of squares obtained when the 
restriction is relaxed, that it cannot be rejected and in each case it 
fails to be rejected on the 7 test. Thus, in this respect as well, 
the equations give support to those estimated for the aggregates.
The rather poorer performance of the equations for the ironfounding umonj 
and especially the A.I.S. is perhaps not surprising when one examines 
the unemployment figures. Though these conform to the general cyclical
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pattern, there are some quite sharp differences in year to year movements 
between them^. Given that the same wage series is used for both (Bowley's 
national average series for iron moulders) it is not surprising that 
differences emerge or that the A.I.S. based in Scotland produces 
relatively poor results.
The next step was to include two other variables, the benefit to 
wage ratio and the rate of change of the cost of living as supply side 
variables, into the equation. The former presents some problems in 
estimation. The original expenditure per member series were deflated 
by the unemployment rate to obtain benefits per unemployed member. This 
was originally used in ordinary least squares regressions and the 
result was uniformly negative but insignificant coefficients. This might 
reflect the fact that, at times of high unemployment, the current 
resources of the union had to be spread more thinly over the unemployed 
members. If, as seems likely, this were the case, then benefit induced 
unemployment would move inversely with the unemployment rate but if such 
effects existed, the benefit to wage ratio should still take a positive 
sign. However, there is the additional problem that any errors in 
measurement in the unemployment series would lead to negatively correlated 
measurement errors in the benefit to wage rate and hence, give spurious 
negative coefficients. To overcome this problem, instrumental variables 
were used . The instruments used for the benefit series were aggregate
* For instance, both unemployment rates stood at 11.5Z in 1880 but, by 
1882, the A.I.S was still at 11.OX while the F.S.I. was down to 4.7Z.
Both rates peaked in the same year 1886 but, while the A.I.S. reached 
34.2X the F.S.I. rose only to 14.6Z
^ This problem was also recognised by Easton in the context of Poor Law 
outdoor relief and he approached the problem in a similar way (1978, p.68)
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output and unemployment benefit expenditure per member and a time 
trend. While this might be expected to reduce spurious negative corre­
lation, it will tend to introduce independent errors into the series which 
will tend to bias the estimated coefficient towards zero and this should 
be borne in mind when inspecting the results.
Table 3.6 reports the results of including both the benefit to wage 
ratio and the rate of change of the cost of living index. In every 
case the benefit to wage ratio takes the expected positive sign but only 
for the U.S.B is the coefficient significant at the 5X level. The other 
coefficients are not changed greatly when this variable is included but,
for the F.S.I., the wage change coefficient loses significance and the
-2  , . values of R turn negative. On the other hand the wage coefficient for
the A.I.S. now takes a negative and significant coefficient. The
inclusion of the cost of living index again provides results which are
consistent with those obtained for the aggregate. In each case, negative
signs appear and in four out of five cases the coefficient is significant
at the 5% level. The effect of including this term is to weaken the
significance of the wage change coefficient and, in any case, these
significance levels tend to be biased upwards since, for three out of
five unions, there is still evidence of serial correlation in the
equations.
The conclusions to be drawn from Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are necessarily 
qualified both statistically and because they represent a somewhat select 
group of unions but the overall impression is of support for the aggregate 
relation at the disaggregated level. The negative coefficient on the 
cost of living does not seem to be an artifact of aggregation nor does 
it appear to reflect deficiencies in the wage aeries. The evidence for 
a positive effect of union benefits on unemployment is weak. It would
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need a more detailed study of a larger number of unions and some 
rather stronger results before much confidence could be placed in such 
a relationship. Hence, while Easton's relationships between Poor Law 
benefits and trade union unemployment must be rejected out of hand, 
there may have been a relation between union benefits and unemployment 
but even this is not strongly substantiated for the few unions 
examined.
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3.6 A Simultaneous Model of Labour Supply and Demand
The findings of the previous sections are consistent with the 
interpretation of the Phillips curve before 1914 as a labour supply function. 
The model on which such functions are embedded, typically emphasise 
equilibrium and market clearing for labour. Thus a convincing model of 
equilibrium should specify both supply and demand curves for labour in 
which the employment rate and the wage will be jointly determined. Thus 
one test of the market clearing approach is that it should be possible to 
explain the wage rate by the variables determining labour supply and 
demand.
There are a number of approaches to obtaining short run labour demand 
curves and the most obvious is to take the marginal productivity condition 
for labour derived under the postulate of short run profit maximisation 
under competition. The exact representation of the labour demand curve 
will depend on the production function chosen. In later chapters on the 
interwar period a simple Cobb-Douglas is used which has the advantage 
of being linear in logs in both the production function and the first 
order condition. For the immediate purposes only the first order 
condition is required and hence, the C.E.S. production function can be used. 
This was initially used in the equilibrium framework by Lucas and Rapping 
and was later applied in a model of disequilibrium labour markets by 
Rosen and Quandt (1978).
The production function is given by the following expression:
Q “
a4t (3.33)
where Q “ output, E “ employment, K “ capital stock and t the time trend.
is the share of labour in total output o, the elasticity
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of factor substitution, gives the degree of returns to scale and
the rate of constant neutral technical progress. To obtain the first 
order conditions, it is assumed that the typical firm faces competitive 
product and labour markets (and hence parametric prices) and that the 
capital stock in any period is predetermined. This leads to the factor 
demand function
It will be noticed that output appears in this expression which is there­
fore not a true demand curve since, in profit maximising equilibrium 
employment and output are jointly determined as functions only of the 
relevant prices. This functional form is obtained by substituting 
the maximised value of output, Q* back into the production function to 
obtain a function which would be linear in logarithms^. Thus the model 
is valid provided it is remembered that output is not exogenous. On 
aggregating over firms, this employment function can be used to represent 
the whole economy but for firms in aggregate, wages and prices will not 
now be fixed and, hence, these are also endogenous variables.
One comnon feature of employment functions is that firms are assumed 
to adjust employment only sluggishly to current demand. Using the 
standard proportional first order adjustment function
where y is the adjustment parameter. Substituting in the labour demand 
function gives
* The true first order condition contains the non-linearity of,.the
If the production function is plugged back into the expression in the square 
bracket, the expression of equation (3.25) emerges.
a,(l+a,) 1+a, a (1+a ) a (1+a )
eU (£) 2 Q* 3 2 e 3 2
t
E* (3.34)
(3.35)
production function:
a tr - (a ♦ «
• E
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lia. p(a3+a2) 'ja4°2
a,(l+o.) „ (l+o,) o (l+o ) a_(l+a ) .
Et * « V i *  <F>t 2 e E“ i
(3.36)
In order to express the demand function as an employment rate as in 
the labour supply function, a simple growth trend is taken to represent 
the labour force
L ■ n e o
*1*
Combining this with the employment function gives the expression 
for the employment rate as
pa,
-(l-y)n,
-P y(a3+a2)
-y  '*  - “ 1 ,  ° 3(1— 2i w a * « 2) a 3d + o2T
■ n0 e (a3°i) (p ) Q
f  ya4a2 1
[o3 d + o 2  ^ ",inlJt e d-P) 
e V t - i
(3.37)
Taking logs, the labour demand function can now be written as part 
of the simultaneous supply and demand system
ln(E/L)t - aQ + Sj ln(j£)t + a2 In Q* + a3t + a^  ln(E/L)t-1 (3.38)
ln(E/L)„ - b ♦ b, Ain Vi ♦ b, Ain C ♦ b, ln(E/L)„ .C O l  C Mm t J  C“ 1 (3.39)
where
p(a3+a2) “a4a2
o3‘a V S 2y  • *2 ’ ojd+op- • *3 ■ o3(l+op * wnl
1 - P, and from (3.21) bj^  - X b2 - Xy 292»
1 - y. a^ is expected to be negative and is interpreted
as y <t and a2 positive and a3 is ambiguous, depending on the growth rates 
of labour supply and technical progress.
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In order to estimate these equations, a number of considerations 
must be made. First, an output series is needed and, for this, Feinstein's 
index number of GDP at constant factor cost calculated from the output side 
was used (1972, Table 6, T18). Secondly, simultaneity must be taken into 
account and the instrumental variables technique was used. In order to 
ensure that endogeneity was taken fully into account, instruments were 
used for the current values of all the variables consisting of one and two 
period lags of each of the variables in the model^. The equations were 
estimated for the full period 1857 - 1913 and for each of the sub-periodi 
but only the former is reported in Table 3.7. In the employment function 
of equation 1 the lagged dependent variable does not give the expected 
sign but is not significant at the 5Z level and the time trend also gives 
the wrong sign, this time significantly. On removing the lagged dependent 
variable, the equation improves markedly with R rising but the Durbin 
Watson statistic is now in the indecisive region. The result is highly 
encouraging^that all the remaining terms are highly significant with the 
expected signs. The doubts which surround the amplitude of variations in 
the trade union unemployment rate mean that the coefficients can only 
be interpreted cautiously as the parameters of the underlying production 
function.
The coefficient on the real wage which represents the elasticity 
of factor substitution gives a value of 0.17 which is rather low compared 
with other estimates. Using this coefficient, the value of the returns 
to scale parameter is estimated at 0.93 which is below that often found in
l • ' .
The instrumental variables were all taken in levels, not changes, so that 
they were, for example, In w t_j» In Wt-2 Pt-1* ln Pt-2 ®tc*
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studies of employment . Assuming a value of 1Z for the average growth
rate of the labour force gives the estimated rate of technical progress as
21.7Z which appears rather high .
Turning to the labour supply equations, the rate of change of the 
cost of living index now loses significance in the instrumental estimates 
and as before, the significance of the wage change term rises sharply 
when it is removed as shown by equation 4. In its absence the elasticity 
of labour supply rises to 0.7 in the instrumental variables estimate as 
compared with 0.55 in the equivalent ordinary least squares equation in 
Table 3.1. Though the changes in the coefficients are only marginal, 
the equations now yield a natural rate of unemployment of 5.09Z and 5.12Z 
from (3) and (4) respectively. Thus the results for the simultaneous 
equations model yields an estimate slightly higher than in the ordinary least 
squares equations.
It was indicated earlier that to have confidence in the market 
clearing approach one should be able to estimate a convincing equation 
for the wage rate. Setting the coefficients a^ ■ bj “ 0, the reduced 
form equations can be obtained from the structural equations to give 
the following.
In their estimates for the U.S. Lucas and Rapping and Rosen and Quandt 
obtained values of the elasticity of substitution of 1.09 and 0.984 
respectively. These are so close to unity that the estimated production 
function is close to being Cobb Douglas. Lucas and Rapping constrained 
their equation to give constant returns to scale but Rosen and Quandt 
estimated a value of only 0.114. This contrasts with the widespread finding 
of increasing returns to labour and increasing returns to scale frequently 
found in studies of employment which are discussed more fully in Chapter 6.
2
Most calculations of the growth rate of total factor productivity indicate 
a rate of below IX for the period 1856-1913. Matthews, for instance, gives 
figures of 0.9Z for 1856-1899 and 0.02Z for 1899-1913. (1964, p. 81).
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In(E/L) t
lni E / D ^ j (3.40)
In Wt
(3.41)
These equations are not true reduced forms since as already indicated, 
and Qt will also be jointly dependent variables. In equation 3.38 there
opposite in sign. Similarly in equation 3.39, the restriction is that the 
coefficients on these terms add up to one. In Table 3.8 the unrestricted 
estimates are given but the restrictions were tested and could not be rejected
trend and the lagged dependent variable give the wrong sign as was the case 
when the latter was included in the structural equation but, as before, it 
is not significant. In the wage equation, however, all variables give the 
expected sign and are significant and the equation as a whole gives a 
high level of explanatory power. This gives strong support to the market
clearing model but, since the cross equations restrictions have not been
2applied, unique values for the underlying parameters cannot be obtained .
The remaining part of the table shows the equations estimated over the 
three sub-periods. Though the coefficients are less well determined, with
The computed F values were for the employment and wage equations 
respectively 0.526 and 1.805 compared with the critical value of F^.j^ 
at 52 of 4.04. There are also cross equation restrictions on the * 
other coefficients but these were not tested.
2 The coefficients a, and b- can be calculated and give values of -0.2159 
and 0.7209 respectively which appear to be reasonable even without the 
cross equation restrictions.
is a restriction on the coefficients of In P and In to be equal and
over the whole sample^. In the employment rate equation (1) both the time
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the exception of the lagged employment rate, all the coefficients but one 
gave the expected sign. The F statistics calculated for the structural 
stability of the equations give a surprising result. For the employment 
rate equation, the computed value was 0.69 and for the wage rate, 11.74 
compared with a critical value at the 5X level of 2.0. This suggests 
either that the structure changed over the period or that the model is 
somehow misspecified. The most obvious part of the model which may be 
misspecified is the expectations generating mechanism. The adaptive 
expectations approach is important in determining the dynamic structure 
of the equations. Furthermore, as can be seen from the reduced form wage 
equation, adaptive expectations is inconsistent with the actual wage 
generating process which emerges when supply and demand are considered 
jointly. In the next section we turn to an alternative approach, that 
of incorporating rational expectations.
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3.7 Rational Expectations and Causality
Recent developments in theory have emphasised that, unless expectations 
are formed on the basis of all available (relevant) information, they
of the model, expectations are formed on the basis of knowledge of the 
underlying process generating wages and/or prices such that forecasts are 
not systematically wrong. Thus the behavioural expectation at time t 
conditional on all available information t-1 or earlier, is identical with 
the statistical expectation which the structure would generate based on 
that information. Thus, for example:
where nt is the forecast error. If nt is an independent random variable 
with mean rero and variance o2 then
Thus, for example, if the wage were constant from a particular period 
onwards, then in an adaptive process such as that specified in (3.12) 
the wage expected at any subsequent time t would eventually catch up 
with the actual wage at t and would deliver accurate forecasts (since 
the weights on all past wage rates add up to one). But if wage rates 
were to rise at a constant rate, the mechanism would systematically under 
predict the actual wage for all time ( since all previous wages are lower 
than the current, with weights adding up to one, the forecast must be 
below the actual.wage). One alternative would be to postulate, as Lucas 
and Rapping, (1969, p.733) did, that there is an additional constant in an 
equation like 3.12 equal to the constant inflation rate. But if inflation 
were constantly accelerating, then a higher order component would have 
to be included to generate accurate forecasts. Furthermore, this begs 
the question of the mechanism by which such growth components become 
incorporated into expectations.
will, in general, be sub-optimal or irrational*. In the standard version
In W,t nt (3.42)
n
E [ m  Wt - E in Wt |lt_ J  - E [in w j l ^ j -  E [in w j l ^ j -  0
(3.43)
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If, for example this expectation applied to the aggregate wage were 
substituted into the Lucas supply equation (3.19), it gives
In nt ” Y0(ln wt ~E4n “ ht> (3.44)
Thus In would simply be an independent random variable with mean zero 
and variance (y0)2a2. Hence if labour supply is a function only of the 
transitory or unexpected component of the current wage, it will simply 
be equal to the long run or normal level plus a random component. This 
would imply that the unemployment or employment rates should be uncorrelated 
with their lagged values. It is hardly necessary to test such a hypothesis 
formally though some equations estimated in the next section can be 
interpreted as applying such a formal test. In empirical applications, 
lagged values of employment or unemployment rates are included as was 
noted earlier on the grounds that there is some persistence in the 
aggregate time series. This might be due to costs of adjustment or to 
the costs of aqjuiring information but the exact structure leading to this 
persistence is left unclear.
This hypothesis on expectation formation might be implemented with 
either the Lucas and Rapping supply function where the relevant 
expectation is of the future wage conditioned on all information up to 
and including the present or the Lucas supply function where there is 
complete information from t-1 backwards and incomplete information at t. 
However, it has been suggested that the Lucas and Rapping framework is 
less appropriate to rational expectations and the model developed below 
is is therefore of the Lucas type*.
This critique has been developed by Minford and Feel who argue that since, 
in the Lucas and Rapping framework the current wage is known, there is 
no point in searching and therefore no rationale for unemployment (1980, 
p. 75). This seems to apply equally to the version of the model with 
adaptive expectations. Another point developed by Altonji and Aahenfeltd«* 
is that if the wage process is a random walk, then in the Lucas and Rapping 
type framework, unemployment will simply be a constant (in the absence 
of persistence) whereas in the Lucas function, it will vary stochastically. 
(1980, p. 219-222). “
A function typical of that used in empirical implementations is the 
following
n
ln Ut “ 3o + 3l(ln Wt ” E ln WJ It-l) + 3  Piln °t-i + elC <3*45>
This is analogous with a modified version of (3.19). E(ln Wt|l^is the
n
rational expectation of Wt and persistence is captured in the term 7 ln Ut 
Sargent (1973) has pointed out since there are no obvious restrictions 
on the coefficients and, in any case, the expectation term is unobserved, 
it is difficult to frame legitimate tests. One test he proposes can be 
demonstrated by testing the expectation of (3.26) which, from (3.24) is
n
ln D, - 3 + 3,n_ + 7  'll. In U_ . + C,_ (3.46)t o I t  1 t-x It
Thus the unemployment (or employment) rate can be expressed as a function 
of its own lagged values plus a random error term 3^ nt ♦ et. No other 
variables dated t - 1 or earlier will enter the model since they can only 
affect unemployment through the wage rate and this information is already 
embedded in the (rationally) expected wage term. Thus the test is to 
include strings of other relevant variables which might be thouglt to 
determine U through W. and test the hypothesis that they are jointly
insignificantly different from zero. Given that these are predetermined 
variables (dated t-1) or earlier) they will not be correlated with the 
error term. Formally the equation to be tested is
in ° t  " 3o ♦ ¿x wi in V i - £  xi  V i + v  <3-47>
where Z is the vector of relevent lagged variables.
As Sargent (1976 p. 217) pointed out in a later paper in which 
the same test was performed, this procedure is equivalent to a test using 
Granger's (1969) criterion for causality. This states that (simple) 
causality exists between X and Y (X causes Y) if past information on X
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improves the prediction of Y obtained from past values of Y alone. This 
is the criterion also used by Sims who termed it "a sophisticated version 
of the post hoc ero propter hoc principle" (1972, p. 543). As the phrase 
implies, this only tests for the independent influence of lagged X on Yf. 
If the causal influence of X on Y is instantaneous or within the period of 
observation, then the direction of causality cannot be distinguished 
in the absence of more restrictive assumptions about the structure of 
the relationship.
In addition to the supply equation, one should also consider labour 
demand. Writing the equation in terms of unemployment, demand is a 
function of the current wage and also of current and lagged Z
m
In U - \|< + In W + l X!  Z . + e_t (3.48)t O 1  t 1 t— 1  /
Taking equations (3.48) and (3.46) an equation for the wage can be 
derived by substitution as
In V* l  * v .  - £ «1 w
3 n + £- — e«o't It 2t
This implies that the wage should be caused by the unemployment rate in 
addition to the variables determining the demand schedule for labour. It 
also implies that the rational expectation for the wage is
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If the set of Z's includes only past observations on In then 
the rational expectation of In W is formed on lagged values of itself 
and lagged In and it should be possible to reject the hypothesis 
that other variables enter Z. In this simple bivariate form, the 
model can be re-stated as 
n
In U - 3 + 7 n. In U, . + V._t O l t-i it
3 —^
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In order to test these hypotheses, auto regressive functions were
estimated for the two key variables, the unemployment rate and the wage
rate (in logs). For both series second order lagged coefficients are
significant but higher orders are not although including the third 
—2lag increases R in both cases. In Table 3.9 the results are given 
for*the case of up to third order lags of both variables with and 
without the current value of the independent variable. The pattern of 
coefficients are of some interest. In the equation for the unemployment 
rate, the first order lags of both variables are significant together 
with the current value of the wage rate when it is included. But in 
the wage rate equation, only current unemployment is significant and 
lagged unemployment only becomes significant when the current term is 
excluded.
Two sets of significance tests were conducted. The first is to 
calculate the sums of the coefficients on each variable and compute 
the asymptotic standard errors. These are given at the bottom of the 
table. For regressions on the unemployment rate, the sum of 
coefficisnts on the lagged dependent variables are significantly less 
than one but not significantly greater than sero.while the sums of
Eq. No.
Dependent 
Variable (Y)
Independent 
Variable (X)
Constant
ln Y
ln Y
ln Y
ln X
ln X
ln X
ln X
R2
RSS
DW
IT
I t
t-1
t-2
t-3
t
t-1
t-2
t-3
LR
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Table 3.9
1 2 3 4
ln U ln U ln W InW
ln V InW ln U ln U
0.7493 1.0712 0.1289 0.1488
(0.9653) (2.1435) (0.0743) (0.0835)
0.7127 0.8873 1.1759 1.2967
(0.1503) (0.1609) (0.1273) (0.1386)
-0.3748 -0.6110 -0.0437 -0.1715
(0.1851) (0.1960) (0.2019) (0.2241)
0.1557 0.0971 -0.1598 -0.1608
(0.1292) (0.1443) (0.1250) (0.1407)
-12.2308 -0.0185
(3.2600) (0.0049)
9.3445 -6.5152 0.0022 -0.0143
(5.2798) (3.5603) (0.0071) (0.0063)
4.7978 6.8957 0.0080 0.0193
(5.1434) (5.7548) (0.0074) (0.0076)
-1.9096 0.0573 0.0066 0.0048
(3.2525) (3.6130) (0.0050) (0.0056)
0.6886 0.6055 0.9847 0.9807
4.8945 6.3298 0.0074 0.0096
1.9612 1.9646 2.1107 2.1141
0.4736 0.3734 0.9724 0.9644
(0.2713) (0.2917) (0.2694) (0.2987)
0.0019 0.4378 -0.0017 0.0098
(8.6913) (7.6713) (0.0111) (0.0114)
0.0030 0.6987 0.0616 0.2753
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of coefficients on the wage rate are close to and not significantly 
different from zero. When the wage rate is used as the left hand side 
variable the sums of own lagged coefficients is close to and not 
significantly different from one while the unemployment rate takes small 
coefficients which are not significantly different from zero. This 
supports the view that it is wage changes and unemployment levels 
that are most important - there is almost no relationship in the 
long run between the wage level and the unemployment level.
The joint significance of including the other variable in each 
equation is tested by constructing the appropriate F statistics. These 
are given for each dependent variable both with and without the current 
value of the other variable in Table 3.10.
These results are quite striking in that, for simple causality (when 
the current value of the right hand variable is excluded) the null 
hypothesis that In W does not cause In U cannot be rejected and the result 
becomes stronger as higher orders of lags are included. By contrast 
in every case, the null hypothesis that the unemployment rate does not 
cause the wage rate is rejected though this gets weaker as higher orders 
of lags are included. For contemporaneous causality when the current 
value of the right hand variable is included, all the F statistics 
reject the null hypothesis as might have been expected. It appears from 
these results that the model of rational expectations is fully supported 
by the data.
We turn to extending the range of variables entered into each 
regression in order to test the rational expectations hypothesis further. 
Three additional variables were used, all of which were used in the 
structural model of the previous section. These are the GDP deflator (P),
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F Statistics for Causality Tests on Employment, 
Unemployment and the Wage Rate
Table 3 .iq
L.H.S. Var. R.H.S.
Highest Order Lag
Var 2 3 4
Simple Causality
ln U ln W 2.233 1.566 0.840
in w: ln U 8.394 7.146 4.500
Critical Value of F2,52 F3,49 F4,46
F 5% 3.19 2.80 2.57
L.H.S. Var R.H.S. Var 2 3 4
Contemporaneous Causality
ln U In .W . 6.085 5.007 3.425
ln W ln U 11.000 10.378 7.225
Critical Value of *3,51 F4,48 *5,45
F 5Z 2.80 2.57 2.43
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the cost of living index (C) and the output index (Q). These were 
included in lags only for both dependent variables with second to fourth 
order lags . The results for third order lags are given in Table 3.11.
It is notable that, in the unemployment equations, the significance of 
the wage coefficients appears to rise dramatically and there are 
individually significant coefficients on the price level and output, lagged 
two periods or more. ' For the wage rate equation this also extends to 
the cost of living index.
Two sets of F statistics were calculated. The first given in the 
upper panel of Table 3.12 is a joint test for the coefficients of all 
four right hand side variables over the simple autoregression equation 
with the same order of lags. The exact same result emerges from these 
results as in the bivariate case in Table 3.9. The unemployment rate is 
not caused by the set of lagged variables but the wage rate is. This is 
quite surprising in view of the significance of individual coefficients 
but strongly supports the rational expectations model.
The second set of F statistics in the lower part of the Table tests the 
equations with all four right hand variables against the set of equations 
with just two variables as represented in Table 3.8. These all fail to 
reject the null hypothesis. Thus adding these additional variables does 
not add significantly to the causal relationships already examined between 
the wage and unemployment rates. Each of the causality tests was also 
performed with the log of the employment rate rather than the unemployment 
rates and the results were very similar .
It is worth briefly comparing these results with those obtained in 
other studies. In his earlier tests Sargent (1973, p. 453-3) could not
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Table 3.12
F Statistics for Causability Tests with Additional Variables
LHS Variable 2
High Order Lag 
3 4
F Statistics for Tests against Autogressions
ln U 1.007 1.528 1.692
ln W 3.450 3.431 2.408
Critical Value F8,46 F12,40 F16,34
of F 5Z 2.16 2.00 1.95
• F Statistics against Wage, Unemployment eqns. (Table 3.7)
ln U 
ln W
Critical Value
0.630 1.471 1.384
1.606 1.830 1.511
F6,46 F9,40 F12,34
2.37 2.12 2.05of F 5Z
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reject that wages and prices together caused unemployment and found that 
a larger set of variables, including GNP and the money supply, also 
improved the prediction of unemployment. In subsequent tests, the wage 
rate and the money supply were found individually to cause unemployment 
(1976, p. 226, 233). Thus the joint hypothesis of the natural rate model 
and rational expectations was decisively rejected. In causality tests 
for Australian labour market variables, Fels and van Ho a found the wage 
rate was caused by institutionally set minimum award rates and. was, in 
turn, a causal variable for detrended output (1981, p. 31).
Thus the findings for the British economy before 1914 appear to be 
more in accord with the simple model based on the rational expectations 
supply function than evidence from postwar economies. Perhaps it is not 
surprising that the model produces stronger results when the period under 
consideration is one in which institutional factors did not have a 
very significant impact. The labour market was competitive and not 
affected by either government welfare provisions or by the benefit schemes 
of trade unions. Furthermore, institutional wage setting was in its 
infancy and centralised collective bargaining had not yet come to dominate 
the market in the process of wage setting.
It would be possible to estimate the model incorporating rational 
expectations jointly with the labour demand function. However, this is 
unnecessary since the essentials of the process determining wages and 
unemployment are obtained from the equations in Table 3.7. Because the 
wage term in the labour supply function is simply white noise, the natural 
rate of unemployment can be obtained directly from the regressions of 
unemployment on its own lagged values. The resulting point estimates 
using two, three and four lags are respectively 3.48Z, 3.76Z and 3.71Z.
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These are quite similar to the results for the single equation model with 
adaptive expectations but lower than those obtained from the simultaneous 
equations model. However, this appears to be due partly to using the 
unemployment rate rather than the employment rate since the results for 
the autoregressive equations for the employment rate yielded estimates 
of 4.42Z, 4.47Z and 3.45Z respectively.
CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE LABOUR MARKET IN THE AGE 
OF MASS UNEMPLOYMENT
4.1 Growth, Structural Change and Economic Fluctuations 1913 - 1938
1913 marked the end of an era in economic history. With the coming 
of war in 1914 the economy was mobilised as never before in the interests 
of a single objective.Mien peace returned in 1918 there was a widespread 
desire for a "return to normalcy" which implied a return to the conditions 
existing before the war. This was not to be. Not only had fundamental 
changes taken place in domestic economic relationships, even more important 
were changes, many of which were already in progress before the war, 
altering the distribution of world income and capital and the whole pattern 
of comparative advantage. The result was that Britain^ nineteenth century 
dominance in international trade and finance was lost and her position 
became increasingly peripheral and uncertain. To the extent that economic 
structure and institutions were carried over from Victorian times they are 
seen as increasingly anachronistic and, where they were not modified to meet 
the new conditions, they were often a serious impediment to growth and 
prosperity.
Fig. 4.1 plots the graph of output and industrial production using 
Feinsteins data. Wartime mobilisation which increased the degree and 
intensity of resource use raised real GDP some 12 X over the 1913 
level by 1917. At the same time industrial production exclusive of war 
production declined sharply. The graphs illustrate the sharp decline in 
activity to 1922 and the subsequent recovery. Adjusting for the break in 
the series due to the exclusion of Southern Ireland after 1920 the 1913 level 
of industrial production was exceeded by 1924 but for GDP not permanently 
until 1927. The sharp dip represented by the general strike is clear in 
both series though the depression from 1929 - 1932 is more marked in 
industrial production. The recovery to 1937 is steep and sustained and 
over the whole period from 1920 the series fluctuates about a strong upward
trend
m
* 
l'
in
 
ii
to
 
iv
 :
 
/u
t
AZ
X 
M
*
 
w
»
'
 
M
l
Figure 4.2 plots the total labour force and employment. The wartime full 
employment and the sharp drop in activity are clearly visible but employment 
rises more slowly from 1922 than might have been expected though it reflects 
the depression and recovery of the 1930s more faithfully. After the war 
there is a decline in the labour force largely due to retirement and with­
drawal of women but the fall is much milder than employment. Thereafter 
a large gap opens up reflecting unemployment which continues through to 1938 
with the labour force bulge in the early 30s exacerbating the fall in 
employment.
Though this unemployment is a constant feature,it has been argued that 
it should not obscure the impressive productivity performance of the 
interwar years. Indeed, it is suggested that rapidly growing productivity 
is at least arithmetically.tbe reason why high unemployment did not rapidly 
disappear. (Aldcrof t 1970 pp 133-6). From 1924 to 1937 real GDP grew at an
annual average rate of 2.3Z which was faster than in any previous comparable 
period but this was largely the result of faster growth of inputs , both 
capital and labour. Adjusting for this, total factor productivity grew at 
0.9Z, exactly the same as for the period 1856 - 1899 but much faster than 
1900 - 13 when it was close to zero (Mathews 1964 p.81).Comparison with other 
economies shows that total output per man-hour grew faster in the UK than 
the average of O.E.C.D. countries which it had failed to do before 1913 
(Aldcroft, 1967 p 37). Hence both by historical and contemporary comparisons 
the growth record was good.
This has led to a reinterpretation of the interwar period as one of growth 
and structural change rather than of waste and decay. This is best 
illustrated by the immense diversity in the experience of different 
industries which is concealed by the aggregates. Table 4.1 gives indices 
of industrial production for broad sectors for certain years. The contrasts 
stand out claarly with tha traditional staple sectors failing to show 
significant incrsasas over 1913. The poor performance of this group would 
becoma dearer if coal, cotton, and ship building wars separated out
4. 3
individually. *
Table 4.1
Indices of Industrial Production 1913 - 100
1924 1929 1932 1938
Total Industrial Production 108.4 125.5 111.9 158.7
Mining and Quarrying 94.0 93.1 75.7 85.2
Chemicals and Allied Industries 110.5 124.1 120.6 155.9
Metal Manufacture 98.4 104.7 75.2 125.0
Engineering and Allied Industries 115.4 141.9 107.4 201.6
Textiles, Leather and Clothing 83.4 84.0 83.9 96.7
Food, Drink and Tobacco 99.7 112.4 110.1 146.2
Other Manufacturing Industries 121.3 152.8 147.4 193.2
Building and Contracting 152.9 217.3 178.8 262.5
Gas, Electricity and Water 139.5 182.8 195.9 301.8
Source Feinstein 1972, Table 51, P.T112 . It should be noted that the
1913 figure includes Southern Ireland which is excluded from the later
figures.
The causes of Che decline in the staple base of the economy are well
known and can be treated briefly. It was pointed out in Chapter 2., before
the war these industries had depended to a large extent on exports and
it was the failure of these traditional exports to recover and expand which
2was .a major cause of their demise.
In cotton textiles,for example, production of yarn in 1938 was barely 
half that in 1912 and of piece goods less than half, while exports had 
fallen by nearly two thirds and more than three quarters respectively. 
(Aldcroft, 1970, p. 156). The experience in ship building and coal was 
similar while woollen and worsted end iron and steel industries fared 
somewhat better.
2 Wide ranging general discussions of changes in industrial structure , 
their causes and effects can be found in Kahn (1946), Pollard (1969), 
Aldcroft (1970) and Alford (1972).
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The lack of expansion of world trade compared with pre-war, the change 
in the pattern of world demand, the growth of alternative domestic supply 
in markets cut off by the war, and increased competition in third markets 
all contributed. Of prime importance however was the decline in 
competitiveness of british goods which was exacerbated in the 1920s by the 
eventual restoration of the pound to its prewar parity in 1925. The 
macroeconomic implications of this are examined in Chapter 5 , as are the 
implications of floating exchange rates from 1931 onwards. These factors 
contributed to the continuing decline in Britains share of world 
manufactured exports from 31.8Z in 1913 to 21.7Z in 1929 and 20.3Z in 1937 
and in her share of world manufacturing output from 15.8Z to 12.1Z and 
14.7Z respectively. (Maizels 1963 Table 8.10 p.220). Using a broad 
decomposition Qf exports Maizels found that the regular decline in shares 
to 1929 owed little to the changed pattern of world trade and was almost 
entirely due to loss of market share while in the 1930s this was somewhat offset 
by favourable movements in the conçosition of trade (1963, Table 8.3, p.200). 
Accordingly to Feinsteins figures exports of goods and services were only 
88Z of their 1913 volume in 1929 and 72Z in 1937 and their share in national 
income fell from 26.1Z to 22.4Z and 16.1Z (Fainstein, Table 7, p.T22,
Table 19, p.T48).
On the other side of the account are the industries which were growing 
rapidly: building, publicj^ehicles some branches of engineering and chemicals 
together with a variety of other industries. Again, if industries such as 
motor vehicles, aircraft, rayon, and electrical engineering are singled 
out their growth is even more striking.^ In their interpretation of the 
inter.war period Aldcroft and Richardson have argued that the emergence of 
these sectors was important in the overall performance of the economy.
In tutor manufacturing output grew from 34,000 vehicles in 1913 to
239,000 in 1929 and 508,000 in 1937 (Aldcroft, 1970, p. 182). Similarly 
for the other industries mentioned, production had only reached negligible 
values before the war.
Because they were based largely on the home market they could not replace 
the exports lost by the staple industries and given their relatively small 
base and their relative capital intensity they could not expand sufficiently 
to soak up unemployment (Aldcroft, 1966, 1967, Richardson, 1961, 1962 and 
1965).1
According to Richardson it was the depression in the staples which 
hastened the resource shift to these new sectors and allowed the economy 
to shake off its "over consnitment" to them. The buoyancy of the new 
industries served both to mitigate the depression of 1929-32 and fostered 
the faster growth of the 1930s. This is seen as due to strong backward and 
forward linkages between them such that they formed a separate development 
block.
These views have been challenged at a number of different levels.
Dowie (1968) highlighted the difficulty in conceptually distinguishing 
between new and old industries pointing out that with building numbered 
among the new industries there is a danger of simply identifying new with 
expanding industries. He computed the index of total factor productivity for 
the periods 1924 - 29 and 1929 - 37 for broad sectors and each of 17 
industries. Productivity growth was not found to be faster in aggregate 
in the 1930s than in the 1920s nor were new industries always those with 
the highest productivity growth (1968 pp. 68-70 Table 1, p.74). Whilst it 
is not denied that in such industries as rayon, rubber and radio scientific 
advance brought rapid productivity growth, improved organisation increased 
utilisation and technical progress enhanced the growth of productivity even 
in contracting industries such as ship building and cotton textiles
Von Tunselmann examined the input-output table for 1935 and concluded 
that "the input from new industries into other new industries is less than 
that from the traditional staples ..., only in chemicals is it above half of
1 Much of the materiel in these articles is also embodied in books by 
Richardson (1967) and Aldcroft (1970).
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the latter"(1977, p.4). Using the Leontief inverse he found that 
restricting the growth of new industries from 1930 to 1935 would have only 
marginal effects on total output growth. Both he and Buxton found that they 
were not necessarily more capital intensive and in any case only accounted 
for about 7Z of employment and 3Z of the capital stock in 1937 (Buxton 1975 
p.218, von Timzelmann 1977, p.14). However if one takes share of 
manufacturing rather than the economy as a whole they formed 19Z of 
employment and 20Z of the capital stock.
Though structural change did not emerge abruptly during the interwar 
period its cumulative effects had important implications for the labour 
force and employment. One is in the shift to the service sector whose share 
of total employment rose from 44.3Z to 48.5Z between 1924 and 1937 while its 
output share fell from 57.6Z to 53.1Z. The decline in the share of non­
service industries arose almost entirely from the contraction in agriculture 
and mining while in services the expansion of the distributive trades 
played an in^ortant part (Dowi* 1968, p.75). The differences from 1913 
are even more marked with the decline of the staples and development of new 
industries building and services shifting employment growth away from the 
northern areas and focussing it on the south, particularly the south-east.
Among occupational categories, skilled and semi-skilled groups declined relative 
to both the professional and clerical workers and unskilled workers 
compared with the positions before the war. Routh has calculated that 
between 1911 and 1921 changing industrial composition was the dominant 
factor, in the case of labourers accounting for a more than 40Z increase in 
share. (1980, Table 1.19, p.43). In addition, within the various skill 
groups the demand for some types of skills expanded rapidly while others 
contracted and coupled with locational changes this caused a radical 
restructuring of the composition of eiqployment. The effects on the labour 
market of these changes are examined in detail in Chapter 7 where structural 
features of employment and unemployment are examined in detail.
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Changing regional and industrial composition has also been regarded 
as important for the character of cyclical fluctuations during the period.
Just as before 1914 exports were an important determinant of variations 
in economic activity and consequently wider fluctuations are found in these 
industries. Phelps Brown and Shackle found that in the depression from 
1929 employment in export sensitive and producer durable industries fcu.1 by 
a quarter, much more than consumer durables and non durables. But in 
recovery, it was consumer and producer durables which led while export 
sensitive employment lagged (1939, p. 124 ). Similarly Corner's (1956) 
finding that exports led the downturnis consistent with Beveridge's view that the 
fluctuation of the 1930's while somewhat more violent was "a lineal 
descendent of past fluctuations"(1944, p.282). But the recovery was clearly 
not quite as typical, though investment particularly building had had an 
important cyclical influence before 1914,its character was different.
Richardson (1972) argued that favourable movements in the terms of trade and 
shifts in income distribution to middle income earners together with 
falling family size and a taste for new types of goods meant that 
consumption played an important part in moderating the depression and 
advancing the recovery.
At a more general level the issue of real and monetary forces in 
interwar fluctuations has been raised. In.tests of "autonomous spending" 
against money multipliers Barrett and Walters described the interwar period 
as "strongly Keynesian" (1966, p. 403 ), but Walters found a much stronger 
relationship between money and prices than money and economic activity (1969,p. 
More recently Howson (1975) has argued on general and institutional grounds 
for the importance of monetary forces and Lothian (1980) has found that changes 
in the rata of monetary expansion lad to changes in the level of nominal 
income in the two major slumps and recoveries of the period. It seams 
likely however that monetary changes ware at least in part induced by 
variations- in activity. Furthermore there ware important policy changes in
the period which had direct consequences both for the level of demand and 
for monetary growth. Thus in the 1920s initial monetary ease was 
connected with government deficits and later monetary stringency with the 
return to the gold standard both of which had a direct impact on the 
economy as a whole and certain sectors in particular. In the 1930s 
floating exchange rates combined with a tariff from 1932 influenced both 
the level and composition of activity. Though cheap money is sometimes 
accredited with an important role in initiating recovery especially in 
stimulating private house building, continued expansion in the later 1930s 
is frequently attributed to the growth of government expenditure for
rearmament
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4.2 The Genesis and ImpacC of Employment Exchanges and Unemployment Insurance
It is impossible to pass on to considering the interwar labour market 
without reference to the profound changes in social policy which occurred 
in the years before the war and which were expanded in scope in the 
following years. From the perspective of the nineteenth century labour market 
the institution of a national system of labour exchanges and unemployment 
insurance represents a revolution in the official approach to the problems 
of unemployment. The system of labour exchanges was passed into law by 
the Labour Exchanges Act, 1909, introduced by Churchill as President of the 
Board of Trade. Unemployment insurance followed under the National 
Insurance Act, 1911, which also provided for a system of health insurance.
The promulgation of these measures must be seen in the context of other 
important reforms introduced by the Liberals in this period.^ They should 
be seen as reflecting the widespread concern about unemployment, increasingly
the subject of Parliamentary Committees and Royal Commissions and to some
2extent foreshadowed by the Unençloyed Workman Act, 1905.
The establishment of a national network of labour exchanges had been 
prominently advocated by Beveridge and initially a new department of the Board 
of Trade was set up with him as Director . This took over some of the 
exchanges established by local authorities under the Unemployed Workman 
Act, 1905 and by 1914 there were 409 exchanges and 1067 branch offices
Other important measures included the Educetion Acts of 1906 and 1907, 
the 'Old Age Pension Act 1908, es well as health insurance introduced at 
the same time es unemployment insurance and Lloyd George’s "Peoples'
Budget" of 1909.
2
It has been prominently argued by Gilbert thet, epart from the negetive 
results of the Unemployed Workman Act, past experience pleyed little pert 
in plenning the schemes end that, for example, the Report(s) of the Poor 
Law Commission, 1909, were almost entirely ignored. (1972, p. 242, 259).
The measures were largely due to the energy and inventiveness of Churchill, 
Lloyd George, Beveridge end Llewellyn-Smith. See also Harris (1972,p.362).
The events are described in detail by Harris (1972, pp. 284-6).
3
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covering the whole country.^ Use of the exchanges was purely voluntary.
They received notification of vacancies from employers and except when the
employee was involved in a trade dispute, attempted to select the most
suitable candidate registered with the exchange, or failing this, to obtain
a suitable applicant by advertising the vacancy at neighbouring exchanges
2
or in the National Clearing House Gazette. According to Gilbert "they 
made a small departure in the direction of true competition, so dear Co the 
hearts of classical economists, in that most imperfectly competitive of 
all markets, the labour market,’(1966, p.264).
They did not however supplant less formal methods of hiring and the 
"placing index" constructed by the Ministry of Labour indicates that by 
1926 only 18Z of engagements of insured workers registered at exchanges 
were made through vacancies filled by the exchanges, reaching 21.3Z in 
1932 and 28.3% in 1938.3 A substantial proportion of these, rising to 
17.6Z in 1929, were filled by applicants from an exchange other than that 
at which the vacancy was notified. Thus Beveridge argued that the exchanges 
had played an important role in increasing the geographical mobility 
though in other respects such as reducing the inefficiencies of casual labour 
at the docks they had been less successful 0-930, pp, 312-323). However 
this function of the exchanges was largely overshadowed by the requirements 
of mobilisation and demobilisation for war and more importantly with the 
administration of the unemployment insurance system.
The introduction of unemployment insurance was a major innovation and
Most important among the pre-existing exchanges taken over were those of 
the Central (Unemployed) Body for London (Beveridge, 1930, p. 296).
2
The development and operation of the labour exchange system up to 1933 is 
comprehensively described by Chegwidden and Myrddin-Evans (1934).
3
The placing index is derived as the ratio of vacancies filled by the 
exchanges to the number of hires, represented by the number of withdrawals 
of employment books from the exchanges in a given period. There is little 
information on this ratio for the 1920s and the figures quoted are from 
Chegwidden and Myrddin-Evans (1934, p. 176) and Beveridge (1944, p. 80).
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was virtually without precedent anywhere in the world.* Initially
contributions were set at 2jd per week each for employers and employed
2workers and lyd from central government and benefits at 7s. a week for
IS weeks in any year. These rates were set on the basis of
calculations which would have ensured a surplus for the fund in all but
2abnormally depressed years. It was originally introduced for a small 
group of trades - building, construction of works, shipbuilding, mechanical 
engineering, iron founding, construction of vehicles and sawmilling, when 
carried on in connection with another insured trade - covering about 2•i- 
million workers in all. These were trades which were thought to be most 
readily insurable in that they were not based on casual labour and suffered
3regular cyclical unemployment which was not met by short time working.
It is no accident that these were among the trades which were heavily 
unionised in which unions had established the most comprehensive schemes of 
out of work benefit, and in which most was known about the pattern of 
unen^loyment. Neither is it surprising that unions felt that the system 
could undermine their strength if it supplanted some of their functions.
As a consequence unions were invited to take a part in administering the 
scheme and provided with financial incentives to provide benefits in 
addition to those offered by the state (Gilbert, 1966, p.279-80).
The system was extended in 1916 and again in 1920 to include all 
occupations except those which were thought to be uninsurable or in which the
...................................................................................................................................... .... ................................. - ..............................................................................• • • • • ( I I I ! / . * . 1 * .
* The only known precedent for a compulsory scheme was one which operated 
briefly (and disastrously) in the Swiss Canton of St. Gall, 1894-6, but 
in some of its aspects it followed the so called "Ghent system" which 
was more popular.
2 Harris (1972), p. 312; Gilbert (1966), p. 282.
O
The considerations determining the scheme are best summarised in extracts 
of an address given by Llewellyn-Smith in 1910 quoted by Beveridge (1930, 
p. 265-6).
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risk of unemployment was low* and, by 1922, it included an estimated 58Z 
of the occupied population. In 1919 and 1920 the insurance system was 
overshadowed by the out of work donation scheme instituted to avoid the 
economic and political disruption which might have followed demobilisation.
As Beveridge commented "From the donation scheme dates the term 'dole' 
indiscriminately applied later to insurance benefit also: from it dates 
the concept of largesse in which all were entitled to share". (1930, p.274). 
Owing to the rise in the price level which had doubled over 
the 1913 level by 1920 standard benefit rates were raised to 11s. in 1919 
15s. in 1920 and 20s. in 1921 being lowered slightly thereafter but 
continuing at more than double the pre war rates.
In a recent controversial paper Benjamin and Köchin have argued that 
"unemployment benefits were on a more generous scale relative to wages than 
ever before or since". According to their index "By 1931 weekly benefits 
exceeded 50Z of average weekly wages" and "by 1938 covered workers were 
indefinitely eligable to receive benefits equal to nearly 60Z of average 
weekly wages". (1979, p .446). From this and other evidence including 
econometric equations they concluded that much of the abnormally high 
level of interwar unemployment could be accounted for by the effects of 
benefits operating in a way similar to that analysed in Chapter 3 with reference 
to union benefit provisions. The econometric arguments are taken;up in Ch.
5 but preliminary to that it is necessary to examine the question of how 
generous the system really was.
As their index of the providence of the sys tem jienjamin and Köchin used 
the benefit rate which would have been applied to a successful male 
claimant with a wife and two children as dependents. This is given as
, . . . . . . . . . . .  i •  <  • •  • a i i i • •  • • • «  • • < •  i i • «  • •  « • • i i  f • • a . . . . . . . . . .  • » • * . . . . . . . : * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Besides all those earning over 1250 a year, the main occupational group* 
omitted from the scheme were agriculture, forestry, horticulture, private 
domestic service, military service, teachers, police, railways and those 
employed in certain other public utilities, nurses and established civil 
servants. Agriculture was brought in in 1936 and domestic service in 
1938 and a special scheme set up for banking and insurance.
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Table 4.1
Weekly Rates of Benefit for Various Groups 1920-38
(1) (2) C3) (4) C5)
Tear
Benefit Rate for 
Adult Male with 
Wife and two 
children
Benefit Rate 
for Adult 
Male
Benefit rate 
for Adult 
Male with 
Wife
Weighted 
Index of 
Benefit 
Rates
Average Benefit 
Payment per 
Unemployed 
Worker
(shillings) (shillings) (shillings) (shillings) (shillings)____
1920 11.3 11.7 11.7 11.44
1921 16.83 16.7 17.5 16.34 7.13 '
1922 22.00 15.0 20.0 17.48 12.81
1923 22.00 15.0 20.0 17.48 12.37
1924 23.67 16.1 21.1 18.86 11.86
1925 27.00 18.0 23.0 21.17 13.23
1926 27.00 18.0 23.0 21.17 11.49
1927 27.00 18.0 23.0 21.17 9.77
1928 27.67 17.3 23.7 21.08 10.98
1929 28.00 17.0 23.0 20.96 14.39
1930 29.50 17.0 25.6 21.89 8.93
1931 29.54 16.6 25.3 21.60 13.12
1932 27.25 15.3 23.3 20.01 15.08
1933 27.25 15.3 23.3 20.01 15.67
1934 28.60 16.1 24.6 21.04 15.71
1935 • 30.30 17.0 26.0 22.28 16.32
1936 32.00 17.0 26.0 22.90 18.72
1937 32.00 17.0 26.0 22.90 18.89
1938 32.75 17.0 26.2 23.00 15.68
Sources: Columns (1), (2) and (3) are full races of benefits for adulc males 
with dependents as specified. These were calculated from the table of rates 
given by Burns (1941), Appendix VI, Table IX, p. 368 and, where changes in 
rates took place during the year, the appropriate average of rates was 
taken. Col. (4) was obtained first taking an average of unemployment shares 
by age and sex for 1925 and 1935. The dependents' allowances were calculated 
by using the 1Z sample of claimants taken by the Ministry of labour in 
April 1927. Of males over 17 years, 39Z had no dependents and the total 
dependency ratio was 1.56 :1 , for females over 17, 90Z had no dependents 
and tha depandency ratio was 0.15 : 1. Applying thase proportions to the 
unemployment weights, gives an overall depandency ratio of 1.27 : 1 and, 
under the assumption that for males, the first dependent would be an adult 
and tha rest would be children, about 38Z of them would have been adults.
The resulting weights for different rates of benefit were as follows:
(see page 4.13a)
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Table 4.1 continued 
Sources (cont.)
Men 21 years and over 0.75 
Men 18 - 20 years 0.05 
Boys 1 6 - 1 7  years 0.02 
Women 21 years and over 0.15 
Women 1 8 - 2 0  years 0.02 
Girls 16 - 17 years 0.01 
Adult dependents 0.49 
Child dependents 0.78
The final series in Column (5) is calculated from total expenditure on 
benefit of the insurance and supplementary national systems given by 
Burns (1941), Appendix IV, Table VII, P. 361 divided through by total number 
of insured unemployed. The expenditure figures are for financial years 
and hence do not exactly match the unemployment figures which are for 
calendar years especially 1921-26 when the financial year ran from July.
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column (1) in Table 4.1 where, for comparison, four other indices of 
benefit rates are given. The index used by Benjamin and Kochin rises 
from just over eleven shillings in 1920 to a peak of 29.5 shillings 
in 1930-31 and, after a slight fall, to nearly 33 shillings in 1938.
By contrast the index for an adult male alone rises much less 
sharply and was higher in the years 1925-1927 than at any other time.
The absolute difference between these two rates gets progressively 
larger over the period illustrating that the sole cause of the rise 
in the benefit rate from the mid 1920s is the increases in dependents 
allowances. If child allowances are eliminated, this still remains 
broadly true as can be seen from column (3). Dependent benefits were 
introduced in November 1921 and they account for the sharp rise of 
Benjamin and Kochin's index from 1920 to 1922 and from 1929 to 1930, 
both times at which unemployment rose sharply. On the other hand, partly 
because of the expansion of dependents' allowances, these were times 
during which the rates for individuals fell and, hence, quite a 
different impression stay be gained from different indices. Moreover 
married men with one adult and two child dependents were in a minority 
both on the unemployment register and among the labour force as a whole 
and, in this sense, the index does not represent a typical group.
In order to provide a more representative measure, a weighted index 
of benefit rates was computed, taking the average of family types as 
reflected in the sex and age composition of claimants on the register 
and the average dependency ratios for each of these groups obtained from 
a sample survey of the family compositfen of claimants. This series is 
given as column (4). Because dependents' allowances still take a 
considerable weight in the index, its profile is not unliks that of 
column (1) even though it contains rates for women and juveniles which
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are omitted in column (1). However, including these rates makes a 
considerable difference to the overall level of the index and the 
divergences become greater in the 1930s and, by 1936-7, the rate is only 
about 802 of that in column (1) . It is also useful to measure actual benefits 
paid per unemployed worker, given as column (5). The year to year 
variations in this series are misleading, given that total expenditure 
is measured for the financial year and average unemployment for the 
calendar year but the overall average levels are approximately correct.
These are less than half the levels of column (1) in the 1920s and little 
more than half in the 1930s. The difference between this and column (3) 
is due to a proportion of the unemployed not receiving benefit while 
serving days waiting or because they were ineligible, their claims 
had been disqualified or they were being paid benefits at below the 
standard rate.
To compute the benefit to wage ratio one needs the appropriate 
wage rate. If one were concerned only with the ratio for adult men 
with three dependents, then the ratio given by Benjamin and Kochin is 
an overestimate because the wage series used is a weighted index of 
rates of earnings across all those in employment, including women 
and juveniles. A survey taken by the Ministry of Labour in 1935 
(near the peak of the benefit to wage ratio) yielded average weekly 
earnings of 48s. lid but, for men aged 21 and over, into which category 
those receiving benefits at rates given in colusn (1) must have fallen, 
the average was 64s. 6d; more than 302 higher1. On this reckoning
1 The findings of the survey were reported in the Ministry of Labour 
Gazette, July 1937, p. 257. Even though the sample covered 5.5 million 
workers, about 40Z of the insured population, the weights may not be 
representative of the whole. An alternative estimate of the average 
obtained by applying the approximate aggregate employment weights for 
different groups by age and sex, gave an average of 47s. raising the 
differential of adult male average to 37Z
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the benefit to wage ratio would have been 0.43 in 1936 compared with 
Benjamin and Kochin's 0.57^. For the unemployed as a whole, however, 
it is more appropriate to take the weighted index of benefit rates rela­
tive to average earnings which gives a peak ratio of 0.41 in 1936.
Taking average benefits paid out in column (5) would further reduce 
the ratio to about a third.
These measures are very similar to those calculated by Metcalf,
Nickell and Floros (1982) who found that inter war benefit to wage ratios 
were not substantially more generous on average than those for the 
postwar years . Extending this comparison to the pre 1914 period 
indicates a lower ratio for the insurance system. More pertinently 
among trade unions the ratio would have been lower. The modal benefit 
rate in 1908 was about 10s., the rate paid by the A.S.E. and weekly 
wages for workers in engineering and boilermaking were, according to
3the 1906 wage census, 32s. 5d., giving a benefit to wage ratio of about 0.3 .
The figure would be slightly lower if the 2Z increase in average 
wages between 1935 and 1936 were taken into account.
2
Metcalf, Nickell and Floros computed a weighted index of benefit 
rates based on the composition of the unemployed and in addition, 
an index of benefits paid per unemployed worker. Their measures yield 
benefit to wage ratios in 1936 of 0.45 and 0.37 respectively (1980,
Table 1, pp. 6-7). In their reply to the criticisms of Metcalf,
Floros and Nickell, Benjamin and Kochin (1982, p. 425) argued that apply­
ing the average wage for manual males in 1935 (quoted above), they 
underestimated the benefit to wage ratio. Benjamin and Kochin are wrong 
in arguing that the series they use is sppropriate for adult male 
manual workers for the reasons stated above. They are also mistaken 
in thinking that the Chapman and Knight series which they use applies 
only to insured workers.
3
The data given by the Board of Trade indicates that of approximately
1.5 million workers entitled to receive benefits, over 900,000 were 
eligible to receive more than 9s per week, of which 600,000 were entitled 
to between 9s. 3d and 10s. A summary of the 1906 wage census is given 
in Mitchell and Deane (1962, Table 36). Benjamin and Kochin (1982, p. 424) 
using other sources, also arrived at an average benefit to wage ratio 
of 0.3 for prewar trade unions.
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It should be clear from the foregoing that Benjamin and Kochin have 
grossly overestimated the generosity of benefits offered by the insur­
ance system between the wars. Average rates divided by wages were roughly 
equal to those in the immediate postwar years but substantially 
higher than those before 1914.
Rates of unemployment benefit alone are an inadequate indicator
of the "stance" of the insurance system which also depends on the
qualifications for the receipt of benefit and the rigour with which they
were applied. In 1920, 20 contributions were required in the previous
year before benefits could be claimed and benefits could then be received
for up to 15 weeks but with mass unemployment emerging simultaneously
with the extension of the system, these conditions were widely waived^.
These waivers which imposed large deficits on the insurance fund were
gradually developed into supplementary systems which, from 1930, were
separated from the accounts of the fund and financed directly by the 
2treasury . From 1934 to 1938, approximately equal amounts were spent 
annually by the insurance and supplementary systems in spite of the fact 
that these benefits were means tested and increasingly stringent
These conditions were changed from time to time in the ensuing period.
For a full account of the changes to 1931, see Burns (1941, p. 47). Burns 
argued that both the increase in benefit rates and the liberalisation 
of qualifying conditions were due to fears of the distress which might 
otherwise have been caused by mass unemployment, "Hence it is not sur­
prising that the relaxations of tha insurance rules were accompanied by 
increases in benefits" (1941, p. 451 Deacon (1976,p.18,1977,p.11-13) has argued 
that this was engendered more by fears of public disorder, leading to 
possible revolution, rather than out of concern for the unemployed.
2 These supplementary arrangements went by a variety of different names: 
from March 1921, "Uncovenanted Benefits" from August 1924, "Extended 
Benefits", from April 1928, "Transitional Benefits", from November 1931, 
"Transitional Payments" and finally from January 1935, "Unemployment 
Assistance". This eventually took over the functions of the Poor Law 
which was to provide a safety net against poverty rather than insurance 
against unemployment.
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conditions applied after 19311
Among the other conditions applied which could disqualify an indi­
vidual from benefit were that he had left his employment voluntarily 
or had been dismissed for misconduct, absenteeism or lateness but not 
for incompetence or unsuitability for the work. Similarly he would be
disqualified if directly involved in a trade dispute but not if his
2 . .unemployment was the secondary effect of a dispute . The condition 
causing the most difficulty was that the applicant for either the 
insurance or supplementary scheme was "genuinely seeking work but 
unable to find suitable employment".
Insurance claims were adjudicated in the first instance by 
Insurance Officers with referral to a local committee and, ultimately 
on appeal to an "Umpire" with full judicial status. The onus of proof 
of "genuinely seeking work" was on the applicant but, with so few
. 3
vacancies and so many unemployed, this was almost impossible to determine .
In her detailed study of the operation of these systems, Burns found 
that, in the 1920s, "Insurance Benefits were ... paid ultimately almost 
indefinitely at uniform rates, regardless of length of unemployment. 
They were thus too high for the short term unemployed and too low for 
the long period unemployed" (1941, p. 98) and, from 1931 to 1935, 
although the full rate was only awarded to about 30Z of applicants for 
Transitional Payments, "there is evidence that in a great many cases, 
transitional payments were made to families who could not be held to 
be in need whan the resources of the family were taken into account." 
(1941, p. 140-1).
2
- These conditions are described in detail by Hill and Lubin (1934, 
pp. 149-153).
O
One important aspect of this which is relevant to the discussion 
in the following chapter is that, in the presence of mass involuntary 
unemployment, it is impossible to distinguish those who are voluntarily 
unemployed.
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The difficulty is reflected in the Umpire's decision of 1926 that "the 
most important fact to be ascertained is the state of the applicant's 
mind" (quoted in Burns, 1941, p. 93). The clause was abolished in 
1930 leading to a sharp increase in claims by married women and 
seasonal and temporary workers with the result that, in 1931, the 
Anomalies Act introduced measures to remove such claims. The proportion 
of claims disallowed, which had averaged about 15Z in the 1920s, fell 
sharply in 1930 and jumped sharply in 1931 as a consequence.
Most studies have concluded that at the various levels, the 
officials combined discretion with an intimate knowledge of personal 
and local circumstances to prevent malingering on the dole and this was 
the conclusion reached by the Blanes burgh Conmittee of 1930. Deacon 
has pointed out that the rules were applied with increasing stringency 
in the 1920s to compensate for the liberality of the rules themselves 
(1976, p.41 ). Insurance benefits were available as of right and 
benefits from supplementary systems came to be viewed in the same light 
as not bringing the stigma and odium attendant on the Poor Law.
According to one informed contemporary, it was not so much the generosity 
of the scales that was at fault as the wide opening of the door to 
claimants who had no moral title to any such payment at all (Davison, 
1938, p. 9).
At the other end of the spectrum, there were a large number of 
workers who were normally in employment but who frequently claimed 
benefit for short periods of unemployment or temporary layoffs. Once 
an initial waiting period of a week had been served, any three days in 
six working days could be counted as continuous unemployment and, 
provided they occurred within six weeks, such three day periods could
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also be linked up. This gave rise to the so-called 0X0 system in 
which workers could potentially alternate short periods of employment 
and unemployment so as to maintain continuous eligibility for benefit. 
Benjamin and Kochin (1979a, p. A47) emphasised this aspect of the 
system as unusually generous though it has also been carried over to 
the postwar period (Metcalf et al. 1982, p. 394).
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4.3 The Dimensions of Unemployment
One important effect of the combined operation of labour exchanges 
and the insurance system is that the information available on labour 
market aggregates is of a completely different order and quality from 
that available before the var. This however creates its own problems 
since, in some respects, it makes comparisons between the pre-war and 
inter-war labour markets more difficult. This difficulty is further 
exacerbated if, as has been argued, the very existence of these 
institutions changed the structure of incentives and the organisation 
of the labour market.
The Ministry of Labour gave two definitions of unemployment, "Books 
Lodged" and "Live Register". The former included all those insured 
workers with claims to benefit or applications for work by insured non 
claimants plus the "Two Months File". This was the total of those 
whose insurance books remained at the exchange (and who had not, 
therefore, taken insured employment) but had ceased to register in the 
last two months. The alternative definition of the Live Register, which 
is not normally used for statistical purposes, excludes the two months' 
file but includes workers outside the insurance scheme registered at 
the exchanges. In numerical terms the two definitions do not differ 
by much and the extent of under or over counting implied by these 
definitions has been widely discussed. Given that the denominator used 
to obtain the percentage unemployed is the insured population as 
measured on the mid year exchange of insurance books, it appears that 
there may be a small upward bias though it is unlikely that this would 
affect the percentages much.
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The annual average of monthly totals of Books Lodged as a percentage 
of the insured is given in the upper panel of Figure 4.3. There are 
sharp rises in unemployment from 1920 to 1921 and from 1929 to 1932 which 
were followed by more gradual declines but the most striking aspect is 
the high average level which, on these figures is 14.12 from 1921 to 1938. 
It is well known, however, that since the 60Z or so of the labour force 
covered by the system suffered higher unemployment on average than 
uninsured groups, the figures are over estimates of the economy wide 
percentage. Feinstein provided an adjusted percentage by raising the 
total number of unemployed by the proportionate deficiency in 1931 obtained 
by comparison with the population census of that year and expressing this 
as a percentage of the estimate of the total labour force*. This lowers 
the average percentage from 1921 to 1938 to 10.8Z or 77Z of the insurance 
figure.
Based on this revision, Booth and Glynn have come to the conclusion 
that "Bearing in mind the impact of the peaks in cyclical unemployment 
in 1921-22 and 1931-33, the highly regionalised nature of unemployment 
before and, particularly after 1914, the better recording and régulari­
sation of work, one could suggest that the national unemployment rates 
for most of the intervar period, while very different in pattern, were 
not very much worse than the national average rates which prevailed 
before 1914, with, of course, the exception of the years 1921-22 and 1931- 
33" (1975, p. 614). This somewhat startling conclusion is supported by
* Feinstein (1972) p. 220-1 and Table 58, p. T128. These figures 
exclude all those in the armed forces and employers and self employed 
and an alternative estimate is given in Table 57, p. T126 where these 
are included (in the denominator only) giving an average percentage 
for 1921-38 of 10.OX.
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the argument that Feinstein's percentages are on average too high because 
the year used to extrapolate from was extraordinarily depressed giving 
rise to a smaller than usual differential between insured and uninsured 
groups (1975, p. 613-4). Though they offer no evidence that this was 
the case, it is likely to have had some effect since the ratio of unemploy­
ment rates between industries with low and those with high unemployment 
appears to increase as the general unemployment rises but the precise 
significance of this is not known*.
However, there are also biases operating in the other direction.
For instance, as they pointed out (1975, p. 613) there was a significant
under recording of the "temporarily stopped" amongst the uninsured. In
addition, the census which took place in April 1931 fell between two
important insurance acts already mentioned, the abolition of the
"genuinely seek work" clause in 1930 and the Anomalies Act of
October 1931. On most estimates, this abnormally raised the insurance
figures by about one percentage point which would make them higher
relative to uninsured unemployment in 1931 and hence biases Feinstein's
2figure downwards especially in the 1920s . Even if further adjustments
* The evidence presented in Chapter 7, Appendix 7A1, gives strong support 
to the view that high unemployment industries were more cyclically elastic.
2 The effects of "administrative charges" were estimated by the Ministry of 
Labour mainly from the examination of the Two Months File which contained 
the insurance books of all those who had ceased to register as unemployed 
but had not found insured employment up to two months after regiatration 
had lapsed. These estimates were published from time to time in the 
Gasetta and, although it was stressed that these estimates could not be 
reliably added up over time, this approach has, at least by implication, 
been taken in a number of statistical enquiries; see, for instance, W.Eady 
in evidence to the Roy - - ■ - ~ * ‘ ' ‘ Minutes
recently, Garside (1980) pp. 49-53. The Ministry estimated that, in the 
short term, the effects of the measures introduced in 1931 was to reduce 
the register by 157,000, the vast majority of whom would have been women, 
this number representing 4.5Z of insured females in July 1931 or about 
one percentage point of total unemployment on a similar reckoning.
of Evidence, p. 121,
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could be made to the figures, it seems unlikely that the overall picture 
would be changed very much and it is likely that, on any adjustments, 
the general percentage of unemployment would come out at between 20X and 
25X lower than that indicated on the insurance figures^.
The question raised by Booth and Glynn however, involves the compari­
son of interwar with prewar averages. The problems in interpreting the 
prewar Trade Union percentages have been discussed at some length in 
Chapter 2 and, if the average percentage of 4.5 for 1881 to 1914 is 
compared with the insurance figure, it is nearly 10 percentage points 
lower. Tet where the two series overlap, they are quite close as was 
previously noted. For the peace time years 1921-26, the insurance 
figures give an average of 12.8X, compared with the Trade Union average 
of 12.OZ and when the Trade Union figures are reweighted to accord with
2the insurance data for the years 1912 to 1922, they are also very close . 
Thus it might be argued that, if the insurance figures are to be revised 
downwards by 202 or more, the same should be done with the Trade Union 
figures. It is interesting to note that Booth and Glynn quote with 
approval Beveridge's suggestion that, when various differences in the 
basis of comparison are taken into account, the average percentage before 
the war would fall between five and seven percent. They fail to recognise 
that Beveridge was attempting to compare the Trade Union figures with 
the insurance percentage and not with some alternative lower estimate.
His reservation about the Trade Union figures has already been noted but,
* This appears to be the range favoured by Booth and Glynn though Glynn 
and Oxborrow (1976, p. 148) also quote Clark's estimate of the true 
percentage of unemployed in 1931 which, at 73* of the insurance figure, 
is even lower than Feinstein's.
2 See Chapter 2, p. 2.11 - 2.12. This comparison was originally made by 
Hilton (1923) pp. 182-3 and Appendix 1, pp. 190-1. His figures are 
reproduced by Feinstein (1972), Table 11.9, p. 225 and Garside (1980,
Table 5, p. 22.
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despite this,his conclusion was that "unemployment after the first World 
War was probably nearly two and a half times as severe as before the war 
but may have been not more than twice, or may have been almost three times 
as severe"*.
It seems that however one juggles the figures, one cannot get away 
from the fact that, on the evidence presently available, the average 
percentage for interwar unemployment is about 8 or certainly between 6 
and 10 percentage points higher than that before the war . According 
to Booth and Glynn, one should regard the two periods 1921-22 and 1931-33 
as exceptional and, by implication not comparable with pre-war. But, 
excluding these years and taking the average for 1923-30 and 1934-38, 
gives averages of 12.5Z on the insurance figures and 9.6Z on Feinstein's 
estimates which are still more than twice the prewar Trade Union average.
In any case it is not clear why the peaks in unemployment should be 
excluded from the comparison since, as previously noted, fluctuations 
in unemployment before the war caused the unemployment percentage to vary 
across a range of about 10 percentage points of unemployment just as in the 
interwar years.
Of equal importance with the overall level of unemployment is its distinc­
tive structure and distribution. The uneven distribution of unemployment 
across industries and geographical areas has led many observers to view 
interwar unemployment as predominantly structural. This issue is dealt 
with in detail in Chapter 7 with the aid of matrices of data by industry 
and region which have not been widely used before. It will, therefore,
* Beveridge (1944, p. 73) Booth and Glynn (1975 p. 613) commented that 
in suggesting five to seven percent, Beveridge "was probably leaning 
heavily on the aide of caution" though they offer no firm evidence that 
this was the case.
2
This, of course, includes the years 1919 and 1920.
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suffice here to map out some of the distinctive features in a brief 
summary.
At the industry level the Ministry of Labour distinguished some 104 
sectors for which unemployment percentages were given though the data 
usually referred to are for a smaller number of major industries. The 
definition of unemployment by industry is somewhat arbitrary and there 
appears to have been an awareness of this problem in the Ministry of 
Labour at quite an early stage (Hilton, 1923, p. 175). The unemployed 
worker was normally allocated to the industry in which he was last employed 
unless it was known to have been temporary or short term employment 
outside his normal industry. At any one time these figures give a wide 
range of percentages, for instance, in August 1936, they range from 2.9Z 
in tramway and omnibus service to 42.8Z in public works contracting.
Given that workers would, over time, be redistributed from one industry 
to another, it is not necessarily the case that industrial unemployment 
rates mirror variatons in employment. Beveridge was much concerned with 
this question and the issue is taken up in Chapter 7 but, though trends 
in unemployment do not appear to reflect trends in employment, variations 
about the trends are reflected closely. An idea of the diversity of 
experience among selected leading industries can be gained from the lower 
panel of Figure 4.3. The low unemployment in coal mining of the early 
1920s represents the brief prosperity given to the industry by the French 
occupation of the Ruhr coal fields but from 1929, the pattern is similar 
to the aggregate but much higher peaking at over 34Z. The ups and downs 
of the cotton industry crucially dependent on international trade, are 
reflected in the volatility of the series and the sharp rise from 1929 
accurately reflects the international slump and leads the rise in
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unemployment in home market based industries. Building follows the 
aggregate very closely despite the building boom which began in 1932 
and this, to some extent, reflects the fact that workers displaced from 
other industry typically spilled over into building (Beveridge, 1936, 
p.374 ). The growing industries of chemicals and the distributive trades 
exhibit the same general pattern of fluctuations but at much lower average 
levels. A wider examination of the industry figures reveals a strong 
tendency for differences to persist in average rates throughout the period 
and the implication of some of the findings of Chapter 7 is that this 
was, in part, a geographical problem.
The main geographical classification used by the Ministry of Labour 
distinguished nine administrative divisions, four Southern divisions 
including London as a separate division and five Northern divisions 
including Northern Ireland. The pattern of unemployment in these 
is depicted in Figure 4.4. The overall impression is one of a strong 
similarity in year to year movements at a range of different average 
levels. Within this, the clearest distinction is .that the four Southern 
divisions always have lower unemployment rates than the Northern 
divisions and fluctuate through a smaller range. The one exception is 
Wales which has the lowest percentage in 1923 and the highest from 1927 
onwards. This is the clearest case of the link between the fortunes of 
an industry and those of a region and the parallel with the profile of 
coal mining is unmistakeable. Less distinct is the somewhat sharper and 
earlier rise in unemployment in the North West which is clearly connected 
with the fortunes of the textile industries.
These figures are all for insured unemployed (Books Lodged) regardless 
of age and sex. Distinguishing unemployment by sex reveals that the 
unemployment rete among females was normally between 50% and 60% of the
4.28
male unemployment rate. It was pointed out by Beveridge (1936, p. 338) and 
later by Benjamin and Kochin (1979, pp. 461-4) that the effect of the 
abolition of the genuinely seeking work clause was to raise female 
unemployment briefly to over 80% of the male rate*. Using industry 
data Beveridge showed that lower average unemployment among women 
could be largely, though not totally, explained by lower average 
unemployment in the industries where the majority of women were 
employed.
Table 4.2
Relative Rates, of Unemployment by Age Group
Age 35-44 - 100
April February November November
Age 1927 1931 1932 1935
16 - 17 33.0 36.7 36.5 33.9
1 8 - 2 0  ] 94.1 70.9 74.4 54.0
2 1 - 2 4  Jf 104.5 107.3 103.8
25 - 34 108.5 97.1 101.8 89.4
35 - 44 100 100 100 100
45 - 54 118.2 115.5 113.2 114.1
55 - 64 150.3 141.3 134.5 154.6
Sources: For 1927, 1931 and 1932, Beveridge (1937 ) Table XIV, P.14,
figures for juveniles (aged 16-17) from 22nd Abstract of Labour 
Statistics, 1936, pp. 14, 52, 54. For November 1935, Ministry 
of Labour Casette, August 1936, p. 278-9.
* This was reversed by the Anomalies Regulations, the effect of which 
was estimated by the Ministry of Labour by an examination of fluctuations 
in the Two Months file. As noted above, the abolition of the genuinely 
seeking work clause is estimated to have increased the register by about
160,000 representing 4.5Z of insured females (most, though not all of 
this change would have been due to females.) It is interesting in this 
context that a dummy variable entered by Benjamin and Kochin into that 
equation for female unemployment for the impact' of the Anomalies 
Regulation gives a coefficient of 4.55 despite the fact that there is 
no equivalent dummy for the period before the abolition of the 
"genuinely seek work" clause. Though they construe this as evidence 
of benefit induced unemployment, it has no bearing on the relationship 
between rates of benefit and rates of unemployment.
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The age distribution is another feature of unemployment. Data 
obtained from surveys of insured claimants is given in Table 4.2. The 
most striking feature of the table is the low relative unemployment rates 
among juveniles, at only a third of that for the age group 35 - 44 and 
less than a third of the rate for adult males over 21. The age profile 
of unemployment rates indicates a sharp rise to age 21 - 44 and then 
a further rise above age 44. Benjamin and Kochin have connected low 
juvenile unemployment with the low benefit to wage ratio faced by 
juveniles. Though they argued that "there exist no industries employing 
an appreciable number of juveniles for which the unemployment rate was 
as low as the economy wide unemployment rate among juveniles" (1979, 
p. 457), it seems likely that low industrial unemployment rates would 
have played some part. Furthermore, the argument misses the point that, 
for juveniles, employment opportunities were, in large part, specific 
to the age group rather than the industry^. In addition, even though 
they might have been unemployed, many juveniles would not appear on the regis­
ter until they had some record of previous employment. It may also be 
noted that there is some evidence (discussed in Chapter 2, p.2.18) 
that a rising profile of unemployment by age existed before 1913 *
* This may be illustrated by Beveridge's comment on the prospects for 
young workers which is typical of many contemporary observers: "they 
enter employment, not as learners but as wage earners, doing some work 
too simple and too light to require the services of grown people ...
They leave or are dismissed and their places are taken by a fresh genera­
tion from the schools. They find themselves at eighteen or twenty without 
a trade in their hands, save unskilled labour. They go, therefore ... 
to overcrowd that already overcrowded market" (1930, p. 125-6) See 
also Pilgrim Trust (1938) p. 53, Bakke (1933) p. 4-6, Jewkes (1938) 
pp. 36-40.
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when it could not have been the result of the insurance system*.
A feature of intervar unemployment regarded as most tragic of all 
and indicative of the labour market conditions faced by the unemployed 
is the emergence in the 1930s of a "hard core" of long term unemployment. 
From 1932 onwards the Ministry of Labour gave information on the length 
of continuous unemployment among applicants to benefit or assistance.
This was analysed in detail by Beveridge who provided comparative figures 
for 1929.
Table 4.3
Proportions of Unemployed Applicants by Duration of Unemployment
Length of September August August August
Current
Spell
(months)
1929
M F M
1932
F M
1934
F
1936
M F
<3 77.1 84.4 56.3 75.6 54.7 79.1 53.1 74.5
>3, <6 10.7 10.5 11.3 9.3 9.4 8.4 9.2 9.2
>6, <9 4.2 2.3 7.8 4.5 6.4 4.2 6.1 4.7
>9, <12 2.5 1.6 6.8 2.6 5.0 2.1 4.5 2.4
>12 5.5 1.2 17.7 8.0 24.5 6.1 27.0 9.2
Sources : Beveridge , 1944, Table 8, p. 64 and Ministry of Labour Gaze
It slight be argued that, since these were applicants for relief, this 
sisiply reflected, on a smaller scale, the kind of benefit inducement 
which Benjamin and Kochin claimed for the intervar years. It appears 
from the evidence, however, that it was the character of employment 
opportunities as well as the level of need which determined the age 
structure of applicants to Distress Consnittees. In the metropolis 
there was a vide range of jobs for youths largely involving fetching 
and carrying, messenger services, barrow boys, etcetera.and this was 
reflected in the small proportion of juvenile applicants. In the 
interwar years one industry which employed a large proportion of 
juveniles, distributive trades, which is noted for its low unemployment, 
grew from employing a total of 1.18 million workers in 1923 to 1.91 
million in 1938.
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The proportions in each duration group for 1929 are compared with 
later dates in Table 4.3. These show a high proportion of short term 
unemployment of less than three months which declines from 1929 onwards 
especially among men. A proportion of these would have suffered repeated 
spells interspersed with short periods of unemployment or non-registration 
and so the proportions do not reflect the distribution of unemployment 
among individuals. In the long term unemployed group with durations 
of at least a year, and especially among men, there is a sharp rise from 
about one in twenty of applicants in 1929 to more than one in four in 
1936. In terms of absolute numbers long term unemployment was, in 1936, 
six and a half times that in 1929. Among women the percentage is 
considerably lower but there is an even greater proportionate rise.
Beveridge showed that this was intimately connected with the regional, 
industrial and personal characteristics of the unemployed. Across the 
Ministry of Labour divisions the proportion of long term unemployment 
rose with the unemployment rate so that in 1936, it was only 8% of total 
in London bgt 38Z in Wales. Similarly with age; while long term unemploy­
ment accounted for 4.2Z of the insured in the age group 35 to 44, it rose 
to 10.5Z of the age group 60 - 64 in 1936. (1937, Table XII, p. 8-9, Table 
XIV, p. 14). This was reflected in the proportion of claims admitted 
to benefit which was higher for women than men despite a higher rate of 
disallowance among women. As Beveridge pointed out, after 1934 the 
contribution requirement was not very stringent, ten contributions 
would qualify an applicant for 26 weeks of benefit in the next insurance 
year. Tat in 1936, only 45Z of applicants qualified for benefit while 
38Z received means tested unemployment insurance. It is difficult to 
reconcile this with the hypothesis that among the significant group of 
those who were unemployed for more than six months, there was much 
voluntary benefit induced unemployment.
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Though, as reflected in the share of claimants receiving benefit, 
the proportions of unemployment for more than six months generally varied 
with the unemployment percentages by industry, there were important 
exceptions principally in the textile industries where high unemployment 
was combined with a high proportion on benefit. This reflects the practice 
in these industries observed before the war, of meeting a large part of 
unemployment by short time working, i.e. of less than a full week. As 
previously noted, the "0X0" system allowed individual days of unemployment 
to be linked together for the purpose of claiming. Similarly, even 
though days waiting may have to be served, it appears that a significant 
proportion of the unemployed were temporarily laid off.by their employer 
with a definite promise of return to work. From 1926 the Ministry of 
Labour classified these separately as "Temporarily Stopped". This group 
averaged 19.2% of the unemployed between 1928 and 1938 and, if unemployment 
among casual workers, also separately classified, is added in, the total 
rises to nearly a quarter. This share declines with the rise in long 
term unemployment in the 1930s, suggesting that it formed an important part 
of unemployment for three months or less. Whether this group can be connected 
with benefit inducement is the subject of empirical enquiry in Chapter- 6 - 
but it is worth emphasising at this stage that, as was pointed out 
in Chapter 2, short time working had been a characteristic of the policy 
of firms in several industries and, hence, there is no prime facie case 
for suggesting that this was simply a product of the benefit system.
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4.4 Trades Unionism, Industrial Disputes and Collective Bargaining
Changes in the institutional structure of the labour market between 
the prewar and interwar periods were both rapid and profound. While 
employment exchanges and unemployment insurance provided a new framework 
and a new relationship between the worker and the state in employment 
matters, organisation among both workers and employers and the structure 
of collective bargaining also underwent a change. But here also, though 
the immediate effects of the war and its aftermath were important, it 
acted largely to extend or accelerate developments which could already 
be discerned before 1914.
War brought the need for total mobilisation and reorganisation of 
the labour force, it required not only the replacement of workers who 
enlisted in the armed forces but the rapid expansion of industries 
producing or providing inputs for munitions as well as the substitution 
for goods previously imported. From 1915 it was recognised that this 
could not be achieved without the cooperation of organised labour.
Trade unionist labour M.P.s were brought into the government, trade union 
leaders took part in the management of strategic industries as members 
of various control boards, and on a wide range of consnittees concerned 
with the domestic organisation of war trades unions were represented.
In strategic industries, branch officials by allocating exemption cards, 
effectively operated the conscription scheme on behalf of the government.
In exchange for the promise that prewar practices and conditions 
would be restored after the war, unions relinquished many of the rights 
and working agreements for which they had fought and achieved in earlier 
decades. Among skilled trades in strategic industries, agreements on 
'dilution' brought unskilled or semiskilled workers in to replace or
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augment the depleted ranks of skilled workers. Restrictions were placed 
on labour mobility and strikes declared illegal but, despite this, strike 
activity did not disappear. Imposition of these conditions from above 
led to a number of unofficial disputes, notably in South Wales and on 
the Clyde. From this there emerged an unofficial shop stewards' movement 
which was contained during the war and rapidly disappeared in the 
ensuing slump^.
In 1913, total union membership reached 4.14 million, some 23Z
of the labour force, rising to a peak of 8.35 million, almost 48Z of the
labour force in 1920. Though membership doubled in these years, it had
doubled between 1905 and 1913 and, hence, the war can be seen as continuing
the pre-existing trend. As in previous spurts of growth, all of this
increase was not held and, by 1922, membership had slumped to 5.6 million
and continued to erode, reaching a low point of 4.4 million in 1935
2when it was close to the level of twenty years earlier . In this 
respect, the effects of war appear to have caused a transient extension 
of an existing trend but the aggregates mask developments in labour 
organisation which were more significant than the mere numbers would 
suggest.
In view of the abrogation of trade union liberties, the disruption 
of the labour market and the removal of many unionists into military *
* This movement has been discussed at length by Hinton (1973) who analyses 
the links between the ideas of syndicalism and industrial unionism and 
the movement and, in turn, its relationship with the embryonic communist 
party. The movement failed to flourish and ultimately collapsed due 
largely to the conflict of goals faced by skilled workers. (See also 
Lovell, 1977, pp. 52-3).
2 These figures are taken from Bain and Elshiekh (1976, Appendix E. p 
134.)
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service, the wartime and immediate postwar growth of unionism is 
surprising. But it has been argued that one of the important effects 
of war was to give a new legitimacy to trades unionism which brought 
them recognition, both from the government and employers as the represen­
tatives not only of specific groups of labour but of the working class 
as a whole. The Webbs saw this clearly as early as 1920 when they 
observed "We may, in fact, not unfairly say that Trade Unionism has, 
in 1920, won its recognition by Parliament and the Government by law 
and custom, as a separate element in the community, entitled to a distinct 
recognition as part of the social machinery of the State, its members 
being thus allowed to give ... not only their votes as citizens but also 
their concurrence as an order or estate" (1920, p. 635).
Though growth took place in the traditional fields of unionism, 
it provided an ever stronger stimulus to newly organised groups. Major 
growth areas were among what the Webbs called the "black coated prole­
tariat", in shops, offices and warehouses and especially among women.
As in previous phases of growth, there was rapid growth among the unskilled 
and labouring groups. The government played a key role in these areas 
either through legislative change affecting particular industries or 
directly as employers which led to unions in local and national government 
service and the Post Office being recognised. But even in these areas 
unionism had begun before the war and the new status and recognition 
also affected groups such as miners and railwayment whose industries 
were directly controlled during the war*. *
* Thus, for example, the Natibnal Amalgamated Union of Shop Assistants, 
Warehousement  and Clerks was started in 1 8 9 1 , the Railway Clerks 
Association in 1 8 9 / ana tne National Union of Teachers in 1 8 9 0 . The 
public service unions were de facto recognised in 1906 but it was not 
until after the war that full bargaining rights were accorded to miners 
and railwayman.
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Leaving aside the boom in growth centred on the war, if the postwar 
distribution of membership is compared with that around the turn of the 
century, the changes are marked. In the traditional areas of unionism, 
mining, engineering, cotton and building, membership increased by 129Z 
between 1897 and 1924 whereas in transport, public and private service 
and among general labourers, the growth was over 400% in each case.
Thus the percentage of total membership in the traditional group fell 
from 56.8% to 40.8% (Tarling and Wilkinson, 1982, p. 10). As was noted 
earlier, the nineteenth century staple industries came under extreme 
pressure between the wars and the recovery of the 1930s was at least, 
to some extent, based on new industries producing for the domestic market 
away from the geographical centres of unionism. Yet from 1933, 
membership underwent rapid growth rising to 6.3 million in 1939. Again 
it was led by groups outside those which had dominated unionism in the 
nineteenth century.
Though Bain and Elshiekh found no structural breaks in the equation 
for membership growth over the whole period 1893 - 1970, the fit for 
the years before 1913 is not particularly good and one might suggest 
that there were differences after 1913^. From 1913 the pattern of union 
growth follows the pattern of boom and slump very closely, suggesting 
a strong link between unionism, wage and price change and 
unemployment. There appears to be close relationship for the intervar 
period between changes in union density and in wage rates 1
1 Tests for structural breaks were conducted, breaking at 1922 and 1932. 
In either case the sharp boom and slump of 1918 - 22 is included in the 
first period which it appears to dominate (Bain and Elshiekh, p. 79 and 
Figure 2.2, p. 82).
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which holds fairly consistently at the industry level and hence it 
appears not to be confined to the newer and growing sectors (Burkitt, 
1974, Bain and Elshiekh, 1982).
Labour unrest characterises the whole period from 1910 to 1930.
The period 1910-13 saw a number of large scale strikes such as those 
by the miners, cotton operatives and railwaymen which virtually brought 
whole industries to a standstill and those in the four years following 
the war, while more intense, followed the same pattern (Cronin, 1979, 
p. 52). In 1910-14 an annual average of 16.1 million working days were 
lost, falling to 4.2 million in 1915-18 and rising again to 35.6 million 
from 1919 to 1923. In this period, the pattern of labour unrest follows 
the pattern of union growth quite closely and econometric evidence 
points to an explanation in terms of sharply rising prices and increasing 
union membership (Cronin, 1979, p. 133).
Of particular significance is the largest strike of all, the General 
Strike of 1926 which does not seem to fit into this pattern particularly 
well. Though it is often seen as a total defeat for organised labour, 
this is largely the view from the top where the General Council of the 
TUC capitulated after nine days, deserting the miners to fight on 
until November, 1926 facing ultimate defeat and returning to work on 
the employers' terms after staying out for six months. First to be 
called out were workers in transport, printing, building, iron and steel, 
heavy chemicals and power. Though the strike never became truly general, 
in the sense of a total withdrawal of labour, there was almost .total 
solidarity in the industries called out. Though defeat and recrimination 
were to follow, the general strike reflected the ability of organised
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labour to stop the whole economy if need be. (Felling, 1976, pp. 174-78).
The general strike has been seen as bringing to an end the period
of militancy and marking a change in attitudes towards a more conciliatory
approach which lasted through the 1930s into the 1950s1. The annual
average of days lost averaged 28 million for 1919-26 but fell sharply
to 3.3 million for 1927 - 1939. However, Clegg has argued that this
did not open a new era in industrial relations - the fall in days lost
was due to the decline in the number of major national disputes which
marked the disappearance of the main causes of these disputes. These
were rapid changes in prices to 1923 and then pressure on the staple
export industries occasioned by the loss of export markets and the
'flu* it
return to the gold standard^rillustrated by the fact that national disputes 
in the cotton industry continued after 1926 until Britain left the 
gold standard (Clegg, 1954, pp. 3-7). Thus most of the industrial 
unrest from 1910 onwards concerned pay settlements as the central issue.
In later work, Clegg explained some of the important features in the 
development of collective bargaining which had appeared since the early 
years of the century. "Before the war ... it was difficult to discern 
a definite trend towards industry wide pay settlement. The war made the 
difference. The cost of living rose rapidly throughout so that wages 
had to be adjusted upwards repeatedly. In these circumstances the 
settlement of rates of pay separately town by town and district by 
district became cumbersome and dilatory. At the same time the extension
1 This new approach is often seen as being reflected in the Mond - Turner 
talks of 1928-9. Though these were abortive, they are more appropriately 
viewed as reflecting adherence to the principles of "Whitleyiam" which 
also characterised the National Industrial Conference of 1919 (Clay,
1929 , p. 154-8, Clegg, 1954, pp. 17-21, Bain, 1964, p. 143).
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of state control throughout the munitions industries and into coal, 
transport and elsewhere meant that the government had assumed final 
financial responsibility for much of the economy and had, in the last 
resort, to take decisions about increases in pay. Consequently, in 
many instances, the unions were able to bypass local groups of employers 
with their separate attitudes and interests and take their case to a 
government department capable of reaching a decision for the whole 
industry" (1976, p. 203).1
In this, as in other aspects, government intervention appears as the 
key factor fostering the changes which occurred. During the war industry 
wide settlements, first in railways, coal and engineering, then spreading 
out to other industries, were made under the auspices of the Committee 
on Production which acted as the ultimate arbitrator. But even before 
the war, the beginnings of such developments can be found. The Concilia­
tion Act of 1896 and the Trade Boards Act of 1909, which provided a means 
for fixing industry wide minimum wages in unorganised industries can 
be seen as approval and direct encouragement of centralised collective 
bargaining (Flanders, 1963, p. 272). The importance of the war, 
however, is reflected in the reconmendations of the Whitley Conmittee 
which vat set up in 1916 to examine the future conduct of industrial
1 It is interesting to note that in his survey of developments in 
collective bargaining, Rowe argued that national bargaining over wages 
and the standardisation of wages and conditions was, by 1913, 
virtually inevitable. "The war, in fact, warped the normal evolutionary 
process to a surprisingly small extent: what it did do, was to quicken 
it." (1928, p. 144). However, Rowe's analysis was restricted to five 
industries in which collective bargaining was most fully developed before 
the war to the exclusion of a wider consideration of industry as a whole.
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relations. This gave positive encouragement to the industry wide 
organisation of both employers and workers. Where the industry was 
already well organised, it recommended the setting up of Joint Industrial 
Councils which would act as the focus of collective bargaining over wages 
and a wide range of other issues affecting the industry and, where it 
was not so organised, new Trade Boards were to be set up.
In the event, by 1921, 73 Whitley Councils had been set up and, although 
many disappeared in the ensuing slump, there were still A6 in 1926 in 
addition to 30 Trade Boards. Flanders has argued that the extent to which 
collective bargaining arrangements set up during the war and immediately 
after endured, was related directly to whether the industry was sheltered 
or exposed to foreign competition (1963, p. 278-9). But this is only 
part of the explanation; where Whitley Councils and Trade Boards were 
maintained was in industries which had no collective bargaining arrange­
ments of any significance before the war and hence could not easily revert 
to the pre-existing arrangements (Clay, 1929, p.160-1). The significance 
of this is that though the Whitley Councils and Trade Boards covered 
only 4 -5 million workers, they ensured that practically the whole field 
of wage employment was covered by some provision for organised collective 
bargaining. In most cases, these continued to operate industry wide 
systems of pay regulation which resulted in a substantial standardisation 
of pay within industries (Clegg, 1976, p. 205, Clay, 1929, p. 176-7).
In some industries, such as railways and building, there was almost total 
standardisation of rates whilst in mining, there was (against the will 
of the miners) a reversion to district bargaining and engineering stood 
between these two extremes with a national standard but district variations.
The developments outlined were also important in determining the 
criteria for pay settlements. As previously noted, the nineteenth
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century practice was to consider wages in the context of "the state 
of the trade" or "what the industry could afford" which, in many cases, 
meant using the criterion of selling prices. But, by the turn of the 
century, there was increasing dissatisfaction with this, particularly 
since movements of the terms of trade were not favourable to increasing 
the real purchasing power of workers. The South Wales miners repudiated 
their sliding scale in 1902 and in 1912 the mining unions mounted a 
claim for a minimum wage which indirectly resulted in the strike of 1912 
involving a million workers (Webbs, 1920, p. 513-516). During the war 
the overall determination of wage increases was based on the rise in 
the cost of living index which was constructed by the Ministry of Labour. 
Even after the war, when prices had fallen sharply, the Ministry's index 
number was still widely taken as the point of reference for comparison 
with 1913 (Clay, 1929, p. 85). As a basis for wage settlements, the 
cost of living index was retained in such industries as railways and 
in all spheres of direct government employment and in other industries 
where the wartime structure of collective bargaining was maintained. That 
such arrangements were not continued in mining is indicative of the condi­
tions which led to the general strike though, by contrast, the iron and 
steel industry remained on a aelling price sliding scale which had worked 
successfully before the war.
By the end of the 1920s, there was a wide spread feeling, at least 
among academic observers, that institutional change had altered the 
balance of forces operating in the labour market such that adjustment 
of wage rates to secure a low overall level and relatively even distribu­
tion of unemployment had become increasingly difficult to achieve. This 
consensus indicated that unemployment insurance had strengthened the 
hands of trade unionists in wage bargaining and Joint Industrial Councils
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and Trade Boards ensured their policies would be imposed on unionists 
and non unionists alike (Pigou, 1927, Clay, 1928, Rowe 1928, Ch. 5) 
Writing in 1947, Pigou summed it up thus: "Every improvement in the rate 
of benefit paid to unemployed persons, and every increase in the length 
of the period over which the benefit is paid under a national system 
of social security, lessens the extent to which the fear of consequential 
unemployment deters trade unions from exerting pressure for higher and 
higher wages. Under the comparability criteria used by Trade Boards 
in badly organised industries, this pressure operated "at least as 
strongly" as under collective bargaining (1947, p. 27).
These views have since been echoed by historians viewing this 
from a wider perspective. "Britain seemed to be in the middle of the 
theoretical gold standard adjustment process, stuck there with unemploy­
ment having no marked tendency to depress wages and prices. Union wage 
scales, unemployment insurance and unemployment relief tended to hold 
wages up. Recurrent labour disputes including a general strike and 
a lengthy coal strike in 1926 dramatized how hard it was to reduce costs 
and prices" (Yeager, 1966, p. 278; see also Garraty, 1978, p. 192-3).
With these observations in the background, we now turn to examining the 
pattern of unemployment and wage rates in more detail.
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4.5 Wages, Prices and Living Standards Between the Wars
The course of wage rates and prices is of considerable interest 
and is shown for the period from 1913 to 1938 inPigure 4.5. The data 
are from Feinstein (1972) who gives an implicit GDP deflator and reports 
the retail price or cost of living index of the Ministry of Labour. The 
wage index is for average weekly earnings which reflects variations in 
hours worked and payment by results and the changing composition of the 
labour force. From 1920 to 1938 it is Chapman's series which is 
essentially a weighted index of wage rates*'.
The graph exhibits three important characteristics. First,
compared with wage and price fluctuations between 1913 and 1923, the rest
of the period was one of stability. The wage index does not reflect
the ups and downs of economic activity as that for the prewar period.
Secondly, there is a strong similarity in the movement of all three
2
indices from 1913 onwards but especially from 1923 . Thirdly, from the 
war onwards, real wages, whether measured relative to the GDP deflator 
or the cost of living index,were higher and rose consistently above the 
level of 1913.
The Ministry's cost of living index is rather crude and the basket 
of commodities somewhat unrepresentative of the typical workman's 
budget but, though it fluctuates more than alternative indices during
* See the lengthy discussion in Chapman (1953) . Virtually the only 
industry in which variations in hours have much effect on the series 
is coal mining.
2 The dip in the wage in 1926, not reflected in the price indices, is 
undoubtedly due to the effect of the general strike, particularly on 
wages in mining.


the war and in the depression of the early 1930s, its overall movements 
are similar^. By the mid 1920s Feinstein's estimates show that real 
national income had returned to the level of 1913 but the share of income 
going to wage and salary earners was substantially higher than before 
the war. In the years before 1914 it had fluctuated around 5SZ whereas 
from 1922 to 1938, it remained within a few points of 62Z. Though this 
was, in part, due to a shift in proportions of the labour force towards 
salaried employment, there was a significant reduction in unearned 
incomes especially rents and income from abroad (Feinstein, Tables 18, 19 
T.45, T48 ). Furthermore the wage index does not reflect the substantial
reduction in hours which took place, in 1919 and 1920 when the working 
week was reduced to 48 hours for about 7 million workers.
After 1922, these changes were less marked and wage earnings 
grew in line with the overall growth in national income. Phelps Brown 
and Browne estimate that from 1924 to 1938 the average annual growth rate 
of real income for wage earners was 1.68Z and the improvement due to the 
relative decline in price of consumption goods was slightly more than 
offset by the slight decrease in the share of total income. (1968, p. 263). 
Overall,Aldcroft suggests that taking into account the reduction in hours, 
the increase in average real income from employment between 1913 and 1938 
was nearly 50Z. (1970, p. 365-6).
* Thus Bowley's modified index gives an increase of 120Z from 1914 to 
1920 compared with the 152Z on the Ministry of Labour's index (1921, p. 106). 
Similarly the Ministry's index falls more than the consumer price^index 
of Stone and Rowe between 1930 and 1933 but deviates little from it 
otherwise (Branson and Heinemann, 1973, p. 157; Aldcroft, 1970, p. 373).
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Empirical investigations of wage change for the interwar years 
have generally come up with rather poor results. As has been noted, in 
his original paper, Phillips did not estimate the wage equation for any 
period after 1913 but simply superimposed the curve estimated for 1861 
to 1913 on observations for later periods. The years 1921 to 1922 are 
clear outliers which were attributed to rapidly changing prices but, for 
the rest of the period, Phillips concluded that ” [t]he actual results 
obtained given the levels of unemployment which were held, could have 
been predicted fairly accurately from a study of the prewar data, if 
anyone had felt inclined to carry out the necessary analysis" (1958, 
p. 295). In his subsequent paper, Lipsey estimated the relationship 
for 1923-39 and 1948-57 as one period and found that the curve had 
pivoted upwards at high levels of unemployment so that there was no 
intercept. The dominant variable explaining wage change was now not 
unemployment but price change which entered with a coefficient of 0.7. 
Further, the characteristic anticlockwise loops changed direction in the 
1920s and Lipsey explained this by the changed cyclical pattern of 
unemployment for which he offered no evidence (1960, p. 27). Neverthe­
less, Lipsey broadly supported the observation that the relation had 
not shifted much .
Efforts to include variables representing the dispersion of 
unemployment percentages in submarkets in the Phillips curve have met 
with only modest success. Terms for the variance of unemployment across 
Ministry of Labour divisions were included for 1925 to 1938 by Archibald 
Kemmis and Perkina..(1974)land Thdtks and Stoney (1972). In neither’case
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were these variables individually significant^. In so far as they attempt
oto test Lipsey's aggregation hypothesis, this might have been expected 
However, Thomas and Stoney also postulated a "wage transfer mechanism"
Wage change is a function of unemployment and price change in a "leading" 
region and wage change in this region enters as an additional variable 
into the Phillips curves of other "following" regions. This was tested 
for 1925-38 by including an additional term in the difference between 
the unemployment percentage in the South East and the aggregate. With 
this representing the leading sector effect both unemployment terms 
were individually significant (1972, p. 229).
However, it has been pointed out that the significant feature in
the process of wage determination in the interwar years was the shift
to industry wide bargaining. Thus the relative wage levels to be taken
into account in bargaining would seem to be between industries rather
than regions. But it is possible, on the other hand, that, within each
industry the wage was set by reference to its most prosperous section
and low unemployment region reflects this in aggregate. No attempt has
been made to test for wage leadership at the industry level and, in any
m ail
case, it would be difficult to identify the leading industry an<^no 
reason to suppose it would not change from one year to the next.
The only other successful model was that estimated by Hines (1964) in 
which wage change was related to the level of and changes in union density. 
This relationship, particularly with changes in density, appeared to be 1
1 This was also tested and rejected by Smythe (1979, p. 230-232).
2
This is because on Lipsey's own analysis, Phillips curves in individual 
markets were linear at high levels of unemployment so that, to the extent 
that individual markets were on the linear segment of the curve, dispersion 
would not displace the aggregate relation upwards.
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particularly strong for the interwar period and using lags on the 
variables, Hines tested the direction of causality, concluding that it 
was unionism which led to wage change and not the reverse*. Nevertheless, 
as has been noted, several studies have proceeded on the assumption that 
trade unionism is the dependent variable and wage change among the 
independent variables. Hines' findings for these years have come in 
for heavy criticism but whatever its interpretation, the wage change — 
density change relation appears to be fairly robust (Purdy and Zis, 1972 
Dogas and Hines, 1974). This has also received fairly strong support 
at the industry level (Burkitt, 1974). There is no indication from the 
results that the effect was confined to,or stronger int specific industrial 
groups such as sheltered industries or those in which collective 
bargaining was newly established.
That there was substantial change in the structure of wage rates 
both within the interwar period and especially between interwar and 
prewar, is confirmed in a recent study by Norris (1979). Using data 
from wage surveys conducted by the Board of Trade and Ministry of Labour, 
rank correlation coefficients were calculated for average weekly earnings 
in 29 industries across different periods. This revealed only a weak 
correlation between the wage structure in 1906 and interwar years, 
especially 1931, when the correlation coefficient was insignificant. 
Surprisingly, the correlation of 1906 with 1938 was stronger than with
* This result is somewhat weakened by the fact that according to Hines' 
hypothesis, union density is only a proxy variable representing union 
"militancy". Thus, finding that density changes systematically precede 
wage change, does not necessarily support the view that the latter 
was caused by union militancy.
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any other interuar year and, hence, changes in the wage structure up 
to 1931 appear to have been partly reversed in the 1930s. (1979, p. 371). 
Industries with average weekly earnings in 1924 below the 1906 level were 
largely export industries and those which had expanded disproportionately 
during or immediately after the war. With 1913 “ 100, the index of engin­
eering wages was 103.1, cotton 97.5 and shipbuilding 77.7 compared with 
the unweighted average of 122.5. By 1938 these were 143.3, 91.7 and
101.1 compared with the average of 138.2 (1979 , p. 372).
Using the same basic material, Routh calculated averages of wages 
across different skill groups and Table 4.4 reports some of his findings. 
It will be seen that, among aggregates of skill groups, there was not 
much change in differentials between 1924 and 1935 and the major changes 
occur between 1906 and 1924. Among these the most decisive changes were
Table 4.4
Relative Annual Earnings for Different Skill Groups
1906 1924 1935
£ index £ index £ index
Foremen 113 100 268 238 273 242
Forewomen 57 100 154 270 156 274
Skilled Men 97 100 182 188 197 203
Skilled Women 39 100 85 218 84 215
Semi-skilled Men 63 100 126 200 134 212
Semi-skilled Women 46 100 98 212 100 216
Unskilled Men 60 100 134 223 136 227
Unskilled Women 26 100 73 280 73 280
Source: Routh (1980), Chapter 2. Various Tables
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relative improvement at each end of the skill distribution; among 
supervisory workers and the unskilled and across skilled groups, among 
women relative to men. For the most part, these changes took place during 
the war years up to 1920 and the improvement for unskilled workers 
and especially women can be ascribed in part to the operation of the 
Trade Boards. Insofar as some groups of workers were on piece rates or 
some form of payment by results, the decline in activity would have 
reduced their average hourly earnings more than the index of rates would 
indicate and these were almost exclusively in the industrial sector*.
Other changes in the wage structure compared with before the war 
are more difficult to establish with much certainty, due largely to 
lack of information from the earlier period and changes in the structure 
of employment. Routh found that, in aggregate, the female/male wage 
proportion increased less than might have been expected from the figures 
in Table 4.4. Using current weights, it was S3Z in 1913-14, 57Z in 
1922-24 and S6Z in 1935-36 (1980, p. 123). Differentials by age also 
remained large. In the Ministry of Labour survey for 1935, referred 
to above, the average wage in industry for boys and youths under 21 was 
36Z of the adult male wage and, for girls under 18, it was only half 
the adult female wage. From various industries covered in the 1906 wage 
census, it appears that proportion for boys and youths is about the same 
at 30-40Z and for girls somewhat higher at 50-60Z. Across geographical 
regions, there is little information for aggregates but for some industries, 
such as building, there is a marked leveling of rates across major towns. 
For fitters and turners in engineering, the trend is less clear especially 
given the regional standardisation in hours. Similarly, among compositors,
the range of regional variation appears to have contracted only slightly.
1 There appears to be little information on what this proportion was during 
the interwar period but it was later estimated to have been 29Z of men and 
48Z of women in manufacturing in 1938. (Crossley, 1966, p. 167).
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(Department of Employment, 1968, Tables 1-4, pp. 28-35).
Added to these tendencies towards greater equality were the effects 
of taxes and benefits, particularly for sickness, unemployment and old 
age which reduced the gap between wage earners and those without wages 
or other income to support them. With the tax exemption level
at £160, national insurance contributions and indirect taxes, the 
working class contributed a considerable amount to the benefits they 
received. But the tax system in aggregate was more progressive than 
before the war. An estimate for 1937-8 indicates that the net effect 
was to raise working class incomes by 8-14Z, reducing those of the 
upper and middle classes by 10-18Z*.
It might be anticipated that with the rise in real income, 
redistribution and the ext ension of social services, poverty on the 
scale revealed by the prewar studies of Booth and Rowntree would have
been largely eliminated. In 1936 Rowntree conducted a further survey
. 2of York which covered the entire working class population . As in his 
earlier survey, the "human needs" standard was set by a basic nutritional 
criterion though this was higher than that adopted in 1899. It was 
found that 31.1Z of those in working class families were living below 
this minimum, some 17.8Z of York's population. Using the same poverty 
line as 1899, however, only 6.8Z fell into the category of primary 
poverty as compared with 15.5X in the earlier survey. The causes of
poverty were also altered somewhat, the share due to the death or illness
* These results were obtained for different sets of assumptions by Ba m a
and are quoted in Aldcroft (1970, p. 372). Other studies referred to
were less detailed than Barns's and indicated smaller redistributory effects.
2 As Glynn and Oxborrow (1976, p. 33 ) point out, the definition of working 
class is somewhat arbitrary and excludes 35Z of the population, some of whom 
would, in most definitions, be working class and a proportion of whom may 
well have experienced poverty.
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of the chief wage earner was more than counterbalanced by the share due 
to old age^. The proportion in primary poverty due to low wages had fallen 
from more than a half to less than ten percent and that due to large 
family size by two thirdsbut, most significant, was the increase in the 
share of poverty due to unemployment. Despite the fact that all the 
families in this group were receiving unemployment benefit or assistance, 
it accounted for 44.5Z of primary poverty compared with 2.3Z in 1899 (1941, 
p. 110).
Under the new standard, unemployment and low wages accounted for
28.6Z and 32.8Z respectively of those below the minimum but the most
severe poverty was felt among the old and unemployed and in the poorest
2group, more than half of total income was made up of state benefits .
(1941, pp. 36, 39). Thus these benefits were not large enough to protect 
recipients from severe poverty and Rowntree estimated that 76Z of 
unemployed persons were living below the minimum. His model family of a 
man, a dependent wife and three children was rather atypical of the 
population at large but, with full benefit, it would have received 69Z 
of the minimum, with a miner's wage 84Z and with the average wage 112Z. 
(Glynn and Oxborrow, 1976, p. 39). But while large families may not have 
escaped poverty even with the chief wage earner employed, smaller families
* As Rowntree pointed out the increased share of poverty attributed to 
old age is due, not only to the growth in numbers over 65 but also to 
the fact that with state pensions, many of them were now able to live 
independently, albeit in poverty.
2 In Rowntree's group A, living at a level 10s or more below the minimum, 
nearly half of all poverty was accounted for by unemployment. In the 
whole group below the minimum, state benefits made up 80Z of income where 
the chief wage earner was unemployed and 66Z where he was too old to 
work (pp. 41-43).
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would be in poverty on benefits but might be considerably above the 
standard with the chief wage earner employed^.
Given its industrial composition, based on railways and chocolate 
and confectionary making, York was not amongst the areas worst hit by 
unemployment. A wide range of surveys of other industrial towns conducted 
at different times, however, broadly confirmed the findings in York.
Using a similar minimum standard, 10Z of the working class population 
of Bristol were found to be below the minimum and a lower standard yielded 
roughly the same proportion for London. These standards were, of course, 
potential, not actual, since "inefficient" spending could push families 
with sufficient income below the minimum consumption standard. In a 
controversial study, Boyd-Orr showed that if actual expenditure was
measured, then as much as half the population were undernourished in 
2some respect .
Despite these depressing findings, it is clear that had they faced 
the same conditions before the war in the absence of social services , 
their plight would have been very much worse. Moreover, with smaller 
average family size and an increasing share of the working population
* In York the average family size was 3.37 persons. Rowntree's 
minimum was defined exclusive of rent which would normally have 
amounted to anything between 5s and 10s per week. Minimum needs, exclusive 
of rent and unemployment benefit for different family types where the 
chief wage earner was unemployed, were as follows in 1936:
Minimum Benefit
Man (alone) 22s.9d 17s
Woman alone 17s.6d 15s
Man and Woman 27s.8d 26s
Man, Woman and one child 35s.Od 29s
Man, Woman and two children 38s.8d 32s
Man, Woman and three children A0s.5d 35s
Sources: Rowntree (19A1), p. 30, Burns (19A0), Table 81, p. 368
The results of many of these studies and their implications are widely 
discussed in a number of secondary sources, see, for instance, Mowat (1955) 
Ch. 9, Aldcroft (1970), Ch. 10, Branson and Heinemann (1973), Ch. 1A,
Glynn and Oxborrow (1976), pp. 33-A5.
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moving into higher paid and salaried occupations, a large proportion 
had considerably higher standards than before the war. From a sample 
of working class budgets in 1937-8, some 40.1 Z of expenditure went on 
food compared with 61.1Z for a similar survey in 1904 and that remaining 
for other items after food, rent, heating and clothing, exceeded 25Z.
Thus, for many families, not only were living standards well above 
subsistence but there was an increasing margin for the purchase of 
luxuries, durables and better quality goods. This is reflected in the 
growing output of motor vehicles and domestic appliances which became 
widely diffused in the 1930s, in the growth of small savings in banks 
and National Savings deposits and, above all, in the boom in home ownership 
and private housebuilding in the early 1930s. In these respects, the 
improvement in standards was similar in nature, though not in extent, 
to the 1920s in the United States which hare been labelled the "New Era".
The irony of interwar Britain is that this took place side by side with 
the persistence of mass unemployment and the continuance of grinding 
poverty for a significant proportion of the population.
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CHAPTER 5
UNEMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND THE MACROECONOMICS OF THE 
INTERWAR LABOUR MARKET
5.1 The Debate over the Role of Unemployment Benefits
In view of the high levels of unemployment which prevailed throughout the 
period, it is widely held that there must have been a serious failure 
in economic policy. In the economic historiography of the period, the 
blame is often laid firmly at the feet of government policy in failing 
to adopt a more aggressive exchange rate policy in the 1920's or 
failing to expand aggregate demand in the 1930's. Thus it is the failure 
to depart from tradition and to adopt a more directly interventionist 
policy which is frequently criticised. More, controversial is the recent argu­
ment of Benjamin and Kochin (1979) in which a large part of unemployment 
is attributed to the policy of providing unemployment benefits at such 
high levels and making them so widely available. In this view, it is 
not more policy activism which is called for but less and the government 
is seen as directly responsible for inducing unemployment. The argument 
about the possible impact of alternative reflationary policies is taken 
up later in the chapter but first, we re-examine the benefits hypothesis 
in detail.
In the previous chapter a number of points were made which, though 
they do not test the benefits hypothesis directly, tend to cast doubt 
on its plausibility. It is worth briefly bringing them together. It 
is clear that, when appropriately measured, unemployment benefits were 
not nearly as high relative to wages as claimed by Benjamin and Kochin.
The majority of those subsisting on benefits or assistance lived at a 
level of poverty with insufficient income to ensure adequate nutrition 
for the maintenance of physical efficiency. Whether one looks across
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age groups or sexes, regions or industries or across time, there is 
a general tendency for long term unemployment to rise more than proportion­
ately with increases in unemployment rates. Given the desolate plight 
of the long term unemployed, it is difficult to interpret this as 
reflecting the voluntary choice of individuals for long term leisure 
as against available opportunities for employment.
Enough has been said about the structure of demand in the interwar 
period to indicate that, to a considerable extent, it explains differences 
in the unemployment experience of particular industries and regions - 
an issue examined in detail in Chapter 7. As far as the distribution 
by age and sex is concerned, structural change may also have been 
responsible though it also seems likely that differences in sex and age 
specific unemployment rates existed before the introduction of a 
national insurance scheme. The evidence indicates that structural change 
only affected the structure of wage rates partially and, in some cases, 
perversely. Age differentials hardly changed at all and skill differen­
tials narrowed but industrial differentials were somewhat more flexible. 
Though Benjamin and Kochin suggested that regional wage differentials 
might be connected with unemployment through lower wage rates and, hence, 
higher benefit to wage ratios in high unemployment regions, the evidence 
of regional wage data does not indicate substantial variation (Benjamin 
and Kochin, 1979a, p. 473; Metcalf, Nickell and Floros, 1980, p. 29).
Collins correlated average wages by industry with average 
industry unemployment rates and, though the correlation was negative, 
it was not significant (1982, Table I, p. 374).
In the light of these findings, the cross section evidence adduced 
does not seem to support the case put forward by Benjamin and Kochin but 
the main weight of their argument rests on the estimated coefficients 
of a single equation time series model. This took the following form:
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U - a + a, B/W + a,(In Q - In Q*) (5.1)o 1 Z
where U is the percentage of the insured population unemployed, B/W is 
the benefit to wage ratio, Q a measure of output and Q* its exponential' 
trend over the sample period (1920 - 1938). All the coefficients were 
significant at conventional levels and the point estimate for a^ was
18.3. They assumed that at a B/W ratio of 0.27 or less (that existing 
immediately before the war) there would be no benefit induced unemployment. 
Taking this zero-effect level together with some other assumptions to 
be discussed later, they used the coefficients to calculate the counter- 
factual level of unemployment which would have existed in each interwar 
year had there been no benefit induced unemployment. They summarised 
the results of this exercise as follows: "We estimate that the insurance 
system raised the unemployment rate by five to eight percentage points 
on average and that, in the absence of the system, unemployment would 
have been at normal levels throughout much of the period" (1979, p. 441) •
This striking conclusion provoked a number of critical studies, 
some of which have recently appeared, together with a rejoinder by 
Benjamin and Kochin. These have emphasised some of the points raised 
earlier but, in large part, have concentrated on attempting to undermine 
the results of Benjamin and Kochin's econometric model in order to over­
turn their conclusion. One step has been to use alternative measures of 
the benefit to wage ratio (Metcalf, Nickell and Floros, 1980, Tables 
6 - 9, pp. 22-25). However, when Benjamin and Kochin used my weighted 
index of benefit rates using interwar weights or that calculated by 
Metcalf at al. with 1972 weights in their basic equations, the results 
are not changed very much (Benjamin and Kochin, 1982, p. 416). It has, 
however, been pointed out that, using thair own series, the inclusion 
of the observation for 1920 when the benefit to wage ratio was 0.15, is
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inconsistent with their assumption of zero effect for the benefit to
wage ratio below 0.27^. Though when this correction is made their
result holds up, others have sought to exclude the observation for 
21920 altogether .
Ormerod and Worswick (1980) and Irish (1980) find that when the first 
observation is removed and a trending variable included the coefficient 
a^ loses its significance. Further tests indicated that the coefficients 
appeared to shift at 1930. Choice of different time periods for 
estimation appears to change the point estimate on the benefit to wage 
ratio quite substantially but, in their reply to Ormerod and Worswick 
(1982), Benjamin and Kochin argued that these shifts were not statisti­
cally significant structural breaks. (1982, p.AlA ). Similarly in 
their original paper Metcalf et al. obtained a wide variety of 
coefficients for different data sets but concluded that "the effect 
estimated by BK could well be about right, although, ..., this would 
appear to have been more by luck than by judgement" (1980, p. 26).
Collins estimated a somewhat similar model on data on unemployment
-by industry finding the B/W coefficient to be insignificant in 9 out
of 12 cases. These results are somewhat improved upon in a slightly
different variant of the equation estimated by Benjamin and Kochin (1982
Table 2, p. A20-1). Cross, in his published comment, restricts himself
* The effect of including the BW ratio at 0.15 in 1920 would be equiva­
lent to having negative benefit induced unemployment in that year - a 
point now conceded by Benjamin and Kochin (1982, p. A15).
^ Metcalf et al. have argued that both 1920 and 1921 should be excluded 
because the existence of the out of work don ation scheme which provided 
generous benefits relative to those available on unemployment insurance 
means that the latter do not properly represent the average benefit 
rate (1982, p. 389).
5.5
Co arguing that the administrative operation of the genuinely seeking 
work clause and the means test leave little scope for voluntary 
unemployment. Furthermore, variations in the way the scheme was operated 
are likely to have had more important effects on unemployment than 
variations in benefit rates. But if this were accepted, Benjamin and 
Kochin would seem to have obtained their results despite, rather than 
because of, institutional changes. Hence Cross argues that causality 
may run from increases in unemployment to improvements in the benefit 
regime rather than the other way round. But this seems implausible, 
at least in view of the events of 1931 when financial pressure on the 
insurance fund caused by rising unemployment, led to a cut in benefit 
rates.
While each of these writers suggest that the basic model is seriously 
deficient, they do not examine the theory lying behind it or offer 
alternative specifications derived from theory. In the interpretation 
of Benjamin and Kochin, the impact of benefits is held to arise in 
three distinct ways. First, the generosity of benefits lowered the cost 
of search and induced workers to search longer in expectation of a higher 
post-unemployment wage, or alternatively to search less intensively and 
use benefits to finance leisure. Second, employers, in an effort to 
maintain a work force whose current marginal product was less than the 
wage, could confer greater utility on their workforce by laying off each 
worker for a fraction of the year, allowing him to claim benefits for 
a spell, than they could by effecting the appropriate wage cut. Third, 
individuals who would not otherwise be in the workforce and had 
no desire to obtain employment, were induced to register in the hope 
or expectation of receiving benefits.
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Thus Benjamin and Köchin's model is implicitly one of labour market 
equilibrium and they cite the earlier work of Maki and Spindler (1975,
197 9) who give a diagrammatic exposition of the model underlying th<2ir 
estimating equation. This is a simple partial equilibrium model of
supply and demand in a single market. The supply side is described by 
E Atwo curves S and S which are, for convenience, upward sloping. The 
former schedule gives the actual supply of workers to jobs at a particular 
point while the latter measures the total observed workforce. The 
difference between the two is the level of frictional unemployment and, 
hence, this may be regarded as a static version of the model discussed in 
Chapter 3.
Figure 5.1
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The diagram shows Che initial equilibrium at an employment level
and unemployment - Eq at the clearing wage WQ . The impact of
benefits in this model is to increase the size of the registered labour
A A Eforce at each wage shifting to and to shift SQ leftwards to
jr
Sx as workers are induced to search more or choose more leisure. Hence 
the unemployment level rises to - E^ and the wage rate rises to W^.
Thus in the model of short run partial equilibrium there are two 
structural equations and two jointly determined variables. One of these 
is either employment or unemployment and the other is the wage rate.
The Benjamin and Kochin model only has one equation and is not estimated 
using simultaneous equations methods. In terms of the equilibrium model, 
the coefficient on the benefit to wage ratio would be expected to be 
upward biased since the rate of benefit is entered as a ratio with the 
wage which is, itself, a positive function of the benefit rate.
In this model a rise in the benefit rate reduces employment through 
an upward shift in the supply curve along a negatively sloped demand 
curve. Unless there is an increase in the wage, it is not clear why 
employment should fall. If the downward sloping demand curve represents 
the marginal product schedule obtained from the equilibrium condition 
for profit maximising firms, then a rise in the wage, assuming prices 
constant will cause a decline in output as well as employment. This is 
presumably the interpretation of their observation that "to the extent 
that increases in the attractiveness of benefits decrease the number 
of persons employed, such variations also decrease output" (1979 , p. 464). 
Thus it might be argued that it is the wage and not output which should 
appear on the right hand side of their equation. This they rejected but 
only on finding that in an equation including output, the real wage was 
not significant.
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In an equilibrium model of Che interwar period estimated by 
Mathews and Minford unemployment was specified as a function of the real
wage, output.and lagged unemployment and the real wage as a functionof 
real benefits and unemployment (1981, pp. 5-6). These were estimated 
by two stage least squares and it was found that, in the absence of 
trending variables and in the presence of long lags the real benefit 
term in the real wage equation was significant. Even so, the elasticity 
was estimated at only 0.05 and 0.03 for alternative specifications. The 
real wage in turn was barely significant in the unemployment equation, 
though giving the right sign and implying elasticities between 1.3 and 3.9.
Benjamin and Kochin made a number of references to implicit contracts 
and temporary layoffs and they equate this with the operation of the 0X0 
system referred to in the previous chapter (1979, p. 448, 450). In 
their recent response they stated in passing that "0X0 systems were 
the single most important way in which the insurance system was exploited 
in the interwar period" (1982, p. 427). Thus, rather than hoarding 
workers with firm specific skills when their marginal products fell below 
the current wage, they could, under this system be laid off and the 
firm would run a smaller risk of losing them should they be needed for 
recall than if they did not qualify for benefits. The higher the level of 
benefits relative to wages, the lower the risk and the more willing firms 
would be to lay workers off.
In this case, the impact of a rise in benefits might be to shift 
the demand curve to the left at a given wage rate. This is illustrated 
in Figure 5.1 by the shift from DE to DE . This reduces the positive 
effect of benefits on the wage rate but will only leave the wage unchanged 
if DE and SE shift to the left coincidentally by the same amount. If
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this effect occurred, then a change in the benefit rate would cause 
employment to fall at any given level of output. Thus at a given 
level of output, unemployment would increase both because of increased 
labour supply and decreased employment. It is not clear, however, 
how far such effects can be taken as representing the voluntary 
actions on the part of workers, particularly if involuntary 
unemployment was widespread.
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5.2 Interwar Unemployment and Labour Market Disequilibrium
The use of a model implying labour market equilibrium by Benjamin 
and Kochin and subsequent writers has coloured the interpretation of 
the results. Thus they argued that interwar unemployment was not due 
to deficient demand and that "the unemployed of the late twenties and 
late thirties were pulled into unemployment, not pushed out of 
employment" and, more ironically that "|V]he army of the unemployed 
standing watch in Britain at the publication of the General Theory was 
largely a volunteer army" (1979, p. 474). Hence it is assumed that, 
for the most part, unemployment was voluntary and interwar unemployment 
is described using this as the maintained hypothesis. In what follows, 
it will be argued that this is not the appropriate assumption
and that a model which views unemployment as involuntary provides a 
better paradigm for interpreting the interwar period.
The most obvious piece of evidence attesting to excess supply of 
labour is the unemployment rate itself. As has been indicated, among 
the insured population this averaged 13Z from 1922 to 1931 and 16Z 
from 1932 to 1938. It has been argued in the previous chapter that, 
on the evidence presently available, the insurance figures appear 
to be roughly comparable with the data on trade union unemployment before 
1914 and that this comparison indicates unemployment rates between two 
and three times higher than before the war. From the evidence of the 
results in Chapter 3, it appear that pre-war unemployment varied around 
an equilibrium which was probably not higher than 5Z. In view of the 
fact that there was no insurance system and no discernible effects from 
trade union benefits, this could be regarded as the long run equilibrium 
level unaffected by benefits as described by the Lq - Eq in Figure 5.1*.
In their recent response to critics Benjamin and Kochin have explicitly 
accepted the comparision of the Trade Union and Insurance figures
as legitimate (1982, p.423).
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The issue then, is whether the higher levels of interwar unemploy­
ment can be attributed to the introduction of the insurance system 
causing an upward shift in unemployment analogous to the position
- E^ in Figure 5.1. Calculating counterfactual unemployment levels 
for the interwar period with the 1913 benefit to wage ratio, Benjamin 
and Kochin found that the average rate from 1920 to 1938 would 
have been between an upper bound of 9.32 and a lower bound of 6.72.^
Though this is still considerably higher than the average before 1914, it is 
argued in Appendix 5.1, in the light of further empirical evidence, that 
the way in which Benjamin and Kochin calculated these counterfactual 
rates is inappropriate even if the procedure itself is regarded as 
legitimate. If one takes their equation at face value, the natural
rate of unemployment which is derived from it is 10.132 which is more
2than double the prewar average rate .
The comparision with the postwar period is even more striking 
and this aspect has been stressed by Metbalf et al. Adjusting the inter­
war data on to the same basis as that for the postwar period yields 
average rates of 102 for 1921 - 1938 compared with 1.452 for 1948 - 1965 
and 3.912 for 1966 - 1980^. As they point out "in no year from 1922
4
to 1938 was unemployment lower than its highest postwar level" (1982, p.387).
^Metcalf et al. have argued that using the econometric equation to predict 
unemployment rates so far outside the sample range is not a legitimate 
procedure (1982, p. 395).
o
This is obtained by taking the constant term from their equation (5.19) 
and adding the threshold benefit to wage ratio (0.27) times the coefficient 
on B/W (18.3).
o
The adjustment to the interwar unemployment data is similar in magnitude 
to that of Feinstein discussed earlier. The averages of unemployment 
rates were calculated from Metcalf, Nickell and Floros (1981), Table 1 
p. 45 and Department of Employment Gazette. *
* If the recent rise in unemployment is taken into account, this is 
unfortunately no longer true.
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Thus the gap is even larger and it is even less likely that this can be 
attributed to differences in the benefit to wage ratio. As Metcalf 
et al. show, on a similar basis of comparison, though benefit to wage 
ratios were somewhat lower in the 1950s, for most of the post war period 
they were at levels closely similar to those existing between the wars 
(1982, Table 1, p. 388).
Changes in the benefit to wage ratio cannot therefore account for 
differences in average unemployment rates in different periods. If the 
period before 1914 saw average rates near equilibrium levels, it is 
likely that the early postwar period was dominated by excess demand.
Even if a figure as high as 4Z is taken as an equilibrium value for the 
postwar years, this still leaves a shift of 6Z unexplained.^ This 
indicates that the interwar period should be interpreted as one of 
excess supply of labour and involuntary unemployment.
It could be suggested that higher interwar unemployment might be 
attributed not the level of benefits but to the generosity with which 
they were administered. The argument of Cross (1982) has already 
been noted in this context. Comparing the administration of the system 
with that in the postwar period, Metcalf et al. have concluded that 
"there is no question of the administration of the system being more 
generous in the interwar period" (1982, p. 374). This is given added 
support by the results of a Ministry of Labour enquiry of 1925 which 
examined a sample of claims which had been authorised but which were thought 
potentially doubtful. Those subsequently disallowed on the ground of 
"not genuinely seeking work" or not making reasonable efforts to obtain 
employment accounted for only 2.7% of the claims examined and, for 
males, only 1.3% (Bakke, 1931, pp. 85-86).
* In a paper on postwar unemployment, Batchelor and Sheriff (1979) found 
that the equilibrium unemployment rate was below 2% until 1970. After this 
disequilibrium shifts raised the rate consistent with fully anticipated 
inflation to about 4%,
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On the basis of this and a number of other enquiries conducted by 
the Ministry together with a detailed study of the unemployed at Greenwich 
in 1931, Bakke concluded that "the behaviour of the unemployed in search­
ing for new employment gives no evidence that the possibility of drawing 
unemployment benefit has retarded the efforts of the unemployed to get 
back to work. It has removed the cutting edge of the desperation which 
otherwise might attend that search" (1931, p. 143). Neither , on the 
whole, were the unemployed unsuited for, or in some way disabled from 
unemployment. In a detailed enquiry into a sample of the unemployed 
in York, Rowntree found that 76Z "are fit and capable and eagerly looking 
for work" while 12Z "are not making any strenuous efforts to find it and 
another 12Z suffered from some degree of physical disability or old age1 
(1941, p. 44).
A more direct impression of excess supply could be gained by comparing 
the numbers unemployed with total vacancies outstanding but, unfortunately, 
vacancy stock data are not available for the period. One sample survey 
of vacancies in 1937 in the South and Midlands yielded "a figure of 2210 
as the maximum of unsatisfied demand for labour in Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland as notified to the employment exchanges" (Beveridge,
1944, p. 88). In the survey month, the number unemployed exceeded 1.5 
million. This yields an extraordinarily low ratio of vacancies to 
unemployment of about one seventh of one percent. Even if vacancies 
were under estimated by a multiple, it would not alter the picture of 
massive excess supply of labour.
1 Even among these Rowntree found that, under normal circumstances of 
labour demand, many would be employed though they would always be 
marginal workers.
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If the evidence on vacancies is discounted, it might be argued that 
the interwar period was characterised by a high level of structural 
unemployment in which excess supply in some labour markets existed side 
by side with excess demand in others. In this case higher interwar 
unemployment represents a higher equilibrium or natural rate of unemploy­
ment. The findings of chapter 7 serve to cast doubt on whether struc­
tural imbalance was as serious an impediment to achieving higher levels 
of employment between the wars as is sometimes thought. At the cyclical 
peak of 1937 the lowest regional unemployment rates were in London and 
the South-East which, on the insurance figures had levels in excess of 
6Z. On the same measure the most fully employed county was Wiltshire 
with 3.8Z and for major counties the lowest rate at an individual 
exchange was 1.4Z - not appreciably lower than the national average for 
the early postwar years. Similarly at the industry level, the lowest 
rate recorded in 1937 was 2.8Z for Scientific and Photographic Instruments 
and Apparatus. (Beveridge 1944, Table 5, p. 61, Table 36, pp. 324-327,
Table 33, pp. 316-320). Thus even in low unemployment areas and industries 
there does not seem to have been significant excess demand for labour 
and what there was is dwarfed by massive excess supply in others.
A direct test of the market clearing against the non market clearing 
approach has been performed on aggregate interwar data by Irish and 
Winter. Though their tests did not reject the market clearing hypothesis, 
they nevertheless rejected it on other grounds and went on to specify 
and estimate a non clearing model which partitioned the sample into supply 
and demand side observations. The result indicated labour market equili­
brium at an unemployment rate of about 10Z (13Z for insured workers only) 
and the years of excess demand were 1923-5, 1927-9 and 1937. Even so,
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the finding Chat virtually all of the coefficients in the supply 
equation were insignificantly different from zero casts doubt on the 
view that employment was ever supply constrained. Accordingly, they 
concluded that "[ijt is quite possible that excess supply existed for 
the entire period" (1981, Table 3 and page 17).
Recent contributions in macroeconomics have examined the short run 
functioning of the economy when markets fail to clear and a number of 
expositions of the basic three markets model are available (Bar-ro and 
Grossman, 1976; Malinvaud, 1977; Benassy, 1977; Stoneman, 1979;
Casson, 1981.) Since real economies are not characterised by price 
setting by a Walrasian auctioneer or a process of recontracting before 
trading takes place, goods and services and, most importantly, labour 
might be expected to exchange at non-Walrasian prices. Since no seller 
or buyer is forced to trade more than he would wish, given the conditions 
facing him, markets transact the minimum of supply and demand, giving 
rise to either excess supply or demand. When one side of a market 
fails to realise the trades it would like, agents will take the implied 
rationing into account in forming their supplies and demands on other
< i
markets. Hence there is a distinction between notional or unconstrained 
and 'effective' or constrained supplies and demands. The implications 
of this for the labour market can be examined with the aid of Figure 5.2.
This is a modified version of Figure 5.1 in which the labour market
is described in isolation from the rest of the economy. The supply side
E Ais represented by supply curves S and S as before. On the demand side 
D is the demand curve as before and its downwards slope represents the 
unconstrained demand for labour; there is either excess demand or 
equilibrium in goods markets and firms can sell as much as they like and
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hence set employment and output in accordance with the marginal produc­
tivity condition. However, this may not clear the labour market and 
give rise to involuntary unemployment because of too high a wage rate. 
This is termed "Classical Unemployment". The vertical section of the 
demand curve DE ' represents the case where firms are output constrained. 
Along this portion firms cannot sell all they would like and find 
themselves in a position where the marginal product of labour is greater 
than the wage. At prevailing prices and wages, there is excess supply 
in both product and labour markets and employment is determined by the
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sales constraint. This is termed "Keynesian Unemployment". At the non­
clearing wage there is voluntary unemployment 1  ^- Lq and either involun­
tary Classical Unemployment Lq - Eq or Keynesian Unemployment of Lq - E^.
As in Figure 5.1 the apparatus can be used to show the possible
impact of unemployment benefits. As before, a rise in the benefit to wage
ratio shifts the supply curves to new positions and S^. The outward
shifting curve raises unemployment by increasing the labour force to
but the leftward shift of the curve has no effect because it is
still to the right of the demand curve, E < L'. All that happens iso o
that some part of the stock of involuntary unemployment moves into 
voluntary unemployment. As a result, workers are not "pulled into 
unemployment" but, on the other hand, they may be pushed out of employment. 
This will occur if, for reasons already discussed, the effect of a rise
in the benefit to wage ratio is to shift the demand to the left as depicted
E Eby the displacement from Dq to in the diagram.
In either of the regimes there is no reason why output should change 
due to direct labour market effects but, in Keynesian unemployment, there 
may be output effects coming through the product market. A rise in 
unemployment benefits at a given level of unemployment will worsen the 
government's budget deficit if it is not compensated by other changes in 
the accounts. This will add to aggregate demand in the standard Keynesian 
manner shifting the demand curve to the right, increasing employment and 
reducing unemployment. Hence the full macroeconomic effect of increasing 
unemployment benefits is ambiguous in the Keynesian regime and depends 
whether the direct shifts in labour supply and demand curves ere outweighed 
by the implied demand expansion.
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As has been indicated, benefits might have aggravated unemployment 
through the more indirect and longer term effect on wage rates. The 
result of an increase in benefits in Figure 5.2 is to raise voluntary 
unemployment by more than total unemployment. Thus if wage adjustments 
are related to excess demand or involuntary unemployment rather than total 
unemployment, there will be a tendency for wage rates to be maintained 
at levels higher than indicated by the level of measured unemployment. 
Alternatively, the effect of rising benefits may be more direct. The 
benefit level may enter directly into the wage bargaining process or 
indirectly by making unions more willing to stick out for higher wage 
rates. In Classical Unemployment higher wage rates will clearly worsen 
unemployment as demand will contract and supply may expand but, in 
Keynesian Unemployment, this will not necessarily hold. A rise in the 
wage rate will not reduce employment directly and, if it results in a 
shift in the income distribution towards those with higher propensities 
to consume out of current income, then by increasing aggregate demand 
employment may be raised.
Labour market excess supply appears to be a more attractive assumption 
upon which to build a model for the period in which Keynes wrote the 
General Theory. With this it becomes easier to understand many of the 
features of the interwar labour market which have already been discussed. 
The concentration of unemployment in specific industries and regions 
reflects higher levels of excess supply as the result of larger demand 
deficiency for the products of these industries and regions. The 
concentration of long term unemployment and its increase in the 1930s 
is the result of persistent demand deficiency. Differences in unemployment 
by age and sex can also be interpreted as the consequence of disequili­
brium. If this is accepted, than cross-sectional comparisons of 
unemployment rates and benefit to wage ratios era meaningless.
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5.3 A Model of Labour Market Disequilibrium for the Interwar Period
In this section we specify a model based on the assumption of labour 
market excess supply. The objective is to develop a set of equations 
with relatively simple functional forms which can be estimated on time 
series data. First the basic equations of the model are laid out and 
then the sets of structural equations relevant for Keynesian and Classical 
Unemployment are considered in turn.
The production function is based on that used by Ball and St. Cyr 
(1966):
reflecting the contribution of technical progress and capital stock 
accumulation. This function is preferred to the C.E.S production function 
in the present context because both the production function and the 
first order condition for profit maximisation are linear in logs. 
Furthermore this approach has been extensively used in the literature 
on employment functions discussed in the next chapter. The variable H 
is the labour utilisation rate (which is the complement of the rate 
of labour hoarding). When the labour market is in excess supply the 
non cyclical component of this is a positive function of the benefit 
to wage ratio. This is reflected in the simple function:
(5.2)
where Q is output, E is employment (number of workers) and t a time 
trend; a1 is the returns to labour parameter and a2 the growth coefficient
H - a3(^) (5.3)
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where and are both positive
For aggregate demand, the following specification is adopted:
Q.D (5.4)
where Z is a vector of exogenous variables determining demand. When 
demand is unconstrained, it is expected to be a positive function of the
meters represented by will also be different.
Two other basic elements of the model are the labour supply equation 
and the wage adjustment equation. .The measurable part of labour supply is 
apparent supply, equal to the observed labour force, L, specified as
The sign of 8  ^ is ambiguous but that of i* expected to be positive and 
the trend term with parameter 83 which captures the secular growth of the 
potential labour force is also positive. The level of effective supply 
depends on apparent supply but also varies with the benefit to wage 
ratio such that
Equation 5.6 allows the ratio of labour demand to effective supply, E, which 
is the complement of the proportion of true excess supply or involuntary 
unemployment to be expressed in terms of observables - employment and 
the labour force
real wage. If demand is constrained, may not be positive and the para­
e (5.5)
(5.7)
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The Phillips curve for the labour market is based on this modified excess 
supply variable but also includes two other components. One is price 
change which reflects the standard augmented Phillips curve and the other 
is the change in the unemployment benefit rate
A
w (5.8)
where all the parameters are expected to take positive signs and a hat 
over the character denotes one plus the rate of change. Thus
A similar approach is taken to the price equation in the case where 
prices fail to clear the product market so that price change depends on 
excess supply or demand and on actual or the expected change in wage 
costs
(5.9)
where 4 and $2 are positive.
Using these equations we can now set out the different sets of 
structural equations for employment, unemployment and wage and price change 
appropriate under each macroeconomic regime.
Keynesian Unemployment
In the Keynesian regime there is excess supply in both labour and
E D Sproduct markets so that E < S and Q < Q . Since firms are rationed as 
to the amount of output they can sell, employment is determined though 
the production function from (5.2) and (5.3) as
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Employment is determined by output end a time trend but also by the 
benefit to wage ratio if it affects employment through labour dishoarding 
or through temporary layoffs which will reduce the level of employment 
for a given level of output. The employment ratio obtained by dividing
Including the labour force equation increases the negative effect of 
the benefit to wage ratio and the sign on the real wage is ambiguous.
The Phillips curve for wage change is obtained by substituting 
equation (5.7) into (5.8) to give
V - eoa 7 1(I)ei (J^ 1'1 i 2 P*3 (5.12)
Thus, given the rate of unemployment, wage change is a positive function 
of both the level of the benefit to wage ratio and the change in the 
nominal benefit rate. In the product market there is no observable 
proxy for excess supply but the notional output supply function can be 
obtained by taking first order conditions for profit maximisation 
subject to the production function which yields^
provided equation (5.3) is substituted into both the production function 
and the cost equation, it does not appear in the first order condition 
for output, though it does appear in that for employment.
(5.10) by (5.5) is
E a
- (a ^ + B j)  ~ (a 2/ a1+B3) t2'“l p3
(5.11)
. l/(l-a.) a/(l- a.)
« - “o »1
-«|/(l-«j> (o2/(l-«1))t
(5.13)
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Since demand is the short side, Q - QD and the ratio of demand to supply
is
(5.14)
Equation (5.14) can now be substituted into (5.9) to give a price change 
equation in terms of observable variables
Price change is a positive function of the real wage since the higher 
the real wage the smaller is notional demand. It is also a positive 
function of actual output which represents effective demand.
Classical Unemployment
In the Classical regime there is excess supply in the labour
E D Smarket and excess demand in the product market so that E < S and Q >_ Q . 
Since firms are not now faced with quantity constraints, they can sell 
as much as they wish so that output and employment are both decision 
variables obtained jointly from the first order conditions. Output will 
now be that given by the notional supply curve in equation (5.13) and 
the equation for employment is
,l/(1- V  -l,w ■l/(1'Bl),B.-°4 a2/ ( W l)C (5 16)
E <0oBi* a3 « (5.16)
Since the production function always holds, equation (5.11), the 
Keynesian employment function is also legitimate though, in this case, 
output would be a jointly determined variable. The employment ratio 
derived from (5.16) and t5.5) is
*1a1/^l-a l) “ ^ x a2/(1-a2))t **2
(5.15)
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Output does not appear in the equation and the real wage coefficient 
will be negative if the slope of the demand curve for labour outweighs 
any tendency for the labour supply curve to be backward bending; the 
effect of the benefit to wage ratio is the same as that in the Keynesian 
case equation (5.11).
Since the labour market is assumed not to clear, the structural
form for the wage equation will be the same as equation (5.12) though,
given the difference between (5.11) and (5.17) the reduced form will
differ. In the price change equation, if the market does not clear,
D Sthere is excess demand, Q > Q and hence, supply is the short side
sso Q ■ Q and demand is represented by the aggregate demand function 
equation (5.4). The ratio of supply to demand is therefore
Q° n“1 v 2
" Q Yo ¥  2
Substituting into (5.9) gives the price adjustment function
*  “$1  w ^  ^  ^ 1y2 «^2
p " Yo <F> 2 w
(5.18)
(5.19)
D SAlternatively, if the product market is assumed to clear, then Q • Q 
and equations (5.4) and (5.13) can be solved for the price level and 
the equation converted to changes to give
-aj/d-aj) y 2
Yl+ai/(l"°i> *Yl+al(1_ai) - f - e 1 1 Z 1 1  l W (5.20)
In this case price change is a function only of the variables determining 
aggregate demand and the non-clearing wage.
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Before reviewing estimates of the model specified in this section 
on interwar data, it is useful to draw some comparisons with the model 
estimated for the prewar period in Chapter 3. In that case labour 
market equilibrium was assumed while the present model assumes disequili­
brium. No attempt is made to test between these hypotheses, partly 
because of the inherent difficulty of so doing but also because strong 
a priori arguments have been advanced for viewing the two periods 
differently. Thus the inferences drawn from the results in each case 
are largely, though not entirely, a matter of interpretation rather 
than testing the values of particular coefficients.
In some respects the models are quite similar though there are 
important differences. In each case labour demand is determined through 
the production function but a different function is used in the present 
context to sharpen the distinction between the Classical and Keynesian 
cases. Similarly in each case there is an equation relating unemployment 
to wage change though, in the present context, it is viewed as a 
traditional Phillips curve type adjustment function. In estimation 
adjustment of both wages and prices are assumed to depend on excess demand 
lagged one period to emphasise the characteristic of disequilibrium. 
Leaving aside these distinctions, the model could be interpreted in the 
manner of Chapter 3 but in order to support the equilibrium view, it 
would have to be shown that significant coefficients could be estimated 
for the Phillips relation. If not, then the interpretation of this as a 
Classical labour supply function is ruled out and the wage has to be 
regarded as determined by forces other than those which are thought of as 
fixing the short run labour market equilibrium.
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5.4 Estimates for the Interwar Years
Before proceeding to the estimation of the equations of the previous 
section it Is necessary to specify the truly exogenous variables appearing 
in the vector Z. While It is possible to offer alternative specifications 
of how these variables might affect the key magnitudes in the labour market 
It is Impossible to be agnostic about the variables themselves. In order 
to take account of competing theories, three key variables are selected as 
being, either individually or jointly, the motive forces in fluctuations 
between the wars. These are real investment expenditure, the nominal money 
supply and a volume index of world trade. World trade was preferred to 
exports because of the obvious endogeneity arising from domestic price 
movements but the other two variables are probably at least partly endogenous. 
However, feedbacks from changes in activity on prices are likely to have 
been relatively small in the short run which adds some support to their 
validity as exogenous variables in estimating equations. The other exogenous 
variables in the model are the average unemployment benefit rate, and a 
time trend.
Annual estimates for the UK 1920-38 on output investment, employment 
and the labour force and wages and prices were taken from Feinsteln^. The 
nominal money supply (Ml) was taken from Sheppard and the index of world
trade from the League of Nations extended back to 1921 on the basis of Lewis's 
2estimates.
Felnsteln (1972). GDP output estimate from Table 6, p. T119; Gross 
Domestic Fixed Capital Formation, Table 5, p. T14; Employment and Working 
Population, Table 57, p. T126; GDP Deflator, Table 61, p. T133; Wags 
Rates Table 65, p. T140.
2 League of Nations (1938) p. 60 Lewis (1952), Table 1 p. 106-7.
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In estimating the equations It Is possible using the appropriate 
techniques to estimate reduced forms, quasi reduced forms or structural 
equations. In the model of the previous section emphasis is placed on 
alternative structural equations which may not be easily distinguishable 
as reduced forms and hence as far as possible structural equations are 
estimated. For some equations the estimating technique depends on the 
true structure since in some cases there will be feedbacks from right hand 
side variables and in others not. Each equation is therefore estimated 
by instrumental variables and the instruments are restricted to those 
variables discussed above that would be exogenous in any version of the 
model. In equations estimated in levels only the current values of these 
variables was used while in wage and price equations specified in changes, 
current and lagged values were used. We turn first to examine the structural 
relations characterising the Keynesian regime.
Keynesian Unemployment
Equations 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and 5.15 form the Keynesian system and 
these are converted to estimating equations by taking logs and adding the 
stochastic error term. Thus the equations to be estimated are 
lnEt - aQ + ax lnQfc + a2ln(jj)t + a3t + Uj^ t
ln(|)t - bQ + b2 lnQt + b2 ln(jf)t + b3 lnj^ + b^t + u2fc 
din Wt - cQ + c2 + c2 ln(^>t + «3 dlnBt + c4dlnPfc + Ujt
din Pt - dQ + dx lnQt_1 + + djt + d4 dlnWt + u4t
The expected signa on the variables in these equations are the following:
a2 > 0, a2 < 0, a3 < 0. b2 > 0, b2 < 0, bj < 0 b4 < 0, Cj > 0, c2 > 0,
c3 > 0, c4 > 0, d2 > 0, d2 > 0, dj < 0, d4 > 0.
(5.21)
(5.22)
(5.23)
(5.24)
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The results of estimating these equations over the years 1921-38 
for the levels equations and 1922-38 for equations in changes are given 
in Table 5.1. The output constrained employment function gives a 
good fit, is free of serial correlation and all variables give the 
expected sign. The output term is highly significant but exhibits 
the common result that the short run returns to labour coefficient a,j 1
is significantly larger than one which, in terms of the simple specifica­
tion adopted, is inconsistent with the possibility of a downward sloping 
demand curve for labour. This tends to support the view that employment 
was output constrained and that some of the variation in output was met 
by changing the utilisation rate of employed labour. It is also consis­
tent with the strikingly significant coefficient on the benefit to wage 
ratio which gives a t value of 5.6. The result is even more surprising 
if the coefficient is used to estimate the reduction in employment re­
sulting from the rise on the benefit to wage ratio from 1921 to its 
peak in 1935. Evaluated at the sample means, this suggests that 
employment fell by over 1.8 million which would account for three 
quarters of the unemployment existing in 1935, considerably in excess 
of the maximum proportion suggested by Benjamin and Kochin*. Given 
the small coefficient on the time trend, it was thought that differen­
tial values of growth of productivity or in the capital stock between 
the 1920s and 1930s might have been picked up by the benefit to wage 
ratio and so a time trend dummy was introduced at 1930. This only 
served to further raise the coefficient on the benefit to wage ratio 
and reduce that on the time trend.
* Benjamin and Kochin concentrated only on the insured population while 
the present estimates use Feinstein's data which covers both insured 
and uninsured though, as they pointed out (1979, p.452 ) the unemploy­
ment percentage for the former, while substantially higher, is closely 
correlated with the Feinstein estimate for the aggregate.
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In the employment ratio equation the coefficient on output is
about the same and the real wage term, though giving the expected sign,
is not significant, which suggests an inelastic labour supply schedule.
Surprisingly, the size and significance of the coefficient on the
benefit to wage ratio is reduced to about half its value in the 
nxho
employment^equation. Hence the measured effects of the benefit to 
wage ratio on unemployment appears to arise mainly on the demand side 
and to be partially offset or masked by perverse movements on the 
supply side. The net effect on unemployment of the rise in the benefit 
to wage ratio from 1921 is now to raise unemployment in 1935 by 
nearly four percentage points for the labour force as a whole. Though 
this result is broadly consistent with those of Benjamin and Kochin, 
they did not examine supply and demand for labour separately and the 
finding that the measured effects of the unemployment benefits arises 
on the demand side run directly counter to their supply side inter­
pretation.
The wage equation is much less satisfactory although a high level 
of explanatory power is obtained and the equation is free of serial 
correlation. The employment ratio gives the wrong sign as do the 
benefit terms and all three are insignificant. Only the price term 
gives a significant coefficient which is substantially larger than one. 
Some experimentation was undertaken to see if these results were 
sensitive to alternative specifications. In particular the benefit terms 
were eliminated separately and together but none of the remaining 
variables with the exception of the price term took a significant 
coefficient. The equation was also run beginning in 1923 and 1924 
to see if other effects were being swamped by the sharp simultaneous • 
decline in wages and prices at the beginning of the period: this also 
failed to alter the results substantially.
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The price equation is more in accord with expectation and all 
variables give the expected sign. The output term is highly significant 
and its coefficient gives an estimate of the slope of the price 
adjustment function which appears to be relatively flat. The other 
terms are not significant but the point estimates give highly plausible 
orders of magnitude.
Classical Unemployment
In the regime of Classical Unemployment the equations are those 
for employment and the employment ratio, (5.16) and (5.17) and the two 
alternative price equations, (5.19) and (5.20). The wage equation is 
also included in this regime but since it is identical to that for the 
Keynesian case, it need not be re-estimated. As before these 
equations were converted to estimating form by taking logs and adding 
the stochastic error term.
Thus the estimating equations are as follows
In E t - a^ + a’ In j  + a£ ln(g) ♦ a^t ♦ uItI (5.25)
(5.26)
Ain Pt - d; ♦ d* in Qt_1 ♦ dj lnijl)^ ♦ d ’ In dj In Mfc_1
♦ d M n  WT , + d' ln W + ult 5 o t J (5.27)
Ain ?t ■ eo ♦ Ain I£ ♦ e2 Ain e3 Ain WTt + e^ Ain Wt ♦ u£t
(5.28)
The expected signs on the coefficients are as follows:
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*1 < 0 a2 < 0 a3 > °* b{ < 0 < 0 < 0,
d, ' < 0 d ’ < 0 di > 0 d! > 0 d' > 0, d' > 0,1 2 3 4 5 6
e. > 0 e0 > 0 > 0 e, > 0 .1 2  3 4
The results obtained from estimating these equations using instrumental 
variables are given in Table 5.2.
The employment equation is much less satisfactory than its
equivalent in Table 5.1 and the low Durbin Watson statistic reflects
the failure of the equation to pick up the decline and recovery of 
employment in the early 1930's. Despite the finding of increasing short- 
run returns to employment in the earlier equation, the demand curve appears 
to be downward sloping though the coefficient is not significant and 
the effects of the benefit to wage ratio disappears altogether entering 
insignificantly with the wrong sign. As might be expected, these 
results are largely reflected in the employment ratio equation. The 
real wage term continues to take the expected sign but, this time, the 
size of the coefficient on the benefit to wage ratio increases as the 
supply side interpretation would predict though it remains insignificant.
The disequilibrium price equation is also less satisfactory than 
its equivalent in Table 5.1. This time the coefficient output is 
predicted to be negative but is positive and insignificant. Among 
the demand variables, the real wage takes a strikingly large and 
significant coefficifcilt but all the other terms are small and 
insignificant with world trade giving the wrong sign. The wage change 
term gives a similar coefficient to that in the alternative equation 
though its significance is reduced. The strength of this relationship 
is increased in the equilibrium price equation as is the size of the
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coefficient and it is the dominant variable in the equation. Of the 
three demand variables, two give the wrong sign, one with a significant 
coefficient.
Inevitably, the results do not provide unambiguous support for one 
specification and reject another. For employment and unemployment, 
the output constrained equations appear to be superior but, by itself, 
this does not indicate that classical unemployment can be ruled out.
Given that there is some evidence of a downward sloping demand curve 
for labour, it is possible that, at times, a classical regime existed 
while, at other times, employment was output constrained. However, the 
finding of increasing short run returns to labour tends to cast doubt 
on the possibility of a downward sloping demand curve. Moreover, the 
finding that the benefit to wage ratio is only important in the 
equations when output is included and that its impact appears to be on 
the employment side casts serious doubt on the equilibrium view.
Under the assumption of disequilibrium price adjustment, the 
hypothesis of excess demand or supply in the product market can, in prin­
ciple, be tested by looking at the sign on output. On this criterion 
the equations offer more support to the Keynesian view and the evidence 
of an upward sloping notional supply curve, though not significant, is 
consistent with the results obtained for employment. However, in the 
alternative equation, there are four separate activity terms and the 
insignificance of the coefficients may reflect the problem of multicol- 
linearity. The most consistent result arising from the wage and price 
equations is the very strong relationship between wage and price change. 
This is the only significant relationship emerging in the wage equation 
which is decisive in rejecting any impact of unemployment benefits on 
the change in or level of wages or any effect of excess supply. Given
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this close relationship, it is hard to untangle the true direction of 
causation though, given the estimating technique, the equations should 
be free of this ambiguity. Overall the results suggest real wage 
rigidity with prices and through this, nominal wages responding to 
variations in output.
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5.5 Interwar Unemployment and the Keynesian Solution
It has been argued so far that the evidence from the interwar labour 
market indicates labour market excess supply. Of the two possible 
macroeconomic regimes, the evidence is consistent with, or at least does 
not contradict, the view that Keynesian Unemployment existed. This 
suggests that policy activism to reflate the economy- and make up 
for deficient demand might have been appropriate. Central to the 
traditional model of generalised excess supply is the consumption 
function. Under Keynesian Unemployment workers are constrained in the 
labour market and consumption depends largely on the constraint of 
current income. In these circumstances, it might be expected that the 
relation between consumption and current income would be closer than 
at other times when workers would not have faced a constraint on 
current labour supply and when they may have faced constraints in the 
product market. We turn first to examining estimates for the consumption 
function before considering values for the expenditure multiplier.
The Consumption Function
Two models of consumption are considered. The first is a 
traditional type of consumption function which allows for different 
propensities to consume out of different classes of income. The 
obvious distinction is between wage and salary income on one hand and 
non-labour income on the other. In the short run the propensity to 
consume would be expected to be higher out of income from employment 
both because of the lower income levels of workers and because the 
constraint of employment would affect their income more than lion -labour 
income recipients.
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The model to be estimated was taken in the following ratio
form
C,t 1
Y,D,t D,t
+ u,5,t
where C “ total consumption expenditure, - total disposable income 
and Yyp - disposable wage and salary income all deflated by the 
implicit price index for consumption. The parameter i(<o is the constant 
term, the marginal propensity to consume out of non-labour income 
and 1 the difference expected to be positive between the marginal
propensities to consume out of labour and non-labour income.
Annual data used in estimation were taken from Feinstein and the 
model was estimated over the years 1921-1938 by instrumental variables 
using domestic capital formation, exports of goods and services and a
Consumer's expenditure and total personal income are from Feinstein 
(1972), Table 10, p. T28. Disposable wage and salary income was 
obtained by subtracting employees' contributions for unemployment 
and health insurance calculated from the same tables from gross wage 
and salary income in Table 21 p. T55. Y ^  will be overestimated to the
extent that these incomes were liable to direct tax but this would be 
relatively small in magnitude and would tend to bias downwards.
Gross domestic capital formation and exports of goods and services in 
constant prices which are used as instruments are from Table 5, p. T15-16
time trend as instruments^. This gave the following result (standard 
errors in parentheses).
C
9
405.305 — —  
(29.536) D,t
+ 0.665 + 0.195 =2^-
(0.083) (0.126) *D,t
0.921 R.S.S. - 0.0006 D.W. - 1.679
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As expected the equation gives a good fit and, although the 
coefficient <\i^ is not significantly different from zero on the t test 
at the 5Z level, it is easily significant at the 10Z level. Furthermore, 
the equation yields extremely plausible estimates of the marginal 
propensities to consume, 0.665 for non-labour income and 0.86 for 
income from employment.
An alternative formulation is based on the permanent income 
approach in which current consumption is related to a distributed lag 
of current income. In ratio form,the function to be estimated is as 
follows
The definitions of the data are the same as those used earlier. In this
case p' is the constant term, p' is the short run marginal propensity o 1
to consume, and i® c^e partial adjustment parameter, 1 - p£ is
C,T 322.480 =-i—  
(48.411) D,t
+ 0.691 ♦ 0.140
(0.051) (0.070) *D,t
R2 - 0.918 R.S.S - 0.0007 D.W - 1.333
The overall fit is not improved over the earlier equation and the
Durbin Watson statistic is lower though it will be biased upwards in 
the presence of a lagged dependent variable. This will tend to bias the 
standard errors downwards but, even so, the lagged term is only marginally
significant at the 5Z level. Bearing in mind these qualifications, 
the result suggests that about 85Z of adjustment comes in the current 
year - a result which is consistent with the view that consumption was 
largely determined by the constraint of current income. The short 
run m.p.c. of 0.69 is substantially higher than that usually obtained 
in this type of consumption function .
The Expenditure Multiplier
There have been two prominent attempts recently to calculate values 
for the standard Keynesian expenditure multiplier which use the two 
different versions of the consumption function estimated above. Most 
recently Glynn and Howells have argued that serious doubt must be cast 
on "the feasibility during the early 1930s of the 'Keynesian Solution' 
granted the validity of orthodox Keynesian concepts" (1980, p. 30).
The argument was based on the finding that the multiplier was low and 
that the large deficits which would have been necessary to make any signi­
ficant impact on unemployment would have caused a collapse of confidence 
which might offset any direct stimulus to demand.
To demonstrate this they went to considerable lengths to obtain a 
value for the multiplier by taking values of the relevant propensities 
from various sources "making generous allowances in favour of the 
Keynesian case". This yielded an upper bound estimate of 1.26 which, 
as they point out is considerably lower than the values estimated by 
comtemporaries which ranged between 1.5 and 2 and which have gained a 
wide measure of acceptance (1980, pp. 35-41). Their values of the 
marginal propensities for the two income classes were taken from Radice 
which were 0.64 to 0.70 for non-labour income end 0.90 to 0.925 for
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income from employment. These are close to those obtained above and 
appear realistic though perhaps not excessively generous. However, 
their value for the marginal propensity to import which they take as 
0.355, appears to be rather high. In the econometric
model estimated by Thomas , this is estimated at 0.21 which seems a 
rather more plausible value (1975, p. 4). If this is substituted into 
their expression for the multiplier, its value rises to 1.49^.
In his somewhat more sophisticated approach, Thomas estimated a 
full Keynesian econometric model of the interwar economy (1975, 1981). 
This gave an.impact multiplier of only 0.98 and a long run multiplier 
of 1.44 which neatly brackets the estimate of Glynn and Howells. In 
his permanent income type consumption function, the short run m.p.c. 
is only 0.443, significantly lower than the value estimated above, though 
given the larger coefficient on lagged consumption, the long run 
m.p.c. is similar at about 0.8. The main reason that such low estimates 
are obtained, however, appears to be that first round expenditure 
effects feed only slowly and partially into disposable income. In *1
* The expression for the multiplier they use is (in their notation)
k - ------- -------
1 ♦ £  - (c-m)(l-t)
P
where c and m are marginal propensities to consume and import, t is the 
marginal tax rate, u is per capita unemployment benefit and p average 
output per capita. Substituting in the chosen values gives
______ ____________ 1____________________
1 * ~ (0*84 ~ 0.355) (1 - 0.15)
k 1.26
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particular, profits respond only gradually to expenditure changes and, 
by assumption, income from self employment does not respond at all.
In turn profits feed only slowly into investment and, as with wages, 
only gradually into consumption.
Glynn and Howells take their text for the'Keynesian Solution’from 
Keynes open letter to President Roosevelt of 1933. While this does 
not embody a specific set of proposals for reflating the British 
economy, they take the definition of the ’Solution' to be the 
indiscriminate expansion of expenditure through public works schemes 
in order to return the economy to full employment. Thus taking their 
estimate for the multiplier of 1.26, they calculate the injection which 
would have been required to produce 2.8 million man years of employment 
which is the total of insured employment in 1932. This gives the 
result of¿537 million. There is no disputing that this is an enormous 
sum but it must be remembered that 1932 was the most depressed interwar 
year. According to their model, the policy of spending would have trans­
formed it into what, by interwar standards, would have been a massive 
boom comparable with that of 1919-20. This seems to be deliberately 
unfavourable to the Keynesian case.
By contrast, Thomas used his model to evaluate the implications 
o'f the rather more modest proposals put forward by Lloyd George and 
supported by Keynes and Henderson in 1929. Both Thomas and Glynn and 
Howells interpret the results as showing that the proposals would not 
have succeeded. According to Thomas's simulations, if a £100 million 
public works programme had been started in 1929 and continued hence­
forward, employment would only have risen by 350,000 in 1932. With 
total unemployment standing at 3.4 million in that year, it would not
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have done much to eradicate the depression though it would have been 
a useful addition to employment. But these proposals were put forward 
in 1929 when total unemployment was only 1.5 million and, even then, 
it was only envisaged that it would fall by half a million. To produce 
this would have required an expenditure multiplier of 1.8 using Thomas’s 
employment function and 1.2 using Glynn and Howells' assumed value 
for labour productivity.
Proceeding with their counterfactual exercise, Glynn and 
Howells examine the implications of the £537 million public spending 
programme. They argue that, given the planned budget balance for 1932 
with totals of £766 on either side of the accounts, "a national budget 
deficit of £537 million would have required an increase in spending or 
a decrease in revenue of 70 per cent" (1980, p. 42). While the statement 
is arithmetically correct, the idea that the £537 million spending 
programme would cause an equivalent deficit is totally mistaken. According 
to their own model,- the tax yield would have increased by £101.5 million 
and the improvement in the insurance fund (ignoring the increase in 
contributions) would have been £140 million. Thus, even leaving aside 
all the other endogenous components of the accounts, the deterioration 
in the budgetincluding the insurance fund (which was regarded as 
outside the budget but still had to be financed) would have been little 
more than half the figure they use. It is odd that this aspect is 
played down since built-in stabilisation is one reason why such low 
values for the multiplier are obtained.
The response of the budget to veriations in income has recently 
been examined in detail by Middleton (1981). The central government 
accounts were first adjusted on to a consistent basis by bringing in 
the social insurance funds and items of capital expenditure and adjusting
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for "fiscal window dressing". The accounts were then fully endogenised 
to calculate the "macromarginal budget rate" which is the ratio of the 
change in the budget surplus to the change in GDP (which is assumed to 
originate in the private sector). For fiscal year 1931/32 this was 
calculated at 0.44 and similar values were obtained for other years 
(1981, Table 4, p. 76). The following table uses this value for illustra­
tive calculations which show the impact of a £100 million public spending 
programme.
Table 5.3
Effects of £100 million Public Spending Programme
(1)
Multiplier
------- m --------
Income change 
(Em)
--------- FT)
Change in Budget 
Deficit (£m)
(4)
Employment
000
change
•s
(a) (b)
1.00 100 56 276.5 413.8
1.25 125 45 345.6 517.3
1.50 150 34 414.8 620.7
With a multiplier as low as one the budget deficit would rise by 
over half the amount of expenditure but with a value of 1.5, it would 
only rise by a third of it. The employment effects are calculated in 
a column 4 where (a) uses Thomas's employment function and (b) Glynn 
and Howells' productivity figure. Depending on the assumptions chosen, 
the effect of the progremme varies between 300 and 600 thousand of 
additional employment. In terms of the number of man years of employment 
which could be bought for every £1 million of loan financed deficit, 
even the most pessimistic outcome is only slightly worse than the 
picture painted by Glynn and Howells, while the most optimistic is 
nearly three and a half times better.
Concluding their paper, Clynn and Howells argued that irrespective 
of the actual value of the multiplier, even a relatively small deficit
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of £50 million or so would have undermined public confidence so as to 
offset any induced effects of the spending programme. (1980, pp. 42-44). 
In fact, when the budgetary accounts are adjusted to accord with 
established accounting principles, it emerges that deficits in the 
neighbourhood of £50 million did occur in fiscal years 1931/32 and 1932/33 
(Middleton, 1981, Table I, p. 58). They point to the debacle of 1931 
as evidence of the likely effects on confidence of a potentially large 
deficit. However, the loss of confidence which occurred then was a 
fear that the gold standard would be jeopardised, not that domestic 
demand would be impaired. Once sterling had left gold, the crisis 
rapidly subsided. Furthermore, the measures which were taken, the 
imposition of a revenue tariff and the establishment of the Exchange 
Equalisation Account to manage the sterling exchange rate virtually 
amounted to a revolution in economic policy. Yet it is not suggested 
that these measures caused a collapse of confidence which made entre­
preneurs unwilling to invest and consumers unwilling to consume :, indeed 
quite the reverse.
It is clear that, in an open economy such as interwar Britain, 
any domestic expenditure policy would have consequences for the balance 
of payments and/or the exchange rate. Similarly any exchange rate 
policy would directly affect domestic economic activity and we turn to
these issues next
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5.6 Exchange Rate Policy and Unemployment
Though unemployment rates were, on average, higher in the 1930s 
than the 1920s, by comparison with other industrialised countries, it 
is the 1920s which stands out as the decade of high unemployment. Almost 
all countries suffered from the world depression of the early 1930s and 
the subsequent slow and incomplete recovery from it later in the decade. 
Even the war torn economies of continental Europe after the severe 
monetary disorders and problems of reconstruction in the early 1920s 
achieved relatively high levels of employment later in the decade. The 
widely accepted explanation for this is that overvaluation of the period 
hindered export expansion, further exacerbating the competitive weakness 
of the staple industries.
In 1918, the influential Cunliffe Committee set the course for a 
return to monetary orthodoxy and towards the restoration of the gold 
standard, viewing these as essential conditions for the return of 
stability and prosperity. During the imnediate postwar inflation, the 
exchange rate against the dollar fell to a low point of $3.20 in February 
1920 but, in the sharp monetary and fiscal contraction that followed, 
wages and prices fell simultaneously and the exchange rate rose to 
average $4.62 in 1922. From then on it maintained an average level of 
about 902 of the prewar parity of $4.86. With the election of a 
conservative government late in 1924, the exchange rate rose further 
on expectations of a resumption of the gold standard and, in April 
1925, Churchill announced a return to gold at tha old parity of $4.86.
Returning to fixed exchange rates at any other parity was never 
seriously considered and any return to gold was thought synonymous with 
the old parity. This brought forth a polemical response from Keynes
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(1931) who, in a pamphlet entitled 'The Economic Consequences of Mr 
Churchill', argued that the pound was overvalued at $4.86 and an exchange 
rate of $4.40 would have been more realistic. This provided the starting 
point for a debate which has echoed on ever since but much of the argument 
has surrounded the issue of why the decision was taken when it was, and 
what the main motives lying behind it were. Keynes argued that Churchill 
had simply been misled by his advisors and had acted impulsively (1931, 
p. 30). Considering it from a greater distance, Sayers found that "[jQn 
.fact it was an exceptionally well considered step" (1957, p. 88). With 
the benefit of official documents, Moggridge has shown that, though a 
great deal of discussion took place, there was very little consideration 
of what the economic consequences might be, even though it was recognised 
that British prices were still higher than those of the U.S. relative 
to 1913 (1969, 1972, Ch. 3). An interpretation favoured by Pollard (1970) 
is that among those who had a voice, such as the Bank of England, financial 
interests predominated over those of industry and trade though this has 
recently been criticised on the grounds of taking too narrow a perspective 
(Tomlinson, 1981, Ch. 7).
Much attention, though little quantitative work, has been addressed 
to the question of what the consequences of an exchange rate of $4.40 
might have been, compared with $4.86. Much of this followed the lead 
of Keynes in comparing domestic and foreign prices compared with 1913 
as a measure of the necessary price deflation which would have been 
needed to relieve the persistent pressure on the balance of payments.
Though these in general indicate a relative price disadvantage of 5Z 
or 10Z, it should be pointed out that the relative prices of 1913 would 
not necessarily be the appropriate ones for 1925, given the difficulties 
of the staple industries, the lack of growth in world trade and the loss
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of earnings from overseas assets liquidated during the war (Moggridge,
1 9 7 2 ,  p p .  9 8 - 1 0 6 ) .
Considerable doubts have been raised as to whether a lower exchange 
rate would have provided much relief to the balance of payments.
According to Sayers a return to fixed exchange rates of itself provided 
a stimulus to world trade which was of greater benefit to Britain's 
trading accounts than a small devaluation would have been. Indeed it 
is suggested that against some currencies a lower exchange rate would 
not have been possible since "a lower level for the pound would have 
meant an even lower level for the French and Belgian francs" (1957, p. 93) 
This also applies to other currencies principally of empire countries 
whose currencies were tied to sterling rather than to gold and hence 
for a substantial share of trade no advantage would be gained. But 
Fresnell (1975) has shown that some empire countries were considering 
breaking with sterling in 1925 if the pound had not returned to gold 
and that part of the increasing strain in the late 1920s was due to the 
weakness in the balance of payments of empire countries. For sterling 
countries , as a whole, devaluation against the dollar would have eased 
the strain considerably. Under such circumstances, it seems likely 
that the relative price effects of devaluation would have been augmented , 
through the effects on the primary producers of the empire, by positive 
income effects on British exports. In the aggregate import and export 
equations estimated by Thomas as part of his model the elasticities are 
-0.42 for imports and 0.53 for exports (with a one year lag). (1981, p. 344.) 
However, there are strong reasons for thinking that this is too 
pessimistic because the relative price term used in both equations is 
the value of the import deflator to the GDP deflator. While this may
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be appropriate for the import equation, it is not a satisfactory index 
of export competitiveness. In order to explore this further, some 
estimates of export functions were made.
An export function for the U.K. 1924-38
To estimate an export demand equation in elasticity form, a 
logarithmic model was used, taking the following form
PXIn X ■ n ♦ n. In WT + n, life— t + “t, (5.21)t o 1 2 T>w 6t
where X is a volume index of exports, WT a volume index of world trade 
and Px and Pw are price indices for exports and world trade respectively. 
Thus is the world trade and t\^  the relative price elasticity of 
demand for exports.
An important test of the model is that exports and domestic and 
foreign prices are individually significant. Thus the alternative 
form is
In Xt - ^  + nj In wr + nj In Px + In Pw + (5.22)
Since the policy alternatives being considered involve changing export 
prices holding world prices constant, it is important that takes a 
negative and significant sign. Furthermore the failure of the two 
price terms to be individually significant would suggest that export 
prices were indeed tied to world prices either due to parallel movements 
in exchange rates or in competing world prices.
For the volume of world trade and of British exports, the indices 
provided by the League of Netions for 1924 to 1938 are used. From the 
same source price indices of world trade are available either measured
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in gold or in sterling. As an alternative, Feinstein's index of 
exports of goods and services and his sterling price deflator were used*’ 
The results are given in Table 5.4.
These equations all indicate a high degree of explanatory power
and the Durbin Watson statistics almost inevitably fall into the
indecisive region. In each case, the coefficients are individually
significant and the coefficients on world trade at around 0.6 are con-
2sistent with other estimates . When prices are measured in gold, 
the relative price elasticity is more than 2 and when entered 
individually, the price terms take almost exactly equal values with 
opposite signs. When sterling prices are used, the point estimates are 
slightly lower but the restriction still cannot be rejected on the F 
test at the 5Z level.
There is a further drop in the coefficients when Feinstein's 
data is used and the separata price terms give even lower estimates 
though, as before the restriction cannot be rejected . It seems likely 
that this fall in the coefficients results from the inclusion of invisi­
bles in Feinstein's data which are likely to have been less price elastic 
and forwhich the prices are, in any case, not adequately represented 
in the price indices1 *34 . Thus the results overall strongly support the
1 The League of Nations' data is taken from Review of World Trade 1938, 
p.. 60 and 78 and Feinstein's export volume and price series were taken
from Feinstein (1972) Table 5, p. T16 and Table 64, p. T139.
3 In his study of long term changes in world trade, Maizels (1963, p.214) 
found that over the period 1899 to 1955 the elasticity of British exports 
with respect to world trade was 0.5.
3 The computed values of F for the three restrictions were respectively 
0, 1.68 and 1.64 compared with a critical value at the 5Z level of 3.29.
4 Feinstein's procedure in arriving at a volume index of exports of 
services was to apply the merchadise import deflator, except in the case 
of shipping where an index of freight rates was used (1972, p. 122).
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view that the export price elasticity is larger than one and certainly 
larger than that obtained by Thomas and furthermore, that this reflects 
the equal and opposite effects of domestic and foreign prices.
Exchange Rate Policy and Employment
In his well known "back of an envelope"calculations, Moggridge 
estimated the deterioration in the balance of payments which resulted 
from the 11Z revaluation of sterling in 1924-5 and which might have been 
expected from a 10Z devaluation in 1928 - a typical gold standard year.
The key assumptions made were that relative price elasticities for 
imports and exports were -0.5 and — 1.5 respectively. Though the 
assumption of infinite elasticities of supply has been questioned, with 
general excess supply prevailing in the domestic economy and import 
prices ruled largely by world markets, these assumptions do not seem 
unreasonable. Furthermore, when the assumptions were changed to 
incorporate upward sloping supply curves, almost identical results were 
obtained for changes on the balance of payments. (Wright, 1981,
Appendix, pp. 304-5).
Moggridge found that the 11Z revaluation and 10Z devaluation implied 
a deterioration of £80 million in 1924-5 and an improvement of £70 million 
in 1928 and, of this, £64 million and £52 million respectively arose 
from the change in the balance of visible trade. However, he did not 
avaluate the consequences of these changes for employment but only observed 
that the improvement in the balance of payments in 1928 would have easily 
contained an expansion of employment to reduce the unemployment rate 
below 5Z. In the following Table Moggridge's calculations are 
taken somewhat further with the initial shift in the balance of payments 
evaluated for three different export elasticities but retaining the rest 
of Moggridge's assumptions.
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Table 5.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tear Export
Price
Elasti­
city
Nominal
Expendi­
ture
Switch
Cm
Nominal
Income
Change
Cm
Change in 
Government 
Budget 
Cm
Final
Balance
of
Payments
Change
Cm
Implied 
Employment 
Change 
000's
1924 -1 -53 -79.5 -31.8 -36.3 -207.5
I f -1.5 -80 -120.0 -48.0 -54.8 -313.2
•• -2.0 -107 -160.5 -64.2 -73.3 -418.9
1928 -1 48 72.0 28.8 32.9 196.9
•• -1.5 70 105.0 42.0 48.0 287.1
• • -2.0 93 139.5 55.8 67.7 381.5
Source: Estimates based on Moggridge 1972, Appendix 1, pp. 245-250.
The estimates of expenditure switching use Moggridges allowances 
for the change in invisibles throughout.
In Table 5.5 this change due to expenditure switching is translated 
into a change in income using a value for the multiplier of 1.5.
Columns (4) and (5) show the change in the budget using a macro 
marginal budget rate of 0.4 and the ultimate change in the balance of 
payments obtained by applying the marginal propensity to import of 0.21 
to the change in nominal income. Column (6) gives the implied change 
in employment using Thomas's employment function^.
Middleton's estimates of the macromarginal budget rate did not cover 
the 1920s but, given the sharp rise indicated from 1929 to 1931, it appears 
that a figure somewhat lower than 0.44 would be appropriate for the 1920s. 
The application of the multiplier and the import propensity in nominal 
terms will, in the first instance, give a smaller income change and, 
in the second, a larger import change (for a devaluation) than if the 
calculations were made in constant prices. In the case of the employ­
ment function, the nominal income change was converted to 1938 prices 
before applying the employment function.
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The results indicate that, depending on the assumed elasticity
of demand for exports, the effect of the 11Z revaluation in 1924 was
to reduce employment by between 200 and 400 thousand. Similar
magnitudes are indicated for the rise in employment which might have been
expected from a 10Z devaluation in 1928. The level of unemployment rose from
1.4 million to 1.56 million from 1924 to 1925 and in 1928 it stood
atl'FU million according to Feinstein's estimates. Thus it is clear
that holding the pound in the neighbourhood of $4.40 in the 1920s would,
not, of itself, have produced a high level of employment and it seems that
total unemployment would not have fallen below one million though insured
unemployment might have*. However, on unchanged fiscal policies it
appears that there would have been a considerable improvement in the
budget. Feinstein’s estimates indicate that the current account of
central government including the insurance funds worsened sharply from
a deficit of £14 million in 1924 to £54 million in 1925. On the middle
estimate of the export elasticity, it appears that a failure to revalue
in 1924 would have eased most of this pressure on the budget but would
not have left much scope for expansionary policies unless a budget
deficit were entertained. In 1928, however, the actual deficit was down
to £4 million. Had the authorities chosen to expand public spending
to achieve a balanced budget, then, with an export elasticity of 1.5 and
a 10Z devaluation, income might have increased by as much as £300 million
and employment by 840 thouaand though this would probably have caused
2balance of payments difficulties .
* The insurance totals for 1924 and 1928 ara 1.17 and 1.28 million respectively.
A
With a given expenditure switch AS and a macromarginal budget rate of 0.4, 
if the authorities expanded public works to maintain the same deficit as 
actuallv occurred, income would be raised by ... 1.5 .„ This gives
AY i-i .5ToT7 )as-
an income change of £308.8m and employment change of 844,000 but also a rise 
in imports of £64.8m which is almost equivalent to the initial improvement 
in the balance of payments due to expenditure switching.
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It is clear from this that while a lower exchange rate would have 
provided some scope for the expansion of domestic demand, domestic demand 
expansion alone would have placed further strain on the balance of pay­
ments. In so far as short term capital movements were sensitive to the 
government's budgetary position, any attempt to pursue a quantitatively 
significant public works policy would probably have placed the gold 
standard in serious jeopardy. In his examination of Lloyd George's 
public spending proposals, Thomas (1975, p. 6) pointed out that any 
"adequate" public works programme would have driven sterling off the 
gold standard before 1931. However, once off the gold standard, the 
position would be different.
After leaving the gold standard, the pound fell sharply against 
other currencies but then began to rise. Redmond has calculated that 
taking 1929-30 - 100, the effective exchange rate for sterling fell to
86.7 in 1932 but then rose to 95.9 in 1934 and was back above its 
initial level in 1937 when it stood at 100.8 (1980, p. 90). After the 
dollar devaluation of 1933, the pound moved above par against the dollar 
where it remained until 1938. Thus any significant advantage to exporters 
which might have come from a lower exchange rate was relatively short­
lived. In part this may have been due to the effects of import duties 
which were imposed in 1932 and which probably kept the exchange rate 
higher than otherwise. On the other hand the policy of cheap money 
adopted in 1932 ensured that the exchange rate was not pushed up by capital 
inflows attracted by domestic interest rate: differentials,such as those 
which had been maintained under the gold standard. Indeed according to 
Nevin, the policy of cheap money emerged largely as a side effect of 
the desire of the monetary authorities, once off the gold standard,
to keep the pound as low as possible. (1953, p.' 82). In mid 1932, the Exchange
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Equalisation Account was established with the same objective but as 
Howson has shown, while in 1933 the authorities were attempting to keep 
sterling below $3.50, by 1936, they were being forced to consider 
rates in excess of $5 because of a strong trend of improvement in the 
balance of payments (1980, pp. 55-56).
Thus the evidence indicates that, from 1932, lower exchange rates 
were not only feasible but desired as an object of policy. And yet it 
was an object which the authorities clearly failed to achieve despite 
the fact that there was an increase in reserves of £620 million between 
1932 and 1937. Though this occurred largely due to capital inflow 
despite low interest rates, so that the current account balances of pay­
ments was worse in the 1930s than the 1920s (Wright, 1981, p. 289), it 
is likely that any further tendency towards deterioration of the trade 
balance would have brought lower exchange rates. This could have been 
induced directly by a higher level of domestic demand which would have 
raised the volume of imports. Hence lower exchange rates would have 
been the natural corollary of a higher level of domestic demand.
In order to evaluate the feasibility of such a policy, we can 
calculate how much the exchange rate would have to be lowered in order 
to accommodate a given domestic demand expansion. This depends on the 
assumption made about the balance of payments. A reasonable assumption 
which makes for computational ease is that the response of the authorities 
would be such that the balance of payments deficit in any year as a 
proportion of the import bill denominated in foreign currency is held 
at the existing level. Hence in proportionate terms the balance of 
payments is not allowed to be any worse than it actually was. The 
relationship between the proportionate addition to income arising from
5.53
demand expansion and the proportionate devaluation need to ensure
that this condition is maintained is derived in Appendix 5.2 and is given
by the following expression
e “ (Zj^d+nj) + z2 (l+n2)-l Y
where e is the exchange rate given in terms of the foreign currency 
price of sterling and Y is real GNP. m is the income elasticity 
of demand for imports which can be derived from Thomas's function to be 
almost exactly 1^. n^ (which is negative) is the price elasticity of 
imports for which Thomas's figure of 0.42 is taken and n£ is the 
export price elasticity for which three alternative values of -1,
-1.5 and -2.0 are used. z^ is (minus) the exchange rate elasticity 
of sterling import prices. Here we follow Moggridge's assumption applied 
for 1928 that a 10Z devaluation would raise sterling import prices by 
9Z to allow for some narrowing of profit margins so that the value of 
z^ is 0.9 (1972, p. 249). Similarly z^ is the exchange rate 
elasticity of export prices in foreign currency which, allowing for some 
rise in exporters profit margins and some increase in costs arising 
from the change in import prices, is, following Moggridge, 0.6.
The three values obtained using export price elasticities of -1,
-1.5 and -2 are -2.09, -1.29 and -0.93. Thus following this policy, 
for every percentage increase in domestic real income above that 
observed, the exchange rate would have to decline between one and two 
per cent to ensure no proportionate worsening in the balance of payments. 
Given the conditions of the 1930's these appear to be perfectly feasible 1
1 From Feinstein (1972) Table 19, p. 149, the average import ratio for 
1921-38 was .206 per cent which, divided into Thomas's marginal 
propensity to import, gives 1.01.
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magnitudes but there is also another important aspect. It is that 
the impact of such a policy would be to expand exports and, hence, 
direct additional demand into the areas where it was most needed. By 
plugging the formula back into the export function we can calculate 
the income elasticity of exports. For the three different export 
elasticities, the results respectively are 1.26, 1.16 and 1.15 and 
hence it seems that this policy would have expanded exports more than 
proportionately with income.
The effects so far calculated are only the first round effects, 
however, and the impact of the increase in exports would be to raise 
income still further and push the exchange rate even lower. Thus the 
automatic operation of the policy would increase the value of the 
multiplier and, in order to measure this, we need to calculate the 
marginal propensity to export. Taking the export to income ratio 
as 0.16* (the value in 1932-3) this is calculated from the export 
elasticities for the three price elasticities as 0.20, 0.19 and 0.19 
respectively. Taking this value as 0.2 we can see how incorporating 
this into the expression for the multiplier would augment the values 
considered earlier. Taking the values for the simple multiplier 
to be 1, 1.25 and 1.5, incorporating this effect raises them to 1.25, 
1.67 and 2.14 respectively. Hence had a policy of devaluation been 
undertaken as the natural corollary of domestic demand expansion in 
the 1930's the multiplier would be enhanced to the extent that 1.25 
would be an absolute minimum and the value may well have been as large 
as 2.0 or more. It goes without saying that this would also have the 
virtue of reducing the loan financed budget deficit which would be 
implied for a given programme of public spending.
1 Feinstein (1972) Table 19, p. 149
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A Note on Benjamin and Köchin's Counterfactual Calculations for 
Benefit Induced Unemployment 1920 - 1938
Appendix 5.1
In an attempt to indicate the possible quantitative significance of 
benefits on unemployment, Benjamin and Kochin calculated counterfactual 
series for unemployment on the assumption that the benefit to wage ratio 
was kept at the "no effect" level of 0.27. It was upon this calculation 
that their statements about the extent of benefit induced unemployment 
were based. This was not simply done by using the single equation model 
to predict unemployment with B/W at 0.27 since they argued that the estimated 
coefficient on this term would be downward biased as an estimate of its 
total effect on unemployment. They argued that holding the level oi 
aggregate demand constant, to the extent that increases in the B/W ratio 
reduced employment as opposed to increasing the total number insured, 
it would reduce output and hence some of the output changes should be 
imputed to changes in the B/W ratio.
This is demonstrated in the following model:
where U, B/W, Q and Q* are as defined earlier. U* ia the natural rate of
demand. Although X is unobserved (5A1.2) can be substituted into (5A1.1) 
to give an equation structurally identical to that of their estimating 
equation given as (5.1)
U - U* + a(B/W - 0.27) + bX + e. (5A1.1)
ln Q - InQ* ♦ d(U - U*) * cX + e2 (5A1.2)
unemployment and X is an index of the unanticipated component of aggregate
U ■ U* ♦
cc
(5A1.3)
c c
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b is expected to be negative and c positive. The t e m  d is the effect 
of a change in unemployment, part of which is a change in employment, 
on output holding demand constant and is therefore expected to be negative. 
If there is no such supply side effect on output, then d ■ 0 and the model
a can be obtained.
Although d cannot be estimated directly, if plausible values can 
be imputed to it, estimates of the "true" value of a can be and, hence, 
the impact of changes in B/W measured. Benjamin and Kochin suggest 
upper and lower bounds for d which give lower and upper bounds for a. 
The upper bound for d is given as
The third term in the expression translates changes in the percentage 
unemployed into changes in employment and o is the proportionate change
the marginal product of unemployed relative to employed workers which is 
given a value of {. For the lower ]>ound, the expression is multiplied
from a change in employment and the remainder from a change in the 
participation rate. Also the ratio of marginal products is reduced to 
take the value of the benefit to wage ratio which gives
Using these measures Benjamin and Kochin first solve out for the 
true value of a and then calculate the counterfactual percentage unemployed^.
1 For footnote 1, sea next page.
collapses back into the single equation from which unbiased estimates of
(5A1.4)
in output for a given change in insured employment set at }. —— ■ is
by | on the assumption that only half the change in unemployment arises
d - (1)(B/W)(o)(îI§4§1ïï) (5A1.5)
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These estimates are reproduced as Columns (2) and (3) in Table 5A.1.
Over the period 1922 to 1938, their estimates indicate that insured 
unemployment would have averaged between 6.3Z and 9.2Z compared with the 
observed average of 14.1Z. In Column (4) an alternative calculation is 
made which sets d - 0 so that the output effects are ignored. This shows 
by how much using these assumptions raises the estimate of benefit 
induced unemployment and the average counterfactual level is now raised 
to 9.7Z.
A different interpretation would suggest that the estimated 
coefficient on B/W is likely to be biased up rather than down. This is 
derived from the Keynesian effects on aggregate demand of the payment 
of benefits. A rise in the rate of benefit, while it may have encouraged 
workers to register at the employment exchanges, will also, as a transfer 
payment, have increased the level of aggregate demand and output. The 
implications of this can be examined by utilising the same two equation 
model but changing its interpretation.
Footnote 1 from previous page:
The true value of a is obtained once a value for d is assumed by 
solving the equations (derived from the estimated coefficients)
which, eliminating b/c, gives
-90.0
a 18.3 ♦ 18.3 (y^gg)
counterfactual unemployment is simply actual minus benefit induced
U - a(B/W - 0.27)
5.58
Table 5A1.1
Counterfactual Insured Unemployment Percentages 1922 - 1938
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Actual X 
Unemployed
Benj amin 
Upper
and Kochin 
Lower
d - 0 Keynesian
effect
1922 14.3 12.2 10.8 12.5 12.8
1923 11.7 9.1 7.5 9.3 9.8
1924 10.3 6.7 4.5 7.6 8.1
1925 11.3 7.0 4.4 7.5 8.4
1926 12.5 8.0 5.4 8.6 9.6
1927 9.7 5.3 2.9 5.9 6.8
1928 10.8 6.1 3.4 6.6 7.6
1929 10.4 5.5 2.8 6.2 7.2
1930 16.1 10.6 7.1 10.8 12.6
1931 21.3 15.5 11.5 15.9 17.8
1932 22.1 17.1 13.4 17.8 19.0
1933 19.9 14.8 11.4 15.6 16.7
1934 16.7 11.2 7.8 11.6 13.5
1935 15.5 9.5 5.9 9.7 11.8
1936 13.1 6.6 3.0 7.0 9.1
1937 10.8 4.6 1.3 4.9 6.4
1938 12.9 6.8 3.3 7.0 9.0
Average 14.1 9.2 6.3 9.7 11.0
Source: Columns (1), (2), (3) from Benjamin and Kochin (1979a) p. 467
For the derivation of these figures and those in Columns (4) 
and (5), see text.
If X is now defined as the level of aggregate demand in the absence 
of insurance transfers, b is still expected to be negative and c positive 
as before but now d is the addition to demand arising from a rise in 
unemployment due to benefit payments. Since the same problem of unobserved 
X exists, it is again necessary to find a value for d and in this case 
it is estimated as
J • *  <S> <rairo> !a1'6
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The last two terms are as before; they convert a change in unemployment 
into a change in output. The first round addition to demand is less
than the implied change in output and is reduced by the ratio B/W.
Finally the first round effect is multiplied by the Multiplier, M times 
the marginal propensity to spend unemployment benefits, k
It will be seen that d is now positive and applying this expression 
in the two equation system gives the counterfactual unemployment percen­
tages in Column (5) which give an average of 11.OZ considerably higher 
than those obtained by Benjamin and Kochin. These calculations cast 
a different light on their conclusion that "while members of the army of 
the unemployed were chiefly conscripts in the two major depressions of 
the era, they seem to haw been willing volunteers during the late twenties 
and late thirties" (1979 , p. 468). The results indicate that, on this 
alternative view, their conclusion cannot be sustained even on the basis 
of their own estimated equation. If the output effects imputed by them 
are ignored, there is no year in which the benefit induced unemployed 
make up the majority. Furthermore, if Keynesian effects are taken into 
account, this conclusion is reinforced.
Even so, these results indicate more than 20Z of unemployment 
was induced but, in any case, the absolute level of all these estimates 
depend on the arbitrary assumption of "no effect" below a B/W of 0.27.
1'There are likely to be biases running in both directions but it was not 
thought worthwhile to estimate upper and lower bounds. The B/W ratio is 
that of Benjamin and Kochin which is an over estimate for reasons previously 
examined but, on the other hand, the average wage used in the denomination 
is probably an over estimate of the productivity of marginal workers 
The multiplier value used is 1.5 and the m.p.c. out of benefits is 0.85, 
both of which, especially the latter, may be underestimates.
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By varying this level according to taste, any proportion of benefit 
induced employment can be obtained as desired. The more important point, 
however, is that this adjustment was made by Benjamin and Kochin because 
they did not expect that the benefit to wage ratio would shift employment 
holding output constant. Had they recognised that this was in large 
part what they were picking up, there would have been no grounds for 
making such an assumption and they would have had to set d ■ 0.
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Economic Activity, the Trade Balance and the Marshall-Lerner 
Condition
The trade balance is defined in terms of foreign currency as:
APPENDIX 5.2
B - P X - eP M x m ( 1 )
Where X and M are volume indices of exports and imports respectively, P^
is the foreign currency price of exports, P is the sterling price of importsm
and e is the exchange rate given as the foreign currency price of sterling. 
Writing the trade balance as a proportion of the import bill:
(2)
To hold the proportionate trade balance constant:
db - eP M m
dP
P X x
eP M m
dX
P X x
e P Mm
de -
P X x
eP2Mm
dP
P X x
eP M2
dM
dividing both sides by
P X x
eP M m
gives (3)
de m  dM
e “ P Mm
(4)
Defining as the exchange rate elasticity of the foreign currency price of 
exports and -z^ as the exchange rate elasticity of the sterling price of 
imports, the expression can be rewritten and rearranged to give:
dM
M
dX
X +
de
e
The import function in proportionate changes is
m _dY 
T
(5)
( 6 )
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where Y is real GNP, m is the income elasticity and n^ the price elasticity 
of imports. Domestic prices are assumed constant.
The export function in proportionate changes is
x
Where n^ is the export price elasticity and world prices are unchanged. 
Substituting the exchange rate into (6) and (7) gives:
(7)
dM
M
m dY 
Y “ V l
de
e
dX
X n2Z2
de
e
Substituting (8) and (9) into (5) gives:
( 8)
(9)
mj- - (niri * n2z2 * zl * Z2 -1*
and on rearranging we obtain an expression analogous to the discrete 
function used in the text.
de ____________ m_____________  dY (11)
e " (tjd+nj) ♦ *2(l+n2) -1) Y
de
e (10)
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CHAPTER 6
EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND BENEFITS: SOME FURTHER TESTS
6.1 Employment Functions and the Interwar Period
In the first part of this chapter we turn to examining variants 
of a simple annual model of employment for the industrial sector and for 
the individual industries comprising it. There are two distinct motives 
for doing this, the details of which are dealt with in sequence. The 
first is to compare the results of these functions on interwar data with 
those of similar functions for the postwar period. In this, the aim 
is to examine and interpret any systematic differences which emerge 
in the two periods in the context of the general differences between 
the periods, in particular in the conditions of excess supply. The second 
is to get behind the results obtained for aggregate employment obtained 
in the previous chapter. In particular, it is important both for the 
evaluation of economic policy and for the debate over unemployment benefits 
to see if the aggregate results for output, the real wage and the benefit 
to wage ratio are substantiated at the disaggregated level. Furthermore 
systematic differences which emerge at this level may raise doubts about 
the validity of the aggregate equations or alternatively indicate what the 
impacts of various policy measures might have been at the industrial level.
Estimating Employment Functions
Since the mid-1960s, numerous studies of the determinants of 
employment have appeared^. These models typically relate employment 
to a string of variables derived from hypotheses about the determinants 
of short run demand for labour and are interpreted as labour demand 
equations. Most of the econometric effort has concentrated on postwar *
* For a recent survey of this literature, see Hazeldine (1981).
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data and supply constraints are generally ignored even though labour 
markets may have been in excess demand for part of the period. Indeed 
it is ironic that the earliest papers in the field by Brechling (1965) 
and Ball and St. Cyr (1966) estimated demand functions for labour over
have been tighter than over any other period for which data are available. 
The interwar period on the other hand, provides a unique opportunity 
to observe employment under conditions of labour market excess supply. 
Despite the fact that equations for this period are likely to be more 
convincing as estimates of true demand functions, such estimates have 
not p'reviously been made. Thus it will be of interest to compare the 
results with those obtained for other periods and to do this, some of 
their features will be briefly outlined.
The characteristic findings can best be examined by reconsidering 
the basic model put forward by Ball and St. Cyr (1966) which was used 
earlier. Essentially, the production function is simply inverted to 
give an equation for desired employment in terms of output and a time
constrained cost minimising employment level. In addition there is the 
partial adjustment mechanism relating desired to actual employment
the period up to the early sixties when the labour market appears to
trend. 1 1 a ,2 t
1 a1 a1E* - a H* Q e ( 6 . 1)o
This is the same equation as (5.2) and represents the output
X ( 6 . 2 )
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On substituting (6.1) into (6.2) and estimating either at the 
industry or aggregate level, some strikingly consistent results appear. 
These are that the estimate of almost always turns out to be larger 
than one|implying increasing short run returns to labour and that the 
estimate of X is substantially lower than one, indicating relatively 
slow adjustment speeds. In a recent study, Wilson (1979) estimated 
different variants of this function on annual data for 1948-70. The 
use of annual observations is important for the comparison with the 
interwar period for which only annual data is available. Out of 34 
industries output was significant in 25, lagged employment in 27 and 
the time trend in 20. In 15 industries, the returns to labour 
parameter exceeded unity which is a rather smaller proportion in mont 
quarterly models. Even more striking was the finding that the point 
estimate for the adjustment parameter X was found to be less than 0.5 
in 31 cases, implying average lags¿calculated as in excess of one
year (1979, p. 10-12)l.
Efforts to explain and improve on the standard results have taken 
a number of directions. One suggestion is that the measured returns 
to labour embody the returns to other factors and should therefore be 
interprrted as returns to scale (Ireland and Smythe, 1970). In order 
to overcome this simultaneous models of factor demand and utilisation 
rates with interrelated factor adjustment have been specified ( Nadiri 
and Rosen, 1969). On U.K. data, the results do not appear to improve 
very substantially on the simple single equation model (Briscoe and Peel, 
1974, 1975, Hart and Sharot, 1978). Alternatively, non-linear *
* Wilson reported slightly better results more in accord with a priori 
expectation from a model based on Hazeldine (1978).
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production functions and asymmetric adjustment lags have been used 
(Hazeldine, 1978). It is sometimes thought that the length of lags 
partly reflects supply constraints as well as internal adjustment costs1. 
When lostwar data is partitioned into supply and demand side observations 
the employment function under excess supply exhibits both faster adjust­
ment and lower short run returns to labour. (Peel and Walker, 1978, p.199). 
Similarly the structural breaks occurring in the standard employment 
function in the mid 1960s may be associated with rising levels of 
unemployment but though the evidence up to 1972 indicated a decline in 
the return to labour parameter, there was also a decline in adjustment 
speed - though this result largely disappears when the data is extended 
further into the 1970s (Briscoe and Roberts, 1977; Morgan, 1979).
Another line of enquiry suggests that part of the observed labour 
force is determined by the scale of the firm's capacity rather than the 
actual level of output. Morgan (1978, p. 9) found that, for non manual 
workers, output elasticities were very low and adjustment speeds insignifi­
cantly different from zero and, more recently, Nickell (1981) has used
2this distinction to derive an aggregate model with a complex lag structure . 
In the framework developed by Oi (1962) each unit of labour may be
1 Ball and St. Cyr (1966,p. 192),Hughes (1971, p. 375 ), Hazeldine (1981 t 
pp. 159— 165.
2 The implication of overhead or fixed labour is demonstrated simply 
by‘Nickell (1981, p. 36). If E_ is fixed labour and the production 
function is a.
Q - (E - Ef)
then the estimated value of short run returns would be
- _ “l 
“ l T ^ T E T
thus a is an upward biased estimate of a^.
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partially fixed because of the firm specific human capital invested in 
the worker. In long run equilibrium, the wage is below the marginal 
product of employees and the difference is the return on the firm's 
investment in training. When demand contracts, they will not be laid 
off until the marginal product falls to the variable cost, i.e. the 
wage. A third hypothesis due to Miller (1971) is that hoarded labour 
can be regarded as a substitute for inventories to meet unexpected 
variations in demand given the costs of inventory holding and the 
adjustment costs associated with changing the employment level. Tests 
of these hypotheses have produced rather mixed results (McKendrick,
1975; Greer and Rhoades, 1977). In any case it seems that the arguments 
should apply with more force to the speed of adjustment than to returns 
to labour except in the case of fixed workers which are more analogous 
to the capital stock. However, the effects might be different at 
different levels of labour market tightness. Firms might be more 
willing to lay workers off if they could get them back at a moment's 
notice.
These hypotheses have been developed largely because increasing 
short run returns is inconsistent with the usual downward sloping demand 
curve needed for competitive equilibrium . Thus taking the first order 
condition for profit maximisation implied by (£.1) gives an equation for 
desired employment similar to (5.16) as
Similarly the implied first order condition for desired output reflected 
in (5.13) is •
(6.3)
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Q* (6.4)
If > 1, there is no finite maximum and it is clear from (6.3) and (6.4) 
that downward sloping functions for output and employment in 
the real wage, cannot be obtained. However, inferences from about (6.3) 
and (6.4) have generally been derived from estimates of (6.2). If the 
effect of quasi-fixity or labour hoarding or contractual employment is 
to cause the true variable part of employment to be mis-measured, then
(6.3) might still be found downward sloping even though it will not give 
an adequate estimate of a.. An alternative would be to exclude employment 
altogether and estimate the parameter from an output equation such as
(6.4) .
If the labour market is in disequilibrium, the observed relationship 
between the real wage and employment or output will depend on the prevailing 
regime. This is shown in Figure 6.1 which is a simplified version of
Figure 6.1
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Figure 5.2. In the neighbourhood of and the economy or industry 
is in Classical unemployment with employment and output set at their 
unconstrained profit maximising levels. Variations in the wage will 
cause inverse variations in employment. Under Keynesian unemployment 
with the wage in the region of W^, variations will not lead to changes 
in employment unless such changes cause changes in the rationed level of 
output which gives rise to employment at E^. In the third case where 
there is excess labour demand in the region of W^, there will be a positive 
correlation between the wage and employment if the labour supply curve is 
upward sloping.
This issue was first raised as an empirical question in the famous 
debate which took place in the late 1930s between Keynes (1939), Dunlop 
(1938) and Tarshis (1939). It arose from a passage in the General Theory 
in which Keynes asserted that "in the short period, falling money wages 
and rising real wages are each, for independent reason, likely to accompany 
decreasing employment, labour being readier to accept wage cuts when 
employment is falling off yet real wages inevitably rising on account 
of the increasing marginal return to a given capital equipment when output 
is diminished " (1936, p. 10). This prompted Dunlop and others to 
investigate the relationships, particularly the correlation between changes 
in real and money wages. As both Keynes (1939) and Richardson (1939) 
pointed out, the more important relationship is between the product 
wage and employment - an issue upon which little light was shed because 
of the lack of an adequate index of output prices as distinct from 
consumer prices.
The evidence which was adduced which included an examination of wage 
and price indices for 1860 to 1913 as well as data for the interwar period, 
didflot offer much support for the inverse correlation. In a later
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study using aggregate data for the U.S. and Canadian economies for the 
interwar and postwar periods, Bodkin reexamined the relationship between 
the detrended real wage and unemployment. The findings confirmed that 
no strong relationship could be found in either direction though, for 
interwar Canada and some other cases, the expected sign was obtained on 
the regression coefficient (1969, p. 361). Recently, more successful 
results have been obtained both for postwar Britain and the U.S. in which 
strong negative coefficients were obtained for employment on the real 
wage but with dynamic models giving long adjustment lags (Neftci, 1978, 
Sargent, 1978 and Symons 1981).
These studies do not estimate structural models of supply and demand. 
As was shown in Chapter 3, a negatively sloped labour demand curve could 
be estimated in an equilibrium model for the period before 1913, a result 
similar to that obtained by Lucas and Rapping on U.S. data from 1929.
In most single equation models, where employment is assumed to be demand 
determined, relative price terms do not generally yield very significant 
coefficients. But when regimes of excess supply and excess demand for 
labour are separated, the results improve. Thus, in their disequilibrium 
model, Rosen and Quandt obtaimed highly significant negative coefficients 
on the real wage (1978, p. 376). Similarly, for post war Britain, Peel 
and Walker used a simple wage change rule to separate the two regimes 
and obtained a strong negative real wage coefficient in an employment 
function under excess demand (1978, p. 198). In each of their studies, 
however, the employment function was following Dhrymes (1969) based on 
the first order condition from a C.E.S. production function. As in 
Chapter 3, output appears as a regressor and it becomes difficult to 
distinguish between the output constrained employment function and the 
unconstrained case. However, if excess supply in the labour market can
6.9
be assumed, then one regime is ruled out and it becomes more feasible to 
attempt a distinction between the two labour demand regimes.
Of more immediate significance for the interwar economy is that, 
if the regime of Classical Unemployment were found to hold in important 
sectors of the economy, then straightforward demand expansion designed 
to relax the constraint of effective demand would not have been as the 
simple Keynesian model implies since the stimulus to output and employment 
would come through raising product prices. This was the point emphasised 
by Keynes (1939) in his response to Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis (1939).
On the other hand, with money wages relatively fixed, given the high 
elasticity of demand for British exports^any policy induced decline in 
the exchange rate might have stimulated exports through raising sterling 
export prices whilst lowering them in terms of foreign currency. Thus 
distinguishing between those industries in which employment was responsive 
to the real wage and those in which it was not, would be important from 
the point of view of public policy.
In the aggregate employment equation of Table 5.1, there was both 
increasing short run returns and an insignificant real wage term which, 
on the face of it, casts doubt on the Classical regime. But this may 
be an artifact of aggregate data in which the service sector whose 
prices are not adequately measured is mixed up with the industrial sector. 
Though separate tests did not indicate that the inclusion of lagged 
employment was appropriate, it is of importance in discussing labour 
hoarding and the role of unemployment benefits to examine speeds of 
adjustment and returns to labour at the industry level.
6.10
The idea that the benefit to wage ratio has a major effect in 
shifting the level of employment is difficult to reconcile within the 
neoclassical approach. However, if employers systematically hoarded 
labour, higher unemployment benefits might have induced them to operate 
closer to their production functions. In the presence of unemployment 
benefits the costs of laying off workers in rotation might not be very 
great especially under conditions where the opportunities for employment 
elsewhere faced by such workers were severely limited. This would 
suggest that employment would respond increasingly rapidly to demand changes 
and that, as the benefit to wage ratio rose, a progressive "shake-out" 
took place. Such hypotheses have been investigated for the 1960s where 
there appears to have been a substitution of hours for employment*.
Even so, it is difficult to imagine that,even if the impact of benefits 
was to reduce short time working, or at least change it from being measured 
as employment to unemployment, as well as to cause substitution of hours 
for employment, that this would have caused measured unemployment to have
* Shifts in unemployment for a given output in the mid 1960s were associated 
with a rise in unemployment benefits by Maki and Spindler (1975) using 
an approach closely followed by Benjamin and Kochin (1979). Knight 
and Wilson (1977) found that there had been a shake out or decline in labour 
hoarding at this time for reasons unassociated with benefits. In their 
study, Holden and Peel (1976) found that there appeared to have been 
a substitution of employment for hours which was reflected in a break 
in the hours equation, indicating increased responsiveness to output 
after 1966.
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risen by one and a half million or more by the later 1930s.
Details of actual hours worked are incomplete and exist for only 
a few industries in the interwar period. In a study using data for the 
engineering industry, Harrison and Hart (1982) found some weak evidence 
that the interwar insurance system affected working hours. However, 
these came through as a result of the insurance contributions paid by 
employers rather than rates of benefit paid to the unemployed. Insofar 
as changes in contribution were paralleled by changes in benefits, this 
effect might be reflected in the coefficient on the benefit to wage 
ratio. However, rates of contribution were small relative to wage rates 
and, unless employment were highly wage rate elastic, it seems unlikely 
that this can account for very much of the observed effect .
Whatever the exact interpretation of the benefit to wage ratio in 
the employment function, it is important to determine whether this result 
holds at the industry level. In his sectoral estimates, Collins 
specified the unemployment rate of an industry as a function of the benefit 
to wage ratio and the deviations of employment from trend, thereby 
explicitly restricting the equations to focusing on supply side effects. 
Only in cotton textiles and the distributive trades were significant 
positive benefit effects found. In their reply, Benjamin and Kochin 
argued that output, rather than employment, should be used thus making 
it* explicit that shifts in employment holding output constant, were 
expected. They estimated the relationship between output and unemployment 
for 7 industries, finding that only in electrical engineering was the 
coefficient not significant (1982, p. 420-1). In the light of this, a wider
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industry level examination of the effect of unemployment benefits as 
a shift term in the employment function will identify the sectors in which 
this phenomenon appears and may suggest some reasons for the empirical 
findings.
When examining employment at the industry level, some account 
needs to be taken of different trends between industries which might be 
due to faster technical progress, capital accumulation or structural 
change such as often discussed in the literature. It is possible that 
some of the structural shifts observed in unemployment rate equations 
around 1930 might be due to such effects (Ormerod and Worswick, 1980,
Table 3, p. 110; Irish, 1980 , pp.3-5 ) from 1924 to 1929, the capital 
stock in manufacturing grew at an annual average rate of 0.6Z, falling 
to 0.4Z from 1929 to 1937. But for individual industries the differences 
are much greater. In textiles, the rates were 0.1Z and -1.6Z, in 
shipbuilding 10.6Z and -1.4Z and in engineering -0.1Z and 0.4Z 
respectively (Dowie, 1968, Table 3, p. 76). Thus at least at the 
industry level some allowances should be made for different trend rates 
of growth in the capital stock between the two periods. Total factor 
productivity also grew faster in manufacturing in the 1930s than the 
1920s and here also there are sharp breaks in the performance of 
industries between the two periods with ferrous metal, electrical 
engineering, textiles and leather all showing a marked rise of 2.5Z or 
more in the 1930s compared with 1924-29.
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6.2 Output Constrained Employment Functions 1921-1938
In this section output constrained employment functions based on 
(6.1) and (6.2) are considered. To obtain an estimating equation 
appropriate to the interwar period, the Ball and St. Cyr model is 
augmented with multiplicative shift terms for the benefit to wage ratio 
and a time trend dummy for the 1930s. Taking logs and adding a stochastic 
error term gives the estimating equation
3
In E^ “ a + a, lnQ_ + a_ lnE^ , + a,t + a.Dt + a, lifer + c, (6.5) t o 1 ^t 2 t-1 3 4 5 w It
where D is a dummy taking the value of one for 1930 to 1938 and zero
X *a2otherwise. Of the coefficients a, • —  , a_ ~ (1-X), a_ » -±—  andI ct  ^ z j
a^ and a^ are the direct shift coefficients multiplied by the adjustment 
coefficient X.
The model was estimated for 19 industries and for industrial 
production and manufacturing as a whole on annual data 1921 - 1938. The 
employment series are for man-years of employment (full time equivalent) 
given by Chapman (1953,Table 61, p. 18) which are based on the 1948 Standard 
Industrial Classification. The wage series are those obtained by dividing 
Chapman's series for the total wage bill in these industries by the 
employment series. Both sets of data are for wage earners only so that 
in ao far as salary earners reflect overhead labour, they are excluded.
The output indices are those given by Lomax (1964, p.32-3) which are 
also based on the 1948 s.i.c. For benefits, different weighting systems 
would be appropriate to different industries but since sufficiently 
detailed information to calculate different sets of weights is not 
available, the national weightad index calculated earlier is used for all
industries
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The results of estimating equation (6.5) are given in Table 6.1.
With a few exceptions for individual industries, the overall explanatory 
. . .  -2power of these equations, judging by the values of P. , is quite high, 
particularly for the aggregates of the first two rows. Only in the case 
of tobacco does the equation completely fail to account for the variance 
of employment. Since lagged dependent variables are included, Durbin's 
h statistic is given below the Durbin-Watson statistic in Column 9. This 
suggests that serial correlation cannot be rejected at the 5Z level in 
either of the aggregate equations and in seven of the industries and this 
is an important caveat in the interpretation of the results.
As might have been expected, a1 is highly significant in the aggregate 
equations at the 5Z level in all but four of the industry equations, 
the exceptions being building materials, vehicles, tobacco and paper and 
printing. The implied values of the parameter and its associated 
standard error are given in column 10 of the Table. Both for the aggregates 
and all but one of the industries, the value is greater than one, 
significantly so in the aggregates and all but one of the industry 
equations. These results are similar to and perhaps even more decisive 
than those typically obtained for the postwar period referred to earlier.
If one takes the interpretation that variations in employment reflect 
variations in the utilisation of all factors, this might be interpreted 
as short run returns to scale but, even so, 8 of the industry equations 
give point estimates for which are larger than 2. In this light, 
it seems likely that the estimates reflect variations in the rate of 
utilisation of employed labour or perhaps a high proportion of fixed or
overhead labour
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The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is strikingly 
different. With the exception of mining and quarrying, it is always 
smaller than 0.1, implying that in annual terms, lags are negligible 
and indeed, the coefficient is often negative though in only three 
industries significantly so. Though these results are not strictly compara­
ble with those which have been obtained on quarterly data, the results of 
Wilson (1979) discussed earlier indicate that this appears to be a major 
difference between the interwar and postwar periods. If, as was 
suggested earlier, adjustment lags are likely to reflect, at least in part, 
supply conditions in the labour market, then this can be interpreted as 
striking confirmation of the conditions of excess supply in the interwar 
period. On the other hand, if one takes excess supply as accepted a priori, 
then the estimates suggest that it is indeed through the adjustment coeffi­
cient that supply conditions are reflected.
The pattern of coefficients on the time trend dummy give very weak 
support for an upward shift in the secular growth rate of output per 
worker in the 1930s though the effect appears to be highly significant 
for the manufacturing sector as a whole. Among individual industries, 
however, both the trend and dummy variables give the wrong sign and, on 
average exhibit low levels of significance. The same cannot be said of 
the benefit to wage ratio which at least in the aggregate equations, 
appears to have, exerted a powerful influence on the utilisation rate of 
employed labour. In manufacturing the coefficient is exceptionally well 
determined, giving a t value of nearly 7 and indicating that a 1Z 
increase in the benefit to wage ratio reduces employment by 0.23Z.
One of the reasons for investigating the effect of the benefit to 
wage ratio was to see if it was merely an artifact of aggregate data 
picking up compositional changes or non-linear trends. To some extent
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this is borne out since, at the more disaggregated level, though 10 of 
the industries give negative coefficients on the benefit to wage ratio 
of which 6 are significant at the 5Z level, 9 give positive signs of 
which 3 are significant. A further impression of this can be gained 
from the weighted average of coefficients obtained within manufacturing. 
Using the average employment weights for 1924, 1929 and 1937, the 
aggregate coefficient for the 12 industries in manufacturing is 0.1058 
which is less than half the size of the point estimate for manufacturing 
as a whole^. Together with the wide variation in the size of the 
coefficients and their significance this casts considerable doubt on 
the impact of benefits as a systematic force affecting employment.
In the 7 industrial unemployment equations estimated by Benjamin and 
Kochin, only in electrical engineering did they fail to find a significant 
positive coefficient on the benefit to wage ratio (1982). Of the six 
of these included among the employment functions in Table 6.1, only two 
gave significant negative coefficients and one of these was electrical 
engineering2.
The weights were taken from the calculations of Dowie (1968,Table 4, 
p. 77) (based on Chapman's data) for the three years. Two manufacturing 
industries, other manufactures and non-ferrous metals are not included 
in the employment function estimates but these only accounted for 3.4% 
of manufacturing employment and the weights on the included industries 
were raised to compensate for their omission.
2 Benjamin and Kochin, (1982) Table 2, pp. 420-1). The other six 
industries they used were coal mining, textiles, timber, shipbuilding, 
electrical, utilities and distributive trades. In the employment function 
estimates above, non-industrial sectors were excluded both because 
service employment is widely used as the basis of output estimates, giving 
a non independence between them and because price data is difficult to 
come by.
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Some further expermentation was undertaken with the equations.
Both the time trend dummy and the lagged dependent variables were removed 
from the equation but this affected the other coefficients very little. 
Secondly a measure of the realwage (discussed in the next section) was 
introduced in place of the benefit to wage ratio. If the latter were 
acting as a proxy for the real wage, then its sign would be positive.
Thus if the real wage were affecting employment independently of output 
in some industries, this might account for the instability of the benefit 
to wage ratio across industries. In six cases, significant negative 
coefficients were obtained but four of these were in industries for which 
Table 6.1 gives negative coefficients on the benefit to wage ratio. The 
main effect of introducing the real wage into equations with output was 
to reduce the size and significance of the output coefficients in cases 
where the real wage coefficient was well determined. As has been 
observed, it is not clear that both of these should be included in the 
employment function and so, rather than examine these results in detail, . 
we move to some estimation of pure classical employment demand and 
output supply functions.
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6.3 Unconstrained Functions for Employment and Output
In this section we turn to examining a set of unconstrained functions 
for employment and output. In this case the underlying functions for 
desired output and employment are (6.3) and (6.4) which are simultaneously 
determined from the first order conditions. As before the employment 
function is derived by including the multiplicative shift terms, substituting 
into the adjustment mechanism and taking logs to give the estimating 
equation
lnEt - bQ ♦ b]L ln(f)t ♦ b2 lnEt_1 ♦ bjt - bADt ♦ b5 (f) t ♦ *2t
( 6. 6)
-X  Xd2where b, " ■=---  , b_ • (1-X) and b, ” *---  with b. and b. as the shift1 1— 2 3 1— A j
coefficients.
Before turning to the results, some reference must be made to the 
additional data on prices which is needed for estimation. These were 
gleaned from several sources and in some cases, pieced together as 
described in more detail in Appendix 6A1. These are rather crude and 
are likely to suffer from two types of error. First the series used 
may not adequately reflect the range of prices which would be included 
in the industry's average price but, more importantly, several of the 
series used are broad price indices which, again, may not adequately 
refect the price history of the individual industry. Secondly the 
appropriate price in theory is the price of value added but the prices 
used most nearly approximate the prices of final output.
The overal explanatory power of the equations given in Table 6.2 
is lower than for those in Table 6.1 though, for manufacturing as a 
whole, it is still respectably high. On the criterion of Durbin's h
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statistic, serial correlation appears to be present in about the same 
number of cases as in Table 6.1 but not necessarily in the same equations. 
For manufacturing, for instance, it disappears altogether while, for 
industrial production, it becomes more serious. The difference between 
the two aggregate equations stands out sharply when looking at the 
coefficient b^ which, for industrial production, is positive but not 
significant and for manufacturing is negative and highly significant.
This clearly explains much of the difference in the overall performance 
of the two equations and might be due to the use of too wide a price 
index for industrial production (the GDP deflator)
but the results for individual industries seem to bear out 
the distinction.
In 14 out of 19 industries, the coefficient b^ is negative and in 
12 of these, significantly so and this preponderance is even greater 
in manufacturing alone where all of the negative coefficients appear. 
However the values of implied by the point estimates are unreasonable, 
ranging across both positive and negative values, although in only 6 
cases are they significantly different from zero. In view of the 
apparently widespread finding of decreasing short run returns to labour 
in Table 6.1, these results should hardly be surprising. What is 
surprising is that, despite the failure to identify a "reasonable" 
production function, the estimated demand curves appear to be 
predominantly downward sloping.
It might have been expected that the exclusion of output from the 
equation would raise the size and significance of the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable. This is not the case, however, and the 
estimates of bj are not substantially larger or more significant than
6.25
in Table 6.1. As before, with the exception of mining and quarrying 
adjustment is almost complete within each period and, in nine of the 
industries, the coefficient b^ gives a negative sign. The time trend 
coefficients are much less ambiguous than in Table 6.1. With the 
exception of mining and quarrying, the coefficient b^ is always positive 
and almost always significant. The trend dummy is, with the exception 
of two industries, always negative though only significant in seven cases 
and not in the aggregates. Hence the results are consistent with the 
model though not with more rapid productivity growth in the 1930's.
The results for the benefit to wage ratio, are much less clear 
cut and, in aggregate, bg takes a negative sign which is significant 
for the manufacturing sector. This is reflected in the industry 
equations where the sign of the coefficient varies, only giving signifi­
cant coefficients in four cases. This is not altogether surprising 
since the effects might run in both directions. If the results of Table 
6.1 are interpreted as indicating some net dishoarding of labour contingent 
upon increases in benefits, then this has the effect of reducing 
employment at every level of output which would be equivalent to increasing 
productivity. This might, in turn, shift the labour demand curve outwards 
raising output and offsetting the direct downward shift in employment.
If this were so, then, given the real wage, the output supply curve 
would shift out with increases in the benefit to wage ratio. If the 
effects found in Table 6.1 reflect the substitution of hours for workers 
on the other hand, as long as it is assumed that the marginal product 
of hours and workers are the same, the benefit to wage ratio will not 
shift the output supply function.
The output supply function is based upon the equation of desired 
output (6.4) from the first order conditions. This is augmented as
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before with the shift terms and a first order adjustment process this 
time, in output. In logs the estimating equation is
lnQt - co + Cl ln(|)t ♦ c2 l n Q ^  ♦ c3t + c^Dt + Cj- ln(|)t ♦ €3,.
(6.7)
-Xc^ Xt»2
where c, ■ ■=---  , c„ “ 1-X, c, “ ■=---  andc.- and c. are the shift1 1 - ^ * 2  ’ 3 1-a^ A 5
coefficients.
As with the unconstrained employment functions, the equations of 
Table 6.3 give a surprisingly high level of explanatory power and, 
although there is evidence of serial correlation in the industrial 
production estimate, it is absent for manufacturing and for individual 
industries with four exceptions. The results of Table 6.3 are also 
strongly supported in other respects. The coefficient c^ indicates 
an upward sloping supply curve for output in manufacturing 
but not for industrial production as a whole and this is, to a large 
extent, reflected in the coefficients on the industry equations where 
the twelve negative coefficients are all in manufacturing industries.
The point estimates of give values which lend much more support 
to the simple production function than the employment equation. All 
but one of the industry equations gives a value which falls less than 
one standard error away from the interval between zero and one. Among 
the more well determined coefficients, the point estimate frequently 
falls near the middle of this range. Hence the results suggest that, 
while the determinants of output lend some support to the model, the 
reason for the inconsistency between this and the unconstrained employment 
function lies largely in the relationship between output and employment 
which was demonstrated in Table 6.1. This appears consistent with the 
n otion that some part of observed employment is fixed in the short run
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and is not treated by firms as a variable factor though the exact reasons 
for this remain unclear*. It also suggests that increasing short run 
returns to labour found in traditional employment functions are not 
necessarily inconsistent with the finding of the conventional downward 
sloping labour demand and upward sloping output supply schedules.
As before, adjustment appears to occur almost wholly within the 
year and among the individual industries, the lagged dependent variable 
gives a negative sin in six cases. The trend coefficients are also 
similar in that, with the exception of mining and quarrying, Cj takes 
a positive coefficient thoughout and the time trend dummy is negative 
in the aggregates and only significant when negative among the industries. 
The other shift term, the benefit to wage ratio is generally positive 
though rarely significant. This lends only very weak support to the 
idea that a shake out of labour raised the profit maximising output level.
The overall findings of this section shed an interesting light on 
the Keynes-Dunlop-Tarshis debate. It indicates that, though for aggregates 
such as GDP or industrial production, labour demand curves are not found 
to be downward sloping, for the all important manufacturing sector, they are.
* Using this approach, if one were to take the coefficient in Table 6.3
as an estimate of the "true” labour parameter and that of Table 6.1 as a 
biased estimate of it due to the fixity of some part of employment, then 
the proportion of fixed labour can be calculated from the two coefficients. 
From the expression on p.6.4 , the ratio of'fixed to total employment
Ef a1(6.3)
T  " 1 “ 5^6.1)
Thus, for manufacturing as a whole, it would be
1 0.40601.4275 0.72
which is an uncomfortably high proportion. Both the difficulties in 
interpretation and the uncertainty surrounding the price data to be
against simply accepting such a result at face value.
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Thus disaggregation is an important key to gaining further insights on 
this issue. However, one should not necessarily conclude that in the 
manufacturing sector at least there was Classical Unemployment. For 
one thing, not all industries exhibit the same tendency and, in any case, 
it is possible that there were switches of regime in any one industry 
across time. Furthermore, it was largely the manufacturing sector 
which competed in foreign markets and particularly in engineering, metals 
and textiles where the strongest results appear. It is therefore 
possible that the price terms are acting as proxies for international 
competitiveness rather than for domestic prices relative to variable 
costs. This would be consistent with the finding of strongly significant 
relative price effects on exports in the previous chapter. Similarly 
it would allow Keynesian unemployment consistent with increasing short 
run returns but in which the quantity rationing was determined largely 
by the level of international competitiveness.
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6 .4 Labour Market Flows and Unemployment
It is now a commonplace that the unemployed cannot be simply 
described as a standing army or a stagnant pool since there is continuous 
entry and exit. Thus the pool of unemployed is not stagnant but is a 
resevoir whose level at anytime depends on the cumulative inflows and 
outflows and in which the current change in level depends on the current 
balance of these flows. In the postwar period, it has been found that,
for some groups, a fifth or more of the labour force flowed on to the
, _ . 1 register in any year .
The relation between stock changes and the different types of 
flows for the three major stocks of employed, unemployed and those not 
in the labour force, can be examined in the simplified framework laid 
out by Holt and David (1966, p. 78):
E£ - “ h + c - r - q - l  (6.8)
Ut - “ q + t + a -  w -  h -  c (6.9)
Ft - Ft-1 “ b - d  + w -  e + r (6 .10)
where the current period flows (between t-1 and t) are defined by the 
lower case letters as h - hires, c - recalls, r “ retirements, q “ quits, 
t ■ layoffs, e - entrants, w - withdrawals, b ” births and d ■ deaths.
In this simple clessification, exits from the labour force (i.e. into the
* Cripps and Tarling estimated annual inflows on to the unemployment 
register as a proportion of employment for 1966 at between 10Z and 30Z 
for different age groups and between 10 and 20Z for across different regions 
(1974, pp. 308-309). Similar orders of magnitude have been calculated 
for 1972 by Nickell (1980 p. 780) and for 1978 by Stern (1982, pp. 7, 11).
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not in labour force category F) are termed withdrawals if they are from 
unemployment, U,and retirements if they are from employment, E,though 
in each case they would include all exits including death, retirement, 
sickness etc. Similarly, entrants into the labour force are assumed to 
enter unemployment in the first instance. Variations in the labour force 
can thus be sunmarised as the net change in employment and unemployment
If rates of flow off the register can be measured, then, provided 
the level is not changing, the average duration of unemployment can be 
calculated. If workers are identical in that they do not have character­
istics which affect the duration of their spell of unemployment, this 
also gives the expected duration of a worker entering unemployment. If 
all workers on the register have the same probability of leaving 
unemployment in any week, then this probability is the inverse of average 
duration, D^, (e.g. in weeks). Thus where U£ “ ^t-1 avera8e duration 
can be calculated as the ratio of the stock to the inflow or outflow (in
It is well known that the probability of leaving the register is not 
constant and that it decreases with length of time unemployed. This might 
be due to length of unemployment itself reducing re-employability and/or 
the fact that workers enter the register with different exit probabilities 
and. given this,higher proportions of those with high durations have low 
exit probabilities which lowers the average exit probability for the group 
as a whole. Some evidence of this latter effect has already been considered 
in the relatively high proportions of long term unemployment amongst older 
workers. According to Beveridge, these longer durations reflected low 
re-employment probabilities. Quoting from his earlier work, he re-emphasised 
that "the adverse effect of advancing years is seen less when it is a 
question of retaining old employment than when it is a question of finding 
new employers" (1944, p. 71).
e - r - w (6 . 11)
weeks)
D U U ( 6 . 12 )u w+h+c r+t+e
1
and the probability of leaving unemployment is Pu - jj- If the same
u
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assumptions are made for employment, average employment duration Dg can 
be calculated as
De
E _ E 
h+c " r+q+i. (6.13)
and the rate of turnover or the probability of leaving employment is
Te “ . It is also useful to express the flow between employment and
® h+cunemployment as a proportion of the labour force « —j—  . If labour
force exit and entry is ignored, the unemployment rate can be expressed
as
u
L T„ x D l u (6.14)
Thus when e ■ r + w, for those workers not leaving or entering the labour 
force, the unemployment rate is the product of labour force turnover and 
average unemployment duration.
These various magnitudes could be calculated if rates of flow on 
and off the unemployment register could be found but such information 
is not readily available. It is possible to make approximation, however, 
using the procedure suggested by Beveridge (1944, p. 80) of applying the 
placing index (i.e. the ratio of vacancies filled by exchanges to the 
number of worker leaving the register for employment) to the total 
number of vacancies filled by the exchanges to give an estimate of the 
total flow into employment. The placing index applies only to the wholly 
unemployed and hence, though the proportion is probably not large, to 
the extent that re-engagements among the temporarily stopped are 
included in the vacancies filled statistics, the rate of flow for the 
wholly unemployed will be over-estimated^. 1
1 It is likely (though not known) that most of recalls of those temporarily 
laid off was direct, rather than through tha exchanges since, in most cases, 
the worker would still be closely linked with the firm or would have been 
laid off for a fixed period and told when to return.
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Using this calculation and applying it to the annual average of 
wholly unemployed using equation 6¿2 gives the estimate of average duration 
(for those not leaving the labour force) in Table 6.4. The figures are 
somewhat distorted for juveniles because of the inclusion of 14 and 15 
years olds in the scheme in September 1934^. Comparison with the upper 
panel of the Table shows that the decline in the rate of wholly unemployed 
between 1932 and 1937 was largely, though not entirely, due to a decline 
in duration which holds for all groups. Furthermore, a substantial part 
of the differences in unemployment rates for different groups is accounted 
for by differences in average duration. Some check on the figures is 
possible by comparison with the results of Cripps and Tarling who calcu­
lated average duration for the wholly unemployed using data on the propor­
tions in different duration groups under the assumption of a Stationary 
register at selected dates. This gave an average duration for adult 
males of 18.4 weeks in April 1933 and 14.4 weeks in April 1937^.
The striking aspect of these average durations is that they are 
so low compared with the unemployment rates and the bottom panel shows 
that this is due to high rates of turnover . On average it reflects 
a movement from wholly unemployed into employment for each worker every 
two years. Surprisingly the turnover rate is lower for adult females 
than for the other groups but this is probably due to the higher proportion
* This tends to raise the rate of flow into employment from unemployment 
fop juveniles aged 16 - 17 because, prior to 1934, many would not have 
come onto the register until they had once been in insured employment.
Once the insurance system was extended to younger age groups, these 
juveniles would be more likely to have experienced a spell of insured 
employment.
^ These figures were calculated from Cripps and Tarling (1974), Table IV, 
p. 306 on the assumption of a 5{ day week.
3 Cripps and Tarling found that the rate of inflow fell dramatically in 
the post-war period before rising again after 1966.
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Table 6.4
Unemployment, Duration and Labour Turnover 1932-38
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
X Wholly Unemployed
M 19.9 19.0 16.2 15.1 12.9 10.3 15.4
W 9.3 8.2 7.0 7.1 6.7 6.2 8.1
B 10.9 10.4 11.3 5.8 4.7 3.1 3.6
G 10.2 10.1 11.2 6.6 5.9 4.0 4.8
All 15.8 15.0 12.9 12.2 10.4 9.2 9.8
Average Duration (Weeks)
M 16.6 14.4 12.8 11.0 11.1 9.9 9.9
W 10.7 9.2 8.0 7.8 7.5 6.8 8.5
B 7.4 6.2 4.7 3.6 2.7 2.0 2.5
G 6.0 5.3 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.2 2.8
All 15.3 13.4 11.8 10.4 10.4 9.2 9.5
4n«tw&( Labour Turnover X
M 6.2.5 68.8 66.6 71.0 60.2 54.0 56.0
W 45.5 46.5 45.6 47.8 46.9 46.5 45.9
B 77.0 86.9 125.3 84.8 89.8 79.6 75.2
G 88.3 98.0 152.1 102.1 97.6 95.5 90.0
All 53.5 58.5 56.6 60.9 52.2 52.2 53.5
Sources: Wholly unemployed calculated from monthly totals for the U.K
In the Ministry of Labour Gazette, Labour force at the mid-year 
card count from 22nd Abstract of Labour statistics, pp. 15-16 
and the Gazette. The flow into employment was calculated by 
dividing the placing index given by Beveridge, 1944, Table 14, 
p. 80 into the annual totals of vacancies filled from the 
Gazette and converted to a rate using the figures for insured 
population.
of man entering casual and relief work and returning to former employers. 
In his estimate for 1937 Beveridge found that, of the 9 million 
engagements of wholly unemployed workers, about 30Z were returns to the 
last employer so that the labour force turnover rate for new
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employment was about 452 per annum .
These calculations, however, largely exclude those among the unemployed 
categorised as "temporarily stopped" or "normally in casual employment".
The former were only distinguished from 1926 and were defined by the 
Ministry of Labour as including "those persons recorded as unemployed 
on the date of the return who were either on short time or were otherwise 
stood off or suspended on the definite understanding that they were to 
return to their former employment within a period of six weeks from the 
date of suspension" (Ministry of Labour Gazette, February 1926, p. 54).
Thus this category appears to capture for the most part, those workers 
who were temporarily laid off including those who might have been 
claiming unemployment benefits under the '0X0' system. Beveridge's 
table illustrates that these were a significant proportion of the unemployed 
as has already been observed.
The proportion of temporarily stopped is surprisingly high and, 
even though it falls in the recovery of the 30's, it still accounts for 
132 even in the boom year of 1937. Together with the casuals these 
figures reflect groups with extremely low durations and probably high 
turnovers.
Despite being a minority of the unemployed, these groups would 
dominate flows on and off the register. In a sample enquiry conducted 
by the Ministry of Labour for the year ended January 1931, it was found 
that only 27.32 of claimants had just one spell of unemployment and that
* Some more detailed information is available for the 6 months ending 
December 26th from Chegwidden and Myrdin—Evans (1934) Appendix 1, pp. 236- 
238. From this it was calculated that 43.22 of adult males and 37.22 of 
adult females returned to their old employer while the proportions 
•entering casual and relief employment ware 25.37 and 19.4% respectively. 
Given the depressed conditions of 1932, these proportions are probably 
higher than at other times and not inconsistent with the figure given 
by Beveridge.
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Table 6.5
Wholly
Unemployed
Temporarily
Stopped
Casual
Workers
1928 69.3 24.6 6.1
1929 72.1 21.5 6.4
1930 68.1 26.7 5.0
1931 73.9 21.8 4.3
1932 75.9 20.4 3.7
1933 78.7 17.6 3.7
1934 79.4 16.6 4 .0
1935 81.0 14.9 4.1
1936 81.9 13.8 4.3
1937 82.5 13.2 4.3
1938 76.2 20.2 3.6
Average 1928-38 76.3 19.2 4.5
Source: Beveridge (1944) Table 11, p. 68
18.3Z had more than ten spells . The average number of spells per
was 7.3, average duration 20.8 days and some 63X of claims were for less 
than 6 days which would predominantly be the temporarily stopped and 
casuals. Thus even though across all groups, the average spell was less 
than three weeks, the average amount of unemployment per claimant was
27.5 weeks or more than six months (Royal Comnission on Unemployment 
Insurance Final Report, p. 71-2). It appears from this that as far as 
individuals were concerned, it was not just among the long term unemployed 
that unemployment was concentrated among a minority — when durations 
were very short they often reflected repeated spells.
In e study of flows across the register in the lata 1930s, H.W. Singer 
found that changes in the stocks of unemployed were determined largely 
by variations in rates of inflow rather than rates of outflow. In 
high unemployment regions the probability of leaving the register in
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any three month period, was lower and the proportion of the insured 
flowing onto it was higher. This indicates that high regional unemployment 
rates arose both from longer duration and high turnover*. It is likely 
that, given their occupational structure, temporary layoffs were more 
common in the North and that, insofar as there were repeated spells 
connected for the purposes of claiming benefit, much of what would 
otherwise be long term unemployment was concealed.
We turn finally to the category of flows so far omitted - movements 
into and out of the insured labour force. The Ministry of Labour 
regularly reported the number of new entrants, i.e. those who had not 
been in insurance before and these are given as a proportion of the insured 
population in the last column of Table 6 .6 . These consist partly of 
workers who were changing from uninsured to insured occupations but 
is dominated largely by the entry of juveniles seeking or obtaining their 
first job. The Ministry also calculated net exits, given in Col. 2 
by deducting the total change in the insured labour force from new 
entrants. Thus the gross flows of entrants including re-entrants cannot 
be ascertained. However, the numbers in the Two Months file were also 
reported and this may be interpreted as a very crude measure of gross 
outflow. This is estimated roughly by taking the average of quarterly 
observations on the numbers in the Two Months file and multiplying by 
six. 1
1 Singer (1939) calculated rates of flow onto the register per quarter 
which gave averages of 32 per thousand for the four southern divisions 
and 89 per thousand for the five northern divisions. The annual 
percentage rate of flow for Great Britain emerging from these figures 
is 28%. This appears to be a considerable underestimate because no 
account was taken of those flowing in and out within the three month 
period and, hence, Singer's flow rates are affected by regional 
differences in the average length of short durations.
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Flows Into and
Table 6.6
Out of Insurance 1926-37
Year ended
(1)
New
(2)
Exitants less
(3)
Two Months
June Entrants Re-entrants file
1926
(X of 
Insured)
7.6
(X of Insured) 
6.3
X insured 
5.7
1927 7.2 6.3 6.1
1928 7.2 6.4 5.4
1929 7.0 5.2 4.4
1930 7.0 4.4 4.0
1931 6.4 3.4 4.4
1932 5.7 5.4 6.7
1933 5.4 4.8 5.3
1934 5.4 4.9 4.2
1935 5.7 5.0 4.0
1936 7.1 5.1 3.5
1937 6.6 4.3 3.0
Sources: Cols. (1) and (2) from Ministry of Labour Gazette, Nov. 1937
P. 421 , Col. (3) calculated as an average of quarterly totali
given in Burns (1941) Table 1, p. 343, expressed as a proportion 
of total insured in Great Britain from 22nd Abstract of Labour 
Statistics, p. 14.
The result in Col. (3) compares reasonably well with Col. (2) 
though it is somewhat lower. This suggests that reentrants were probably 
not a large proportion of the insured. It seems likely that most of 
the movements were permanent changes connected with different stages 
in the typical lifecycle. Among new entrants the effect of falling 
birth rates during the First World War is very clear as is the post war 
rise and, fortuitously, this serves to reduce the inflow during the 
depression of the early 1930s. The low rate of exit in the 1930-1 and 
high rates in 1932-33 which are reflected in the residual change in the
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insured population and in the Two Months file are clearly associated 
with the genuinely seeking work clause and the anomalies regulations. 
Though the evidence is not very firm, it seems likely that some of those 
affected subsequently reentered, though it would not have been common
at other times.
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6.5 Quarterly Variations in Employment and the Insured Labour Force 1924-39
If sufficient flow data were available, it would be possible to 
conduct estimation - which could shed further light on changes in the 
stocks represented by insured employment and unemployment so far 
examined only on annual data. One implication of large scale flows across 
the unemployment register and especially the high proportion of temporary 
layoffs is that stock adjustments could be made through small alterations 
in rates of flow. Increases in demand for labour could be met almost 
instantly be recalling those on temporary layoff, hiring casuals or 
contacting the employment exchange. The evidence from employment functions 
bears this out, at least on annual data.
A stringent test of this general view is to examine the determinants 
of quarterly changes in employment, unemployment and the labour force.
As illustrated previously, the net change in any stock is simply the 
balance of gross flows and, hence, the determinants of such stock changes 
should embody the determinants of the various inflows and outflows. With 
these considerations in the background, we proceed in this section to 
build an explanation of quarterly changes in unemployment by analysing 
changes in employment and the labour force before considering unemployment 
directly in the following section.
An important reason for examining quarterly changes is to provide 
further tests of the impact of unemployment benefits. It is possible 
that annual data used in levels was affected to some extent by differences 
in coverage and methods of counting, not to mention structural change.
This might have affected the levels but would be less serious when the 
data is converted to changes. Furthermore, in the recent discussion of
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Che impact of unemployment benefits, it appears to have been accepted 
that one is unlikely to obtain very accurate point estimates of the effect 
of benefits when using only 18 or so annual observations. (Benjamin 
and Kochin, 1982, p. 413, Metcalf et al., 1982, p. 395). However, 
despite the availability of quarterly data for the period, this has not 
been resorted to in order to increase the number of degrees of freedom 
in time series estimates.
The model used for employment is essentially the same as that 
used on annual data and similar quarterly series are therefore required. 
These were drawn largely from the quarterly data base conveniently 
provided by the Ministry of Labour for 1924 onwards given in the 
Ministry of Labour Gazette^. The maximum period for which these are 
available is from 19241 to 1939II just prior to the outbreak of war, 
giving a total of 62 observations in all. The employment totals, wage 
rate and wholesale price indices are all available for the entire 
period. There is no quarterly national income series and the Ministry's 
quarterly industrial production series begins only in 1928 and so, for 
earlier quarters, the London and Cambridge series was used suitably 
spliced in 1928 . For unemployment benefits, the table of rates given 
in Burns (1941) was again used epplying the same weights but converting 
to a quarterly basis. (See earlier discussion, pp.4.13).
The equations are specified in first differences of logarithms to 
give proportionate rates of change and thus the exponential trend term 
appears as the constant in the equation. The notation is as before with 
Q .being industrial production, W/P the wage relative to wholesale price *
* The whole set of data can be obtained from two Supplements to the Gazette, 
August 1932 and February 1940.
This was obtained from the L.C.E.S. Bulletin for January 1934, p. 14.
6.43
and B/U Che benefit to wage ratio. The equations reported in Table 6.7 
are for Keynesian and Classical Models of employment with both the real 
wage and output included in equation (3). Given that the specification 
is in pure first differences, the equations (1) and (3) which include 
output give a remarkably good fit though equation (2) which excludes 
output, fails totally. Surprisingly, when both output and the real wage 
are included, the latter becomes significant with a negative sign. It 
is likely that the wholesale price series is more representative of raw 
material inputs than of final outputs and, hence, it may be picking up 
the effects of relative input prices.
Table 6.7
Eq.
No.
Const. Ain Qt Aln(W/P)t Aln(B/W)t R2 RSS D.W.
1 -0.0100
(0.0029)
0.2605
(0.0164)
-0.0665
(0.0495)
0.8198 0.0059 2.3441
2 0.0091
(0.0063)
-0.0960
(0.1131)
-0.0864
(0.1169)
-0.0024 0.0328 1.3867
3 -0.0104
(0.0027)
0.2637
(0.0151)
-0.1452
(0.0444)
-0.0528
(0.0458)
0.8460 0.0049 2.4849
4 AlnEt - 2.3515 + 
(0.7545)
0.2595 AlnQ 
(0.0159)
* 0.0648 
(0.0285) ln V l
- 0.1534 Aln(W/P) 
(0.0432)
- 0.0902 In ~  - 0.2901 In E, . + 0.0012t
(0.0280) t-1 (0.0946) z~ l (0.0004)
R2 - 0.8635 RSS - 0.0414 D.W - 2.2122 
(Seasonal* included but not raported)
No strong emphasis is laid on the particular values of the point 
astimatas for output and tha raal wage sines both measures are not fully 
representative and are likely to be more volatile than tha wider measures
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of the output and price of insured industries would be if they were 
available. It is notable that, in these equations, the benefit to wage 
ratio is never significant at the 5Z level though, as in the industrial 
employment functions, it does better in equations with only output.
Thus an important result appears to be the disappearance of the benefit 
effects or employment which were shown to underlie the annual estimates 
where quarterly differences are used.
It is possible that by constraining to first differences important 
dynamics affecting the variables in different ways are missed out. As 
a test of the first difference formulation against an equation in 
pure levels or one in levels with first order dynamics, the lagged level 
of each variable (including the dependent and a time trend) were added 
to the equation. This more general model was then tested against the 
first difference specification for each of equations (1) - (3) using 
the F test1. This does not reject first differences for equation (1), 
rejects it for equation (2) and is almost exactly on the borderline of 
5Z significance for equation (3) • None of the terms in the benefit to 
wage ratio was significant at any time and, hence, these terms were 
dropped and the equation re-estimated with differences and lagged levels 
as given in equation (4). It appears that a dynamic specification is 
appropriate when the real wage term is included but not otherwise. It 102
1 In the simple bivarate case, the test for Y on X in first differences 
gives the null hypothesis H^, AY^ “ B^AX£ with the alternative as
Hx, AYt - B1AX£ ♦ B2 Xt-1 + e3 Yt-1. If the time model is in first 
differences, then • 0 and if the true model is in levels, then
02 ” and 0^ ■ -I, If a dynamic specification in levels is indicated, 
then the coefficients 02 and 0^ may take on other values. Thus performing
the best for the joint significance of lagged levels tests the first 
difference specification against thase alternatives.
The computed F statistics were 0.72, 3.60 and 2.34 raspectively and 
the critical valuas are 2.55, 2.55 and 2.40.
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is possible that these effects were too subtle to be picked up on annual 
data though this may simply be the result of the inadequacy of the 
particular wholesale price index.
We turn to the other side of the labour market for an examination 
of quarterly changes in the insured population. It has been noted at 
several points in the discussion that variations in the insured population 
were affected by a whole range of legislature and administrative changes. 
The Ministry of Labour often evaluated the short run effects of such 
changes by examining the flow of insurance books through the Two Months 
file... If, as was suggested in the previous section, the Two Months 
file closely reflects the outflow from insurance, it is useful to see 
if this flow can be accounted for in regression analysis.. To the extent 
that this can be explained, the impact of various influences determining 
the size of the labour force can be accounted for. To do this we need 
a variable which can act as a proxy for the effects of legislative and 
administrative change. Easton (1978, p. 158) and, following him,
Benjamin and Kochin (1982, p. 412) used the number of claims admitted 
by the insurance and supplementary systems as a proportion of books lodged 
as a measure of the severity with which the system was enforced. However, 
among the claims not admitted were those serving waiting days and those 
disqualified from benefit. For the purposes of determining the flow 
out of insurance it seems that the rate at which claims were being 
disallowed would be e more appropriate variable and this has been used 
to explain postwar flows off the register by Nicheli (1982).
This information was reported regularly in the Gazette from the 
last quarter of 1924 but there'are some problems in using it. The main 
one is that the types of claims referred to and the machinery for 
evaluating them changes over time. From November 1924 to April.1928
6.46
they are for claims to extended benefit adjudicated by local 
Employment Committees. From May 1928 to March 1930 they include all 
claims incliding both those decided upon by Insurance officers and those 
decided on appeal to Courts of Referees. From then until October 1935, 
the system changed,narrowing the jurisdiction of Insurance Officers such 
that only Courts of Referees had the power to disallow. A further change 
occurred in November 1935 when Insurance officers were re-empowered under 
certain circumstances. These changes caused sharp breaks in both the 
numerator number of disallowances and the denominator number of claims 
such that the ratio fell from about 15Z in the first period to 9Z in 
the second and 7Z in the third, rising slightly in the fourth.
In specifying the model for the Two Months file we take the Burns 
series on the total number of books in the Two Months file at a date 
near the end of each quarter from 19241 to 19391 as representing the 
current rate of flow off the register^; This is, therefore, explained 
using first differences of variables thought to determine labour supply, 
namely the benefit to wage ratio and the wage relative to cost of living 
index, termed C (also given as a quarterly series by the Ministry). 
Another variable included is the unemployment level (in absolute numbers) 
in an effort to capture the net impact of added and discouraged worker 
effects. If the discouraged worker effect dominates, then labour supply 
will be smaller the higher is unemployment, due to the rationing of job 
opportunities that the latter represents. Finally the ratio of
There are soma difficulties with interpreting this as a pure flow since 
it is strictly a stock, i.s observed at a single point in time but, given 
that duration is fixed (i.e. two months) then variations will largely 
reflect changes in the flow. However, since we are not measuring completed 
spells, the composition of durations will not, in general, be constant 
(such that average duration is always one month). Though this will be 
relatively unimportant (given that the maximum spell is shorter than the 
period of observation) it stay also be that books were drawn back into 
the system in different proportions at different times.
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disallowances Co claims , termed Z is included as a level since it 
represents a flow variable, was entered separately for the four periods 
distinguished when different disallowance procedures operated.
The result of estimating this equation is given as equation (1) 
in Table 6 .8 . Though a reasonable level of explanatory power was 
achieved several of the terms including the change in unemployment were 
not significant and the equation exhibits serial correlation. An 
alternative formulation is to include unemployment as a level rather than 
a change. This represents the total stock from which those passing through 
the Two Months file were drawn and was therefore included with a lag 
of one quarter*. As shown in equation (2) this improves the equation 
considerably and raises the Durbin Watson statistic to an acceptable 
level. The coefficient on lagged unemployment indicates that the 
elasticity of the Two Months file to the number unemployed is strikingly 
high at 0.6. Furthermore the benefit to wage ratio enters significantly 
with the expected sign, indicating that an increase in the ratio reduced 
the flow out of insurance. The wage to cost of living ratio, however, 
now gives the wrong sign and is not significant. The variables for the 
rate of disallowance subscripted for the different periods also give 
ctrikiing confirmation of the impact of changes in the provisions for and 
administration of benefit claims. In the first period variations in the 
rate of disallowance do not seem to have affected the outflow but, subse­
quently, the effects are strongly positive and increasingly large. An 
attempt was made to see if these effects were simply arising because 
the different segments were acting as shift dummies , but the inclusion 
of dummies for each of the periods did not give any significant coefficients.
* This is the appropriate stock since those on the file would have been 
there for anything up to two months. Also, it does not appear that those 
passing directly from employment out of insurance would appear since their 
books would not have been deposited at the exchange.
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Thus it appears that insofar as the Two Months file reflects the 
outflow from insurance, it can be explained using a combination of 
variables representing economic incentives and the stance of the insurance 
system. The next step is to attempt to embody this in an explanation 
of variations in the total number insured. This variable is available 
on a quarterly basis in the data set referred to compiled in the Gazette. 
Since direct observations are only available once a year (at the mid 
year card count) the quarterly figures were interpolations almost certainly 
obtained by examining the records of new entrants and the Two Months file. 
Insofar as there are inaccuracies in this estimate, it will also be 
reflected in the quarterly series for employment which is obtained by 
deducting the monthly average of unemployed from the labour force 
estimate.
One additional variable needs to be included to account for the 
flow into insurance which, at least for new entrants, has a large demo­
graphic component. Thus it is necessary to construct a variable representing 
the cohort of juveniles entering insurance each year. This was done by 
taking the annual figures for births in England and Wales and Scotland and 
constructing a two year quarterly moving average. This was then advanced 
by 17 years and applied to the quarter at the beginning of which it was 
centred^. This is a flow variable (termed J) and is therefore entered as 
a level rather than a change.
The data was obtained from Mitchell and Deane (1962) p. 30-31. The 
method of construction is such that, e.g. for 19321, it is the average 
of births for 1914 and 1915 and for 1932II it is 1915 plus the average of 1914 
and 1916, etc. This is consistent with the insured labour force series 
which includes juveniles aged 16 and 17 throughout but excludes those 
aged 14 and 15 noted earlier. The inclusion of these is likely to have 
affected the timing of the entry into insurance of juveniles aged 16 and 
17.
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With the addition of this variable the equation used in the Two Months 
file was applied to changes in the insured labour force and the results 
are given as equations (6.3) and (6.4). The number unemployed was tried 
both as a difference and a lagged level. Though inclusion as a level 
improves the estimate, only about 25Z of the variation is explained and 
there is serious serial correlation. With this qualification in mind, 
however, some of the variables, including the disallowance rates show 
up well with the expected signs which are are the opposite of those for 
equations (6.1) and (6.2). Given the extent of serial correlation, the 
lagged levels of all the variables were included except those which 
represent flows, i.e. the disallowance rates and the demographic term.
The F test massively rejects the first differences specification and 
the full model including lags, is reported as equation (6.5). The most 
striking coefficients are on the lagged labour force and the benefit to 
wage ratio. The former indicates rather slow adjustment of only 20X per 
quarter and the benefits terms indicate strong positive current and lagged 
effects. On the other hand, the unemployment rate and wage to cost of 
living ratio have coefficients which are very small and insignificant. It 
is pleasing to note, however, that the coefficients of the three 
disallowance rate terms and the demographic variable remain significant.
It would be possible to explore the dynamics of employment and the 
'labour force further and obtain from the coefficients a quarterly model of 
unemployment. However, given that both variables are to some extent 
constructed by a form of interpolation, it is more appropriate to move 
to analysing the unemployment data itself which is observed directly each 
month. The equations estimated in this section do, however, indicate 
which variables appear to be important on either side of the labour market. 
These do not correspond well with the results of our earlier findings:
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for employment output and the real wage and for the insured labour 
force, the stance of the insurance system and the demographic trend appear 
to dominate. Thus the variables are clearly separated into those affecting 
labour demand and those affecting supply which is useful in interpreting 
the coefficients of a quarterly model of unemployment.
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6.6 Quarterly Variables in Unemployment 1924-1939
In this section we examine the results of estimating equations 
which parallel those estimated in the previous section for each side 
of the labour market separately. The quarterly series provided by the 
Ministry of Labour are averages of monthly observations and from the 
beginning of 1926, when the separate categories were first distinguished, 
total unemployment is divided into the "wholly unemployed" and the 
"temporarily stopped". Given that these reflect quite different types 
of unemployment and, in particular, different durations, it is likely 
that the responses to economic variables will differ as between the two 
groups. However, there is a major qualification in that casual workers 
who were unemployed are included with the wholly unemployed group.
Apart from these the wholly unemployed also includes a significant 
proportion of workers with short durations who were changing jobs or 
moving into or out of the labour force. Thus the difference is not 
simply of duration but of the degree of attachment to individual employers 
but, even among the wholly unemployed, the high frequency of returns 
to previous employment has been noted. The importance of distinguishing 
the temporarily stopped is that it focuses exclusively on unemployment 
among those with a definite promise of or agreement for resumption 
within a finite and relatively short period.
Recent developments in theory emphasise that the employment contract 
may, in some circumstances, include not only a current wage contract but 
an implicit agreement as to the continuation of wages, hours and 
employment which may be expected in the future contingent on the demand 
conditions facing the firm. Given worker preferences, a lower multiperiod 
wage can be offered by firms in the presence of a contract which minimises 
expected costs and which in some states, leads to layoffs rather than
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wage reduction. These arrangements depend on the alternative income 
available to workers when unemployed, the obvious alternative being 
unemployment insurance benefits. In the simplest case where these 
are externally financed, the layoffs will take place when the marginal 
product of workers falls below the value of benefits plus the utility 
the additional leisure.
The implications for temporary layoffs have been examined by 
Feldstein (1976) and Baily (1977) among others. In these models, higher 
unemployment benefits lead to higher average levels of temporary layoffs 
and larger variations in employment for given variations in demand.
Demand conditions are usually summarised by the price facing the 
competitive firm but if the firm is sales constrained, this enhances 
fluctuation in employment under the contract. In Baily's model 
the alternative income facing workers is the combination of benefits and 
the expected return from job search. The better are job opportunities 
elsewhere, the greater the value of these alternatives and the more likely 
are layoffs. However Pissarides (1981) has argued that, if workers 
have firm specific human capital, the risk of the loss of this capital 
to the firm is lower the poorer are opportunities of employment elsewhere 
and, hence, the more likely are layoffs at a time of high unemployment.
In this case firms will be more likely to place their workers on the 
unemployment register than to keep hoarded labour on the payroll.
The relevance to the intervar period of these observations is 
obvious. The speed of response of unemployment to variations in demand 
is one of the features which distinguishes the period. If temporary 
layoffs are found to vary more in response to demand than other types of 
unemployment, it would suggest a rationale for these findings which is
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rather more subtle than the mere observation of labour market excess 
supply. Little empirical work on temporary layoffs has been done, though 
Feldstein (1978) finds strong cross sectional evidence of a positive 
relation between the benefit to wage ratio and temporary layoffs which is 
stronger in the presence of unionisation. The recent argument of Benjamin 
and Kochin connecting the 0X0 system with short term benefit induced 
unemployment has already been noted. If the link between the temporarily 
stopped and unemployment benefits can be substantiated, it would support 
this view and also help explain why, in some employment equations at least, 
benefits appear to shift employment at given levels of demand.
The specification used for unemployment is the same as that used in 
the previous section with both supply and demand side variables and the 
dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the number 
unemployed (rather than the unemployment rate). Equation (1) of Table 6.9 is 
for total unemployment. The change in output and the real wage are 
significant with the expected sign but the benefit to wage ratio and the 
wage over the cost of living index, though giving the expected signs are 
not significant. None of the other terms including, the lagged dependent 
variable gives a significant coefficient and all give the wrong sign.
Thus the effects of disallowance rates which were distinguished in the 
supply side equations do not come through in the unemployment equations.
An alternative dynamic specification which drops these terms is given 
as aquation (3). A determinate long run solution for unemployment for 
given values of the independent variables requires that the lagged 
dependent variable and some of the other lagged terms be noh aero but more 
of these are significant. On the F test a pure first differences 
specification (including the first five terms only) cannot be rejected 
against either of equations (1) and (3) or against the most general
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Table 6.9
Eq. No. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Ain Ut Ain WUt Dep. Var. Ain Ut Ain TSt
Const. 1.4549 1.1440 Const. 1.0563 3.4198
(1.0595) (1.2378) (2.1369) (3.0222)
AlnQ- -0.7253 -0.3750 Ain Q -0.7736 -1.6715c (0.0902) (0.0939) t (0.1011) (0.1835)
Aln(B/W) 0.4013 0.1051 Aln(B/W) 0.5800 0.4313t (0.3226) (0.3970) t (0.3527) (0.7160)
Aln(W/Pl 0.7982 0.7698 Aln(W/P) 0.8728 3.4459t (0.3197) (0.3482) t (0.3480) (0.6845)
Ain(W/C) 1.2130 1.2120 Aln(W/C) 0.8135 2.1610t (0.8376) (0.8943) t (1.0542) (1.9005)
Ln(DepVar) -0.0528 0.1149 ln(DepVar) -0.0854 -0.6433
t-1 (0.0561) (0.0619) t-1 (0.0971) (0.1293)
ln J 0.0686 -0.0165 ln J 0.1116 0.5880t (0.1132) (0.1292) t (0.1261) (0.2806)
ln Z 0.0467 0.0675 li» Q„ , -0.1418 -1.0036t
(24-28) (0.0276) (0.0302)
t—1 (0.1127) (0.2335)
In Zt 0.0172 0.0371 ln(B/W)t_a 0.2026 -0.8186
(28-30) (0.0233) (0.0746) (0.2730) (0.4918)
In Zfc 0.0736 0.0455 ln(W/P)t_a 0.2944 1.0277
(30-35) (0.1640) (0.1775) (0.2758) (0.7011)
In Zt 0.1436 0.2297 ln(W/C)t_ -0.6005 0.1738
(35-39) (0.1585) (0.1704) (1.2035) (2.0966)
R2 0.6880 0.7220 t 0.0015 -0.0010
RSS 0.1261 0.1203 (0.0024) (0.0045)
D.W. 1.8392 1.8988 R2 0.6663 0.8314
RSS 0.1319 0.3607
D.W. 1.7248 2.3755
Not«! Equation« (1) and (3) ara a« timated for 1924II to 1939II and 
aquation« (2) and (4) for 1926II to 1939II.
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model including all of the variables in the equations^.
Equation (2) is for the wholly unemployed and may be compared with 
that for total unemployment (though it should be noted that sample 
period is different). The wage and price terms give similar coefficients 
but that on output falls sharply and the lagged unemployment coefficient 
is now larger and just significant. It might have been expected that 
the disallowance variables would enter more strongly for the wholly 
unemployed but they are still positive and with slightly higher 
significance levels so the puzzle remains. The test for the joint 
significance of those terms fails as does that for a dynamic specification 
against pure first differences.
In equation (4) the model is estimated for the temporarily stopped 
using the dynamic specification. As would be predicted, the short run 
elasticity to changes in output and the real wage are larger, about 
twice the size as compared with those for total unemployment. Further­
more, lagged terms in the temporarily stopped, output and the benefit 
to wage ratio are significant. It is interesting to note that, given 
the coefficient on the lagged.dependent variable and the negative sign 
on lagged (B/W) the long run effect of the benefit to wage ratio is 
negative. Thus there seems to be no support in time series that the 
benefit to wage ratio is positively related to the numbers temporarily 
stopped. A further surprising feature is that the demographic variable 
now takes a significant and positive sign which is not present in the 
comparable equation for the wholly unemployed. This is surprising, 
given that juveniles formed such a small proportion of the temporarily 
stopped at any time.
* The computed F statistics are respectively F g ^  “ 1.269,
fy ^  » 0.739, Fj^ 40 " 1.794, none of which are significant at the 5%
level.
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These observations suggest that it may be useful to disaggregate 
into different groups by age and sex. Data for the wholly unemployed 
and temporarily stopped distinguishing adult males and females and 
juvenile boys and girls are not available in the quarterly series provided 
by the Ministry of Labour. These therefore had to be taken from individual 
monthly issues of the Gazette and aggregated into quarterly series. The 
averages of these figures for 1926II to 1939II are as follows (in thousands):
Men Women Boys Girls
Wholly Unemployed 1123.38 185.69 41.72 37.36
Temporarily Stopped 241.82 100.82 6.56 5.85
These figures (which for the wholly unemployed now exclude casuals) show 
the surprisingly large number of women who were temporarily stopped - 
a feature which seems to be related to the industries in which they 
worked.
The equations for adult men and women appear in Table 6.10. The 
equation for the wholly unemployed are consistent with those for the 
aggregate in that changes in output and the real wage are most significant 
among the economic variables. However, among women, the joint significance 
of the disallowance terms can be rejected but for men it cannot^. The 
performance of the disallowance terms suggests an interpretation of the 
previous results. Among men they are all positive and significant 
while, among women, three are negative and none significant. Thus the 
effects of disallowances on the insured labour force previously found 
may have been due largely to the effects on women. For men on the other
1 The relevant 7 statistics are: for women F, ,Q
' . . 3 ,  '
- 2.297 and for men
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Table 6.10
Wholly Unemployed Temporarily Stopped
Eq. Mo. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Group (i) Men Women Group (i) Men Women
Const. 0.8281
(0.2801)
1.0499
(0.3494)
Ain Q -0.4056 -0.4759t (0.0770) (0.1732)
Ain(B./W) -0.2600 0.3211i t (0.3180) (0.6954)
Aln(W/P) 0.8083 1.4651t (0.2892) (0.6589)
Ain(W/L) 0.0505 2.4846t (0.7406) (1.6405)
InWU. . -0.0891 -0.1879xt-1 (0.0403) (0.0746)
m zit 0.0636 0.0376
(25-28) (0.0199) (0.0844)
in Zit 0.0371 -0.0677
(28-36) (0.0144) (0.0580)
1“ Zit 
(30-35)
0.0996 -0.4725
(0.0894) (0.3636)
in Zit 0.2353 -0.4588
(35-39) (0.0848) (0.3426)
R2 0.7682 0.6051
RSS 0.0877 0.4449
D.W. 1.8865 2.0659
Const 7.0164
(2.2296)
2.7671
(2.6771)
Ain Qt -1.5383
(0.2202)
-2.2076
(0.2716)
Aln(B./W)t -0.4915
(0.8470)
0.6070
(0.9301)
Aln(W/P)t 3.8720
(0.8335)
3.9308
(0.9656)
Ain(W/L)t 2.0462
(2.3249)
0.5482
(2.7523)
lnTSit-l -0.7424(0.1351)
-0.5468
(0.1083)
ln V l -0.9240
(0.2403)
-0.8347
(0.3114)
ln(B^/W)t_1 -0.8911
(0.5717)
0.7178
(0.6538)
ln(W/P)t_1 1.3854
(0.8186)
1.1287
(0.9295)
ln(W/C)t_1 0.3223
(2.4736)
-3.7350
(3.0799)
t -0.0065 0.0107
(0.0054) (0.0065)
R2 0.7630 0.7202
RSS 0.5709 0.7953
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hand it is possible that high disallowance rates were more a result 
of high unemployment*. The results for the temporarily stopped also 
resemble closely the aggregate results with large significant coefficients 
on output and the real wage and significant negative coefficients on 
lagged output and the lagged dependent variable. The lagged benefit to 
wage ratio gives negative signs though these are not significant.
We turn finally to the similar equations for juveniles. This raises 
a problem for the disallowance variables since juveniles were not 
separately distinguished before 1930 and even after this not by sex. An 
effort was made to include the variable using dummies for the two regimes 
before 1930. This yielded some significant coefficients but, unlike
the equations for adult males and females, the dynamic terms could not 
2be rejected .
The equations given for the wholly unemployed, therefore, include 
the lagged independent variables and nearly every variable enters with an 
individually significant coefficient. Of particular interest are the 
coefficients on the benefit to wage ratio which are significant and 
positive in both the current change and the lagged level. The long run
* Beveridge found that the total number of disallowances increased as 
unemployment fell and ascribed this to the larger proportion of claims 
formed by those of "unsteady character" (1944, p. 197). This figure, 
however, excludes those found ineligible for benefits on grounds other 
than misconduct, voluntary quit or refusal to accept suitable employment.
The restrictions tested were as follows: (1) for the disallowance terms 
in absence of the lagged independent variables, (2) for the lagged 
independent variables in the absence of the disallowance terms (3) for 
the disallowance variables in the presence of the lagged independent 
variables and (4) for the lagged independent variables in the presence 
of the disallowance terms. Significance at the 5Z level is denoted 
by the asterisk
Restriction (1) Y ^ ^  (2) (3) ^  (4) F j ^
Boys 3.573* 3,278* 1.746 1.719
Girls 2.669* 3.394* 1.786 2.488*
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elasticities implied are stiikingly high, for boys 3.65 and for girls 3.37.
It is possible that lack of wage series for juveniles and the consequent 
use of the aggregate wage index leads to spurious results but the size 
and significance of the coefficients suggests that they cannot be easily 
dismissed. The long run coefficients/ on the other variables are consistent 
with expectation with the exception of the wage relative to cost of 
living which is negative. The other curious finding is that the demographic 
variables give significant negative coefficients about which further 
comment will be made.
In the equations for the temporarily stopped, the usual results 
for the output, the real wage and the lagged dependents variable appear 
but there are striking contrasts in other respects. In particular the 
benefit coefficients are strongly negative which suggests that in parts, 
the effects of the benefit to wage ratio were to shift juveniles out of 
the temporarily stopped and into the wholly unemployed. However, the 
net effect of a rise in benefits (evaluated at the sample means) is to 
raise the wholly unemployed by nearly four times the fall in the temporarily 
stopped. Finally, the effect of the demographic variable is now positive 
though it is not sufficiently large to offset the negative coefficients 
for the wholly unemployed.
These results for quarterly data are curious and conflicting and 
the reasons for them are not obvious. The results obtained indicate that 
a quarterly model for interwar unemployment can be estimated with some 
precision using available data. However further work on the dynamic 
structure and, perhaps, the variables used in the model is needed before 
clear conclusions can be reached.
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Table 6. 11
Wholly Unemployed Temporarily Stopped 1
Group (i) Boys Girls Group(i) Boys Girls I
Const. 8.2671
(2.6817)
5.7538
(1.7953)
Const. -14.0194
(9.2767)
-13.4374
(10.3128)
Ain Qt -0.5228
(0.1018)
-0.4144
(0.0896)
Ain Qt -2.1503
(0.3553)
-2.6448
(0.3848)
Aln(B./W)t 1.1400
(0.5067)
1.0309
(0.3651)
Aln(Bi/W)t -4.5775
(2.1936)
-3.0961
(2.3360)
Aln(W/P)t 1.4906
(0.3428)
1.0346
(0.2931)
Aln(W/P)t 4.7728
(1.2448)
4.8085
(1.2607)
Aln(W/C)t -0.2449
(0.1136)
0.3030
(0.9560)
Aln(W/C)t 6.4089
(3.6609)
1.6208
(3.6499)
ln(WUi)t_1 -0.4600
(0.1238)
-0.3975
(0.1093) ln(TSi V i
-0.7514
(0.1583)
-0.6046
(0.1406)
m  jit -1.5259 
(0.5230)
-0.9593
(0.3530)
m  Jit 4.5676
(2.1367)
3.8470
(2.3900)
ln V l -0.1680(0.1015)
-0.1184
(0.0815)
ln Qt_x -0.9267
(0.3673)
-1.0794
(0.4247)
ln(Bi/W)t_1 1.6783
(0.5429)
1.3375
(0.3883)
ln(B./W)t_1 -4.6930
(2.2510)
-3.6706
(2.4143)
ln(W/P)t_1 1.2665
(0.4566)
0.7415
(0.3622)
ln(W/P)t_1 1.7165
(1.3548)
1.2452
(1.3156)
ln(W/C)t_1 -2.2911
(1.2389)
-2.5756
(1.0995)
ln(W/C)t_^ 2.9603
(3.8800)
-3.8714
(3.9670)
t 0.0069
(0.0034)
0.0092 
(0.00 30
t -0.0224
(0.0115)
0.0080
(0.0101)
R2 0.8728 0.9135 R2 0.7492 0.6943
RSS 0.1115 0.0862 RSS 1.3586 1.4228
D.W. 2.0803 1.8857 D.W. 2.1045 2.0499
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APPENDIX 6A.1
Sources and Methods of Calculation of Price Series for Industries, 1920-38
In order to produce the estimates of employment demand by industry 
in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, a product price index for each separate industrial 
sector was required. No detailed series on prices for sectors deferred 
by the Standard Industrial Classification of 1948 are available. The 
price series used were crudely constructed from readily available sources 
and it is hoped that however defective the resulting estimates are, they 
approximate the year to year fluctuations in prices by sector somewhat 
better than using the aggregate price index.
Price indices for Drink, Tobacco and Gas and Water were taken from 
Stone and Rowe (1953), Table 73, p. 190, Table 71, p. 195 and Table 94, 
p. 211 respectively and Building Materials from Maywald (1954) p. 193. 
Series for Ferrous Metals, Non Ferrous Metals, Textiles, Chemicals and Coal 
were obtained from Mitchell and Deane (1962) p. 477 and spliced at 1930.
The index for "Other Articles" continued from 1930 as "Miscellaneous" was 
used for Leather, Paper and Printing and Timber and Furniture. The 
remaining series were obtained from Feinstein (1972); Shipbuilding and 
Vehicles from Table 63, p. T137, Food and Clothing from Table 62, p. T132 
and, for Miscellaneous goods, an index was derived from rows 8-10,
Tables 24 and 25, p. T62-3 and T166-7. Separate indices could not be 
derived for each division of engineering so Feinstein's (1965) "Unspecified 
Plant and Machinery" index was used for Mechanical Engineering, Electrical 
Engineering and Precision Instruments.
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CHAPTER 7
STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BETWEEN THE WARS
7.1 Unemployment by Industry and Region
The broad dimensions of the pattern of interwar unemployment was 
discussed in Chapter 4. In this chapter, the focus is on the variation 
in unemployment rates across industries and regions, the major features 
of which may be briefly restated. Taking the average over the 
years 1923 - 1938, Industrial unemployment rates ranged from a little over 
four per cent in groups such as Business and Financial Services and Other 
Road Transport up to nearly thirty-eight per cent for Shipbuilding.
S im ila r ly ,  ov er th e  n in e  re g io n s  d is t in g u is h e d  by th e  M in is try  o f  Labour,/
average r a t e s  v a ried  over th e  same y e a rs  from c lo s e  to  e ig h t  p er ce n t fo r  
London and th e  South E a s t  to  around tw enty-tw o p er c e n t fo r  th e  most hard 
h i t  re g io n s  o f  Wales and N orthern Ir e la n d . There i s  a c le a r  o rd erin g  o f 
re g io n a l unemployment r a t e s  which p e r s i s t s  ov er tim e , w ith  th e  Sou th , in ­
cluding th e  Midlands (which i s  in te rm e d ia te  in  some re s p e c ts )  having 
unemployment r a t e s  on average h a l f  o f  th ose in  th e  n o rth ern  h a l f  o f  th e 
cou n try . I t  was la r g e ly  t h i s  d is t in c t i o n  which gave r i s e  to  th e  n o tio n  
o f  "Two B r i t a l n s ” o f te n  la b e l le d  " In n e r  B r i t a in "  and th e  "O uter R eg ion s"*-.
For many w r ite r s  who have examined th e r e g io n a l in c id e n ce  o f  unem­
ploym ent, t h i s  Im balance, which appears to  have been th e  re v e rs e  o f  t h a t  
2existing before 1914 was almost entirely due to the contraction of the
The geographical separation of the two regions used in this chapter follows 
that used by the Ministry of Labour, the four southern divisions London,
South East, South West and Midlands, comprise Inner Britain, while the 
remaining five, North East, North West, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland make up the Outer Regions.
2 See Beveridge (1944) pp. 73-74 for a comparision with the prewar distri­
bution .
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m ajor n in te e n th  ce n tu ry  s ta p le  In d u s tr ie s  o f  T e x t i l e s ,  C o a l, Iro n  and 
S t e e l  and S h ip b u ild in g , to  which p erh ap s. E n g in eerin g  should be added.
Thus, In  t h e ir  r e c e n t  p ap er. Booth and Glynn argued th a t  "h igh  r e g io n a l 
unemployment d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a ro se  b ecau se o f  th e  g eo g ra p h ica l c o n c e n tra tio n  
o f  th e se  a i l i n g  In d u s tr ie s ,  the lo c a t io n  and e s ta b lish m e n t o f  growth 
In d u s tr ie s  elsew h ere and th e  im m obility  o f  th e  in d u s t r ia l  w o rk fo rce" .
(1975, p. 618).
T h is  view was in  vary ing  d eg rees taken  by contem porary w r ite r s  such 
as Beveridge and C lay and i s  the m ost commonly found te x tb o o k  e x p la n a tio n  
o f  re g io n a l v a r ia t io n s * .  V ir tu a l ly  th e  on ly  form al attem p t to  examine th e 
r e la t io n s h ip  betw een th e  in d u s tr ia l  and r e g io n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
unemployment appeared in  two a r t i c l e s  w r it te n  by Champernowne ju s t  b e fo re  
th e  outbreak o f  war . H is co n c lu sio n s  were s ta te d  in  th e s e  te rm s: " I t  
seems t h a t  th e  main cau se o f  th e  v a r ia t io n  o f  unemployment p e rce n ta g e  b e­
tween in d u s tr ie s  i s  n o t so  much t h a t  th e  p e rce n ta g e s  v ary  betw een in d u s tr ie s  
w ith in  In n er B r i t a in  o r  w ith in  th e  o u te r  R eg io n s, a s  t h a t  some in d u s tr ie s  
a re  m ainly s i tu a te d  in  prosperous In n e r  B r i t a in  and o th e r s  a re  m ainly  
s i tu a te d  in  th e  d ep ressed  Outer re g io n s "  (1938, p . 103).
Champemowne worked with data provided by the Ministry of Labour for 
100 industries for these two regions at the mid-year of 1929, 1932 and 1936.
The conclusion stated above, however, was drawn primarily from examining
»
a random sample of sixteen of the industries for which hypothetical 
unemployment percentages were computed by taking the region wide unemploy­
ment rates for Inner Britain and the Outer Regions weighted by the share 
of the industry's labour force in each region. These were then compared 
with the actual national unemployment rates for these industries in the
* Clay (1929) p. 45, Beveridge 1930, p. 355. Two wellknown texts.which 
embody this approach are Aldcroft (1970), Ch. 3 and Glynn and Oxborrow 
(1976), Cha. 3, 5.
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year of observation, 1936 (1938, p. 102). However, when challenged to 
further substantiate the arguments that most of the variation between national 
unemployment rates by industry could be accounted for in this manner, 
Champernowne retracted the statement, conceding that the sample was 
unrepresentative. He admitted that location could only account for a small 
proportion of the differences in rates and that simple statistical tech­
niques could not isolate geographical from industrial mobility1'.
The basic idea lying behind such comparisons is that, if in a 
region, there were perfect mobility of workers between industries but not 
between that region and tuiother, then for each industry in the region, the 
unemployment would be approximately equal but different from the rate typical 
in the other region. On the other hand, if workers were mobile geographi­
cally but not industrially, the rate of unemployment in an industry would 
tend towards equality between different regions but not between industries 
in a region and the differences in regional unemployment rates would merely 
reflect the shares of various industries across regions. This gives a
crude distinction between the extremes of structural unemployment which
2might be characterised as regional and industrial .
It is often not sufficiently stressed that this distinction does not 
necessarily bear a close relationship to the original cause of regional 
and industrial differences. For Instance, if an industry concentrated in 
a particular region suddenly collapsed, workers in that industry might 
became evenly distributed over other industries in the region and hence 
the imbalance would appear as regional rather than industrial. However, 
the fact of redistribution or lack of it, reflects the specificity of
1 Champeraowne (1939b) p. 215. The objection was raised by ..Singer 
though the conclusion was also criticised by Dennison (1938) p. 158.
2 It should be noted at this stage that the term "structural unemployment 
is used only to refer to the fact of regional or industrial differences 
and not as a theoretical construct.
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labour, whether in terms of skills, other objective characteristics or 
subjective attitudes^. It is this which is relevant if structural 
unemployment is considered from the point of view of solutions rather 
than causes. A severe regional imbalance might be tackled with appropriate 
regional policies while an industrial imbalance would require a policy 
framed towards stimulating particular industries or sectors of the economy. 
Thus one might consistently hold, as Booth and Glyn appear to, that the 
decline of particular industries was the cause but that "the interwar 
unemployment problem was essentially regional", (1975, p. 611).
In his original article Champemowne pointed out that in 1936, with 
only one exception (tailoring) the industrial unemployment percentage was 
greater in the Outer Regions than in Inner Britain, suggesting in the 
sense just defined, that unemployment was, to a certain extent, regional.
In his "correction", however, he pointed out that there was a "fairly marked 
correlation" among industries between the unemployment percentage in the 
two major regions suggesting that Immobility between industries was an im­
portant feature (1938, p. 103, 1939b, p. 126).
The same data used by Champemowne is given in the statistical tables 
produced by Beck and this can be used to throw some further light on the 
issue (1952, Table 21). The original source is from unpublished tables 
compiled by the Ministry of Labour and it should be remembered that the 
data covers only insured occupations which account for about sixty per 
cent of the labour force in 1936. *
* Allocating the unemployed to an industry is always somewhat arbitrary 
and there appears to have been an awareness of this problem in the Ministry 
of Labour at quite an early stage, see Hilton (1923) p. 175. The 
unemployed worker was normally allocated to the industry in which he 
was last employed unless it was known to be temporary or short term 
employment outside his normal industry.
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In the upper half of Table 7.1, the actual unemployment percentages are 
given for the whole country (UK), Inner Britain (IB) and the Outer Regions 
(OR) as calculated in the usual way. The absolute difference between the 
two major regions, which widens after 1929 to nearly double its previous
Table 7.1
Actual Unemployment Rates (mid-year)
UK IB OR OR—IB
1929 9.66 6.30 12.87 6.57
1932 22.39 15.98 28.47 12.49
1936 12.95 7.27 18.80 11.53
! Unemployment Rates (lOO industries equally weiqhted)
UK IB1 OR OR—IB
1929 8.83 6.85 10.94 4.09
1932 22.70 18.31 26.52 8.21
1936 11.75 7.77 16.16 8.39
level 1* given in the final column. If this difference were due largely 
to iamobility between industries with high unemployment being located 
predominantly in the outer regions, then this difference should decline 
substantially if all industries are weighted equally in each region. The 
results of these, calculations are provided in the lower half of the table 
and these show that about two thirds of the differences remains with a 
slight tendency for the proportion to increase over time. Thus, on average, 
unemployment percentages in industries were higher in the Outer Regions 
by four percentage points in 1929 and by over eight percentage points in *
* This column gives an average over ninety-nine industries since one
industry (jute) is not represented at all in Inner Britain.
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the early 1930s. It is also interesting to note that the averages computed 
for the U.K in this manner do not differ very much from those in the top 
half of the table which reflects the fineness of the industrial 
classification^.
These findings tend to support Champernownefe original view though not 
quite in the way he expressed it. A formal representation of the rela­
tionship he specified for his sixteen industry sample is given by the 
following equation
U « a + a S Ni o 1 ORi (7.1)
where UNi is the national unemployment percentage in industry i and S0Ri 
is the share of the insured labour force of industry i which is located 
in the Outer Regions. If the national unemployment percentage for the 
industry were merely a function of the proportion of the industry's labour 
force in the high unemployment region, then equation (1) would give 
equal to the unemployment percentage in Inner Britain and to the 
difference in the percentage between the two regions. Thus, in 1936, 
the year examined by Champernowne, the hypothesis would be o q ■ 7.3 
and “ 11.5. Using the one hundred industries as units of observation 
and allowing a stochastic error term, equation (7.1) was estimated by 
ordinary least squares and the results for the three years are given in 
Table 7.2.
Thus, for instance, the textile group contains eleven different 
industries on this classification and, hence, when each is weighted equally, 
the group, as a whole, maintains more than a ten per cent share in the 
total.
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Table 7.2
Year Const. S0R R2
1929 4.18 9.63 0.18
(1.08) (2.03)
1932 10.76 24.68 0.20
(2.61) (4.91)
1936 4.59 15.15 0.24
(1.39) (2.66)
(Standard errors are given in parentheses) .
The results are of some Interest and again they tend to support 
Champernowne's contention although they do not bear It out exactly. The 
coefficients are all highly significant and suggest a strong relationship 
between the share of the labour force In the Outer Regions and the overall 
unemployment percentage though It should be noted that only about a fifth 
of the variance Is explained. The equation for 1936 suggests that an 
Industry located entirely In Inner Britain would have a predicted 
unemployment rate of 4.6 per cent compared with the actual of 12.9 and In 
the Outer Regions of 19.7 compared with the actual of 16.6. The actual 
and predicted figures are some what closer for 1929 than for the two 
subsequent years but. In each case, the coefficient estimate Is signifi­
cantly different from that Implied by the null hypothesis. The result Is 
always for a to be smaller and a, larger, suggesting that Industries 
located mainly In the Outer Regions tended to have higher unemployment rates 
and those located mainly In Inner Britain lower rates than the regional
averages suggest
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We now turn to the other relationship mentioned, namely that 
between the unemployment percentage in the two regions for each industry. 
This is specified in the following equation
ORi 6o + ®1 IBi (7.2)
In this case, if there were pure industrial Immobility, we would expect 
“ 0» 8^ “ 1 predicting identical rates in the industry in both regions. 
This polar case has already been rejected in Table I but it is of interest 
to measure the two parameters separately, The results of estimating equa­
tion (7.2) across ninety-nine industries are given in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3
Year Const. UIB R2
1929 4.43 0.95 0.53
(0.73) (0.09)
1932 8.66 0.96 0.58
(1.72) (0.08)
1936 6.50 1.23 0.50
(1.13) (0.12)
(Standard errors in parentheses)
All the coefficients are highly significant and about half of the variation 
is explained in each case. In each equation the constant term 6q is 
quite close to the difference in unweighted unemployment rates in Table I 
which is equivalent to the average differential and the coefficient 0^ is 
close to one. 1936 is slightly different with 0q lower and 0^ significantly 
larger than one by a small margin. Thus there is a highly significant differen­
tial between industrial unemployment percentages in the two regions. This 
alone would tend to yield higher unemployment percentages in industries
The jute industry was omitted since it was not represented in Inner Britain
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located primarily in the Outer Regions. Above this, however, a one 
percentage point increase in an industry's unemployment rate in Inner Britain 
Is closely associated with a similar rise in the Outer regions. These 
results clearly reject the pure industrial unemployment hypothesis as
expected and suggest that Champernowne need not have conceded his point 
quite so easily. But in order to get some idea of the relative importance 
of the regional and industrial components of unemployment, we need to measure 
each separately and compare the relative magnitudes.
A method frequently used for this purpose is "shift-share" or
standardisation analysis. The unemployment rate for a particular region
can be written as the weighted sum of industrial unemployment rates in the
region, U « E w U where W . is the proportion of the region's labour ” r ^ ri ri ri
force in industry i and Url is the unemployment rate of Industry 1 in the
region (r) . Similarly the national unemployment percentage can be
written a s u  «■ E W ,U . where subscripts n denote national magnitudes, n i ni ni
The tomposition constant" rate of unemployment for the region can be 
calculated by applying national weights to regional unemployment percen­
tages to give 0* - E W , U ,. Thus U - U* measures the Industrial r i, ni ri r r
composition component of the differential between the regional and
national unemployment rate. Similarly, the "rate constant" unemployment
rate for the region is calculated by applying the national industry
unemployment percentages to regional labour force weights to give
0** - E W , g ,. This gives the "regional rate” component of the differ- r i ri ni
ence between the regional and national unemployment as - U** .
These two terms do not sum to the difference between the regional and 
national unemployment rates since there is a residual interaction term as 
can be seen when the expression for the entire difference between the 
two is written as follows:
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+ 2 w .(Uri - Uni}ri
1 M h2 H- - Wni> (Uri - V ’ (7.3)
- U**) + r 2 (Wri ~ Wni)(°ri ~ Uni> (7.4)
The third term will be negative if there is a positive correlation 
between weight and rate differences. There are a variety of other ways 
of decomposing the total difference, some of which eliminate the interaction 
term but provide a less satisfactory basis for comparison^".
The industrial composition and regional rate components given in 
equation (4) were first calculated for the data set previously examined 
for one hundred industries in Inner Britain and the Outer Regions and the 
results are given in Table 7.4.
The decomposition given by (7.3) and (7.4) is one of those discussed by Dixon 
and Thirwall who gitre four other alternatives which are as follows:
> u_-u_ - I o_,(W_J-W_,)+I w_4 + 2 (wni-wri> (Uni-Uri)r n i ni ri nl , ni ri ni
b) V -0 - I 0 . (W . -W .) + 2 W . (U . -U .) r n i ri ri ni ^ ni ri ni
°> V. ■ l "„I'-rl-'V * 5
«  V ° . ’  f '■«n*“»!1 ’" r l-V  * '"rl- V
There are no theoretical reasons for preferring any one of these
over that given in equation (7.3). Its closest relative is (a)
but this yields the terms 0 - 0* and U - U** which are not the straight-n r n r
forward composition and rate components but the complements of them which 
makes interpretation slightly more difficult. Equations b and c have the 
advantage of eliminating the interaction term but have an assymetry since 
one term standardised by the region and the other by the aggregate.
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Table 7.4
Shlfte-Share Analysis for Unemployment in Two Major Regions
1929 (Ü - 9.66) 1932 (U - 22.39) 1936 (U - 12.95)n n “
ü - Ü r n u  - u *  r r u  -  u * *r r u  - Ü r n u  -  u *  r r u  - u * *  r r Ü « Ü r n u  -  u *  r r u  - u * *  r r
Inner -3.36 
Britain
-1.37 -1.88 -6.41 -1.85 -3.38 -5.68 -1.07 -3.89
Outer +3.21 
Britain
+1.09 +1.73 +6.08 +2.69 +3.21 +5.85 +1.45 +4.01
These calculations show that in each case the industrial composition 
component is smaller than the regional rate component. This suggests that 
differences between unemployment rates in the same industry accounted for 
more of the observed unemployment differential between regions than 
differences in the industrial composition of regions. There is also some 
evidence that this effect increased with time as might have been expected 
if mobility of labour within regions tended over time to reduce differences 
between industries. But it is surprising that this happens between 1929 
and 1932 when the depression in particular industries was most intense.
It can also be seen that the interaction term is negative for Inner Britain 
and positive for the outer Regions which is consistent with the findings 
of the previous section1 .
This arises from the results of Table III which suggest a roughly constant 
differential across industries between unemployment rates in the two regions. 
Thus, for example, the larger the share of the labour force in the Outer 
Regions the greater will be and the closer will the regional
unemployment rate be to the national rate Un^. Bence falls relative
to U . giving a negative correlation and, since the sign on the interaction
A l
term is negative, the outcome is positiva. Por Inner Britain the sign will 
be reversed since the larger the weight of Inner Britain relative to the 
aggregate, the higher is U relative to Uni.
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The analysis can be taken further to examine regional and industrial 
components of unemployment differences for the nine individual Ministry 
of Labour Divisions for which data on numbers employed and unemployed 
by industry is again provided by Beck (1952, Tables 14 and 22). In this 
case the number of industries is reduced to thirty. These are not based 
on a broader classification of industries, however, but are the largest 
of the individual industries accounting, in aggregate, for 
nearly three quarters of the labour force of the hundred industries.
Since there is a possibility that this might lead to some bias 
in the results, the analysis was also done for the two major regions 
on the thirty industries for comparison. There is some reason to 
believe, however, that the results will not be too misleading since 
the overall unemployment percentages calculated for the smaller number 
of industries do not differ very much from those for the full complement 
of industries^. The results given in Table 7.5 show, however, that for 
the two major regions the dominance of the regional rate component is less 
marked. For the two earlier years Inner Britain benefitted from and the Outer 
Regions suffered from composition and rate differences in roughly equal amounts 
though, by 1936, Industrial composition was a far less Important factor 
In the unemployment differential. Zn 1929 the Industrial distribution 
provided an advantage to the South West but a substantial disadvantage 
to the North East, Hales and Northern Ireland and, to some extent, the 
Midlands. For London and the South East differences In rates are very 
dominant and this also benefitted the South West but severely disadvan­
taged the North West, Hales and Northern Ireland. The pattern Is not
* The figures comparable with those of the top panel of Table 7.1 are-as 
follows:
Unemployment Rates (30 Industries)
UK IB OR OR - IB
1929 8.83 5.93 12.88 6.95
1932 20.99 15.38 28.56 13.18
1936 11.68 6.87 17.90 11.03
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very  d i f f e r e n t  fo r  1932 though a s  unemployment d i f f e r e n t i a l s  in c r e a s e , 
th e re  i s  a tendency f o r  both  components to  grow. Even during th e  
sharp r i s e  in  unemployment w ith d iv e rg e n t r a t e s  o f  c o n tr a c t io n  among 
in d u s tr ie s ,  i t  ap p ears t h a t  o n ly  in  th e  M idlands, N orthw est, Hales and 
N orthern Ire la n d  i s  in d u s t r ia l  com p osition  th e  dominant f a c t o r .  By 
1936 o n ly  in  th e  N orth  E a s t  i s  th e  in d u s t r ia l  com p osition  component 
eq u al in  im portance w ith  re g io n a l r a t e  d iv e rg e n ce . In  a l l  re g io n s  w ith  
th e  e x cep tio n  o f  ÍTales and N orthern Ire la n d  com positon e f f e c t s  are  
r e la t iv e l y  sm a ll.
These r e s u l t s  a t  th e  d iv is io n a l  le v e l  a re  c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  r i s e  
in  th e r e g io n a l r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  noted in  th e  p rev io u s s e c t io n  and su g g est 
th a t  e s p e c ia l ly  f o r  1936 t h i s  a p p lie s  q u ite  w id ely  a c r o s s  d iv is io n s .  The 
in t e r a c t io n  term s g e n e r a lly  ta k e  th e  same s ig n  a s  th e  observed  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
as expected  and a r e  sometimes q u ite  la r g e . In  p a r t ,  t h i s  may be due to  
th e  methods used in  c a lc u la t in g  th e  com p osition  c o n s ta n t unemployment r a te  
s in c e  where th e  r e g io n a l w eight i s  z e ro , th e r e  i s  no r e g io n a l unemployment
r a t e  and hence th e  n a tio n a l r a t e  was u sed . T h is  may acco u n t in  p a r t  
f o r  th e  v ery  la r g e  r e s id u a l f o r  N orthern Ir e la n d  and th e  co n c lu s io n s  
s ta te d  above must be s u b je c t  to  t h i s  q u a l i f i c a t io n .
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7.2 Employment Growth by Industry and Region
In most accounts of the lnterwar labour market, the major cause 
of persistent regional disparities In unemployment rates Is found In the 
differential rates of growth of employment across different regions. For the 
100 Industries employment fell to 96 per cent of Its 1929 level in 1932 
In Inner Britain but to 86 per cent In the Outer Regions. By 1936 
employment in Inner Britain was 15 per cent above that In 1929 while In 
the Outer Regions It was still 2 per cent below. For 30 industries* at the 
the extremes,employment grew by a quarter between 1929 and 1936 in the 
South East while it fell by 16 per cent In Hales.
Some writers have seen relative rates of growth among regions as 
simply a reflection of their industrial structure. For Instance, according 
to Fogarty, "There was a tendency before the war for employment to increase 
or diminish In each area at about the rate which might have been expected 
if each industry had grown or contracted at the same rate all over the country 
(1945, p. 7). In his memorandum to the Barlow Comnission, Jones came 
to a similar conclusion about the changes in the insured population which 
took place between 1923 and 1937. Though some differences emerged between 
the expansion of different groups of industries in different areas, the 
regional industrial structure appeared to be the most important determinant 
of a region's fortunes (Barlow Coonnission Report, 1940, pp. 277-9). The 
apparent exception to this was the area of Mid Scotland whose employment 
growth over the same period was investigated by Leser and Silvey. Using 
shift-share analysis they found that if all industries in mid Scotland 
had expanded at the national rate, total employment would have expanded 
by 3.7 per cent, instead of which it declined to 3.9 per cent (1950, p. 166). 
Richardson argued more generally that the regional pattern of recovery 
in the 1930's was "not full explicable in terms of industrial composition".
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Comparing the experience of Scotland with Great Britain as a whole, he 
found that the slump after 1929 was more intense primarily because of 
the Scottish industrial structure but that "the dominant factor in recovery 
was the benefits of induced recovery spilling over into Scottish industry, 
particularly heavy industries, from the broad wave of recovery in the 
United Kingdom as a whole (1967, pp. 290-1).
Champernowne, in his analysis, computed the employment change which 
would have occurred in Inner Britain and the Outer Regions if, in nine 
major industries and the remaining aggregate of 'All Other Industries', 
between 1929 and 1936, employment had grown at the national rate. The 
result indicated "a tendency for industries to grow more slowly in the 
Outer Regions than in Inner Britain, thus exacerbating the regional 
imbalance (1939, p. 98). However, nearly half of the slower growth of 
the former arose from the slower growth of the 'All Other Industries' 
group in which compositional effects were not taken into account.
I t  i s  a  n a tu r a l s te p  t o  shed fu r th e r  l i g h t  on th e s e  is s u e s  by 
conducting s h i f t - s h a r e  a n a ly s is  w ith employment grow th. One p lu s  th e  
growth r a t e  o f  employment in  a  re g io n  can be w rit te n  a s  (1  +  g^) “
before the "composition constant" rate of growth for the region plus one
can be calculated by applying the national base year weights to one plus
the regional growth rates to give (1+g*) - I P  (1+g .) where the baser nl $ 8 **
year n a tio n a l employment w eights a re  d efin ed  as P_> ■  E , tZ E .n +»8 n i ,  8 £ I » l | i
The industrial composition component of the difference between regional 
and national employment growth is (l+gr> - (1+g*) ■ g^ - 9*r > Similarly 
the "rate constant" rate of growth (plus one) is obtained by applying
similarly for the economy as a whole As
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national employment growth rates (plus one) to the regional base year
employment weights to give (1 + g**) « £ (1 + g )P . . The "regionalr ^ ni ri,s
rate" component of the growth differential is (1+g^) - (1+g**) ■ g^-g^*.
This decomposition of the growth difference raises exactly the same 
problems as those encountered with the unemployment percentages and the 
expression for the total difference is:
g - g r *n ’ri ri ni 'ri(gn -  ’ni»
ri” Pni)(9ri" gniJ (7.5)
(Pri- Pni>(gri" gni> (7.6)
As before there is an interaction term which will be negative if there is 
a positive correlation between weight and rate differences.
The two components of growth were calculated for the lOO industries 
and the two major regions for the intervals between the years previously 
used namely for 1929-32, 1932-36 and 1929-36. It should be remembered 
that, in so far as each interval represents a different length of time, 
the components for different periods «ire not directly comparable.
Table 7.6
Shift-Share Analysis for Employment Growth in Two Major Regions
1929-32 (g - 8.96) * n
Inner *5.24 + 1.89 + 1.45
Britain
1932-36 (g - 16.28) n
g - g g -g* g - g***r *n "r *r "r "r
+ 2.91 + 1.41 + 1.28
1929-36 (g - 5.87) n
gr~ gn ^  gr~ gj*
♦ 8.89 + 3.64 + 3.13
Outer -5.20 - 4.13 - 1.44 - 3.24 - 1.44 - 1.42 - 8.83 - 5.69 - 3.10
Regions
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The results in Table 7.6 indicate that both industrial distribution 
and regional growth rate differences were important, particularly the former 
which contributed especially during the slump of 1929-32 in the Outer 
Regions. The large positive interaction term for Inner Britain 1929-32 
suggests a strong negative relationship between weight and rate differences 
that is somewhat puzzling since it is not reflected in the results for 
Outer Britain. This disappears for 1932-6 and a check on the figures does 
not reveal an obvious reason for it.
The same exercise can be repeated for the nine Ministry of Labour 
divisions across 30 industries, the results of which are given in Table 7.7. 
For the two major regions the results are similar to those obtained for 
lOO industries including the large interaction term for Inner Britain 
1929-32. Among the individual divisions of Inner Britain, there are 
some noticeable differences. The most important component maintaining 
employment in London during the slump of 1929-32 was its industrial 
distribution and to a lesser extent, this is true for the South West. In 
the South East and the Midlands, growth rate differences In Individual 
Industries are relatively more Important. This reflects the small'share 
of staple Industries and heavy manufacturing In the first two regions while 
In the other two, It reflects the buoyancy of manufacturing Industries such 
as engineering and vehicles compared with other areas. It appears to be
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these conflicting trends which give rise to the anomalous result for Inner 
Britain. Industrial composition is the more important factor in the 
contraction of employment in the outer regions especially in Hales and the 
North East but not in Northern Ireland.
In the recovery of employment from 1932 to 1936, composition and rate 
effects are more evenly balanced and both continue to impose a substantial 
disadvantage in the Northern divisions and Wales. It is interesting to exa­
mine the recovery in Scotland which was referred to earlier which, together 
with Northern Ireland, appears rather different. Though Scottish 
employment contracted more sharply them the aggregate during 1929-32, it was 
very close to the national average in recovery and its 
industrial structure proved a slight disadvantage in the recovery
without which above average growth would have occurred. A more 
striking illustration of recovery in the Outer Regions is given by 
Northern Ireland which continued to benefit from its industrial structure. 
Surprisingly, in the South, London and the South West do no better than the 
nation as a whole. In the former, industrial'structure now proves to 
be a disadvantage while, in the latter, growth rate differences offset 
favourable structure.
It is clear from the results that Fogarty's claim that regional growth 
is merely a reflection of industrial growth is not supported, at least 
in the accounting context of shift-share analysis since, at least in the 
Northern divisions and Wales, industries grew slower than the national 
average and, in the South Bast and Midlands, they showed a tendency to 
grow faster. However, the claim cannot be dismissed quite as easily as 
this since it has been strongly argued that the shift-share approach is 
not an adequate method for determining the underlying cause of differences 
in employment growth1 . As was mentioned earlier in the context of
1 This point has been put most forcibly by McKay (1968) .
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unemployment:, some of the effects of expansion or contraction of industries 
might show up as regional effects in other industries. This could occur 
both because changes in incomes resulting from the expansion of one industry 
in a region could raise demand for the products of other industries in that 
region, which viould cause further expansion through the regional multiplier 
or because regional input-output connections could result in backward link­
ages between one industry and another within the region. These effects 
are likely to have been quite important and Richardson, for example, 
discussing the slow rate of expansion during recovery of the northern regions, 
argued that these were held back by "low purchasing power and high 
secondary unemployment resulting from the depressed regions' heavy 
reliance on staple industries (1967, p. 278).
One way of approaching this problem is to examine the statistical 
relation between the growth rate of an industry in a region and the 
overall growth rate of the industry and the region. If there were 
a distinct regional component to employment growth, then we should expect 
in a cross section of industries by regions to find a stable relationship 
between the growth of a region and the growth of an industry in that region. 
Given that industry growth is also obviously a cause of differences, this 
should clearly be taken into account. For the whole cross section of 
industries we may specify the following equation
(1+?ri) *'71<1+9r> ♦ Y2 (1+9i) + u3
The equation is specified in terms of (1+g) “ E /Efc_n 1-0 ord,r to reduce 
the problems of exceptionally large values of g £^ when the industry is ini­
tially very small. Zf the differences in growth rates are explained
only by the differences in industrial growth rates, then y^ should be 
significant and close to one. If there is a systematic regional component
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to growth, then Y^ would be positive and significant and y ^ accordingly 
smaller than one. A natural restriction to impose on the regression would 
be that Y^ and y^ should add up to one but this was not imposed in order 
that the significance test on Y^ and y^ could be separate. However, the 
equation was restricted not to have a constant term which would be 
meaningless in the context1.
The equation would not necessarily be expected to give the same results 
for different groups of industries and regions as across all industries and 
regions. One important reason is that demand for the products of some 
industries would tend to be more localised and others less so. In the 
"export base" approach to determining regional employment, some industries 
are regarded as serving national or international markets and are, therefore, 
not dependent on local demand, in which case induced effects of regional 
expansion will be small and,within the region, the industry's growth 
will reflect that of the Industry as a whole. These industries should 
therefore be closest to the case of pure industry determination with Yj 
close to one and y ^ close to zero. The staple industries are the most 
obvious group to fall into this category though it might be extended to 
others serving a national market. At the other end of the scale are 
industries which trade very little outside the region and these can be 
characterised as predominantly service industries though other localised 
industries such as building and small scale manufacturing might also be 
included. It was also considered that the results might differ among
1 An alternative formulation which was also considered was 
(1+9i4) - (l+94) - Y^ ♦ Y£(l+9r> + «3
This explains the difference between the growth rate of an industry in a 
region and the industry wide growth rate by the region wide growth rate.
7.23
M  ina in D m 8  g inI
7.24
different types of regions and here the most obvious distinction to make 
is between Inner Britain and the Outer Regions.
The results are reported in Table 7.8 for all industries and two 
sub sets for industries for the U.K. and Inner Britain (IB) and the Outer 
Regions (OR)\ Where an industry was not represented in a region the 
observation was omitted, leaving a total of 252 observations for each
of the three time intervals. The seemingly high explanatory power of
-2the equations as evidenced by the high levels of R should not be taken 
too seriously since there is no constant in the equation.
For all industries and all regions the results strongly support the 
view that industrial growth is the prime determinant since the coefficient 
Yj on aggregate industry growth is highly significant and close to one 
while the regional growth coefficient y is not significantly different 
from zero. The picture changes somewhat when the two major regions are 
separated. In Inner Britain the regional growth rate does appear 
significant though not for the whole interval 1929-36 and there is a 
tendency for the size of the industrial coefficient to fall. In the 
outer regions, however, it exceeds one and the regional coefficient is 
negative. This reflects the fact that industries grew faster in the South 
due in part to distinctly regional factors and though industrial growth was 
more dominant in the Outer Regions, industries nevertheless grew more 
slowly there.
Several different definitions of "export base" industries were tried 
and the results reported are for a small group of staple industries which 
consists of Coal, Steel, Cotton, Woollens, Shipbuilding and General
1 For each of the major regions, the values of 1 + g. appearing as 
regressions are for the UK as a whole, not just the 1group of regions 
concerned.
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Engineering. Surprisingly, for the UK as a whole, industry growth is a less 
dominant factor particularly over the whole period 1929-1936 when the 
coefficient is not significant but there is a striking difference between 
the two major regions. In Inner Britain, regional growth is dominant over 
the whole period and the industry growth gives a coefficient close to zero.
For the Outer Regions, the industry growth is much more important though, 
over the whole period, it is still surprisingly low. One possible explanation 
for the findings is that, in each region, these industries are 
closely linked with others through regional input-output connections and 
that the interdependent growth of these groups is closely related to regional 
growth.
The group of service industries contains diverse industries such as 
Transport, Power Supply and Laundry Distribution, Banking and Finance and
Leisure Industries^. The estimates for these are much closer to the pattern
for all industries with Industrial growth the dominant factor. As before.
this is more marked in the Outer Regions than in Inner Britain where
regional growth is significant at least for the whole period of 1929-36.
A number of o$her sets of industries were tried, one of which was to be
industries with over 70% of their employment in either of the two major
regions as the export base industries for the regions. These results tended
to confirm the differences between regions rather them between different groups
of industries with Inner Britain showing stronger regional effects than
the Outer Regions. The overall pattern of results emphasises the importance
%
of industry growth as a systematic influence in different regions while 
the impact of regional growth is less systematic across industries but 
appears stronger in the South. 1
1 The nine industries included in this group are Gas, Hater and Electricity, 
Tramway and Omnibus Industries; Road transport not separately specified;
Shipping Service; Distributive trades; Commerce, Banking, Insurance and Finance; 
Entertainments and Sports; Hotel, Public House, Restaurant, Boarding House,
Clubs etc. Services: Laundries, Dyeing and Drycleaning.
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7.3 Time Series Variations in Industrial and Regional Unemployment Rates
The maldistribution of unemployment across regions and the coincident 
differences in industrial structure, have led some observers to the view 
that some measurable proportion of unemployment could be regarded as 
"structural". Though the term is not often given a rigorous definition, it 
is often taken as synonymous with some minimum level of unemployment which 
the economy could have achieved had a sufficiently high level of aggregate 
demand been maintained.
An official report for 1935 estimated that between 800 and 900 
thousand of the unemployed could be attributed to geographical maldistribu­
tion (Howson, 1981, p. 273). Fogarty calculated "excess" unemployment in 
each region as all unemployment in excess of that which would yield the 
same unemployment percentage as in London and the South-East. This gave 
totals of 573 thousand in 1929, 1054 thousand in 1932 and 580 thousand in
1937. Since 1929 and 1937 were cyclical peaks, the "excess" unemployment 
at these dates, which amounts to about 6Z of the labour force, was 
referred to as "persistent" excess unemployment (1945, Table 3,p.5)*. 
Subsequent writers have taken figures of about 6Z as the best estimate 
of "hard core structural unemployment" . It is clear from the figures that 
excess unemployment calculated in this way increased in the depression 
of the early 1930s and than declined again in recovery. Hence the persistent 
excess observed should not be taken to represent a fixed lower bound on 
the maldistribution of the labour force relative to employment. It seems 
likely that, had the peak in activity been higher, the component measured
* These calculations are also reproduced in Aldcroft (1971) p. 86.
 ^Glynn and Oxborrow (1976) p. 157. A figure of 8Z is quoted by 
Constantine (1980) p. IS.
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as persistent excess would have been smaller and the regional problem 
would have appeared less acute (McCrone, 1969, p. 102). This would be 
the case if, due to the combined effects of industrial composition and 
other factors, high unemployment regions were more cyclically sensitive 
than those with low average unemployment.
For the postwar period, efforts have been made to measure the cyclical 
sensitivity of unemployment in different regions by estimating time series 
equations in which the unemployment percentage of a region is a function 
of the national unemployment percentage. In his study, Thirwall estimated 
a model which was linear in unemployment percentages. This gave coefficients 
on national unemployment larger than one for high unemployment regions and 
smaller than one in low unemployment regions, which suggests that regional 
differentials tend to decrease as aggregate unemployment falls (1966, p. 210). 
In a similar study Brechling estimated a model which was logarithmic in unem­
ployment percentages. This gave the opposite result; the coefficients or 
aggregate unemployment were generally higher in high unemployment regions 
(1967, p. 10). At one level all this reflects is the fact that, as 
aggregate unemployment falls, absolute differences between percentages in 
high and low unemployment regions decrease while their ratios increase.
However there is a more serious question about the manner in which 
such equations should be specified and interpreted and neither specification 
is entirely satisfactory in this respect^. Cyclical fluctuations arise
It has been argued, for example, by Gordon (1979) that if migration 
between regions is an exponential function of the aggregate unemployment 
rate, then the appropriate functional form lies somewhere between the two 
alternative specifications.
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directly or indirectly from variations in employment and the appropriate 
functional form should relate employment variations in the region propor­
tionately to those on the aggregate. Since the focus is on unemployment 
and there will generally be some cyclical sensitivity in participation rates, 
the model to be used is specified as logarithmic in the employment rate 
E/L which, in percentage terms, is lOO - U. Following the convention, a 
constant term is included and a time trend which attempts to capture the 
net effects of secular growth trends in regional employment and labour 
force, relative to the aggregate. This gives the equation to be estimated 
as
In Q.OO-Ü ) - 3  + 3  IndOO'-ü ) + 3 t+ u... (7.8)r t. o l r t
If 3^ > 1, then the region is cyclically sensitive compared with the 
aggregate, such that a one per cent change in the aggregate employment rate 
implies a larger change in the regional rate. Whether there is a tendency 
for unemployment rates to converge in cyclical expansion depends on both 
3q and 3^ and whether there is secular convergence, on 3^.
The data used in estimating the equation are annual averages of monthly
observations of the unemployment percentage for the nine Ministry of Labour
Divisions from 1923 to 19381 . Some small adjustment to the data was
occasioned by the changes in regional classification which took place in
1937^. The results given in Table 7.9 show that, with the exception of
Northern Ireland, a good fit is obtained though there is evidence of
serial correlation in most of the equations. This reflects the fact that
cyclical variations in the regions do not depend solely on the aggregate
but also on factors which give rise to slightly different regional
* These percentages are the same ones which are widely referred to in the 
literature for instance Beveridge (1944), p. 61, Gilbert (1971) Appendix 1, p.312 
Booth and Glynn (1975), p. 633.
^ The only change important enough to affect the regional unemployment 
percentages was the introduction of a new Northern region which was carved 
out of the North-East and North-West divisions. This was, therefore, 
the only adjustment made to the data.
(S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s)
7.30
cycles^. The coefficients 3^ on the national employment rate are all 
highly significant and show a strong tendency to increase with the average 
rate of unemployment across regions which is given in the last column.
The coefficient 3^  is negative in high unemployment regions and positive 
in high unemployment regions which implies a tendency towards secular 
divergence among unemployment rates. The tendency for unemployment rates 
to converge in the upswing of the cycle, which is evident in the data can
best be illustrated by calculating the rates predicted by the equations
2for different national unemployment rates .
Table 7■10
Predicted Unemployment Percentages
National Rate 1
20« 15* i o * 5«
London 16.61 8.76 5.99 3.28
S.E. 11.56 8.39 5.30 2.28
S.W. 14.85 10.98 7.18 3.43
Midlands 17.85 12.64 7.43 2.21
N.E. 25.87 19.27 12.52 5.61
N.W. 25.03 18.88 12.62 6.26
Scotland 25.55 19.27 12.87 6.35
Males 33.18 26.39 19.35 12.07
N.I. 26.79 23.79 20.85 17.96
SD Of Û 7.20 6.17 5.34 4.93r
" « « axe NI 7.36 5.95 4.48 3.05
SD of Û /Û 0.36 0.41 0.53 0.99r n
« ■ » axe NI 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.61
1 These have been discussed by Richardson (1967), pp. 266-7, 275-6.
2 Since the estimating equations have time trends, the predicted rates will 
depend on the year of observation which was taken for ease of calculations 
as 1932 (when t - 10) .
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The first three columns are within the range of observation but the fourth 
which predicts regional rates for 5% national unemployment is more 
conjectural. The projection gives plausible magnitudes which, if anything, 
will be biased towards a greater spread of unemployment rates than would 
actually occur if some markets began to reach full employment. The 
standard deviation of the absolute unemployment percentages shows the 
tendency towards convergence - a tendency which is increased when Northern 
Ireland is excluded. As expected, relative to the national rate, the 
dispersion increases as unemployment falls though by less when Northern 
Ireland is omitted.
The same exercise can be performed on data for industrial employment 
rates to see if the pattern of convergence is similar for industries as 
for regions. Time series equations for 1923-38 similar to those for the 
regions were estimated for 36 industries and the results are given in the 
Appendix 7A.l.The equations on the whole give a good fit and the-coefficient 
32 fails the significance test at the 5* level in only five cases. With 
few exceptions, industries with average unemployment rates above the 
national average are cyclically sensitive as measured by 9^ > 1. 
Calculating predicted unemployment rates as before gives plausible 
values in most cases but, in five of the equations, negative values are 
predicted for a national unemployment rate of 5%. It is interesting to 
note that these are in the iron and steel and engineering sectors and 
this probably reflects in part the disproportionate expansion of these 
industries in the late 1930s with the stimulus of rearmament. This is 
consistent with the relative tightness of the labour market 
In engineering observed from 1937 and, in any event, it seems likely 
that these industries would be among the first to reach full employment
in cyclical recovery
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The standard deviations of the differences and ratios of predicted 
unemployment percentages from the equations are given in the following 
table.
Table 7.11
Standard Deviations of Predicted Percentages 
National Rate 20%____________15%__________ 1Q%____________5%
SD of U. - U 10.3 7.4 5.2 5.7l n
" " " excluding 9.9 7.4 5.2 4.9
5 industries
SD of 0,/U l n 0.52 0.49 0.52 1.15
" " * excluding 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.98
5 industries
The results show substantial declines in the standard deviation of the abso­
lute percentages which continues to the conjectural 5% level if the 
five industries are excluded. The standard deviations of ratios are also 
somewhat similar to those for the regions and the sharp rise at the 5% rate 
is somewhat reduced when the five industries are omitted.
The equations clearly underline the relative volatility of employment 
rates in the staple industries and in engineering compared with other 
sectors. The employment rate elasticities 3  ^for Coal, Iron and Steel, 
General and Electrical Engineering, Shipbuilding and Cotton Textiles are 
among the highest of all the Industries examined. In general those: 
industries which were most dependent or most closely associated with the 
more volatile components of aggregate demand, such as exports and 
investment, tend to exhibit greater variations in employment rates relative 
to the aggregate. It is clear that a substantial part of the differences 
in regional elasticities are attributable to this. This effect would be
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enhanced if a higher proportion of employment in the Outer Regions 
were associated with the more volatile components of demand within each 
industry as well as between industries.
Some impression of the implication of the differing industrial 
composition of each region can be gained by calculating the weighted average 
of elasticities appropriate to each region. This was done for the 
thirty industries examined earlier in the cross section and the weights 
used are those for the labour force shares in 1929 .
Table 7 « 12
Regional Employment Rate Elasticities (3.) calculated 
______________from Equations by Industry_______________
Inner Britain Outer Regions
London 0.73 North East 1.37
South-East 0.85 North West 1.36
South-West 0.94 Scotland 1.23
Midlands 1.12 Wales 1.51
Northern
Ireland 1.17
These are not directly comparable with the time series regional estimates 
since only thirty industries are included but the pattern is very close to 
that emerging from the regional equations. The regions of Inner Britain 
are somewhat above the earlier estimates and, in the Outer Regions,
Northern Ireland appears again to be the exception.
All the evidence so far examined points to a close association 
between the industrial composition of regions and their cyclical sensitivity 
and it is important to ask how far this is reflected in dependence 
on different components of aggregate demand. This is an important issue, 
both for the diagnosis of structural unemployment and the evaluation of 
potential economic policies. The dependence of staple industries on 
exports is well known and often regarded as the major single determinant
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of unemployment differences. The regional impact of Investment, the 
next most Important source of fluctuations is less clear cut since some 
investment good industries, such as building, are fairly evenly distributed 
while others are less so.
The importance of the broad sectoral composition of expenditure
can be examined by attempting to explain the employment rate in the
region relative to that in aggregate (lOO - Ü )/(lOO - U ) as a functionr n
of the proportion of exports and investment in total expenditure X/Y 
and I/Y respectively. The following equation specifies this relationship 
in logarithmic form.
100 "  0 v  T
111 100- 0 - “ eo + e l l n Ÿ  + e 2 l n Ÿ' + e3t + U 5t <?-9)n t t t
A constant is included and a time trend to account for secular changes in rela­
tive employment rate ratios. If the variations in this ratio can be 
explained by these major elements in the composition of demand, then 
and C2 should be significant. Regions which are disproportionately 
dependent on exports or investment would be expected to have positive 
values of and and those with less than average dependence, negative
values.
The equations were estimated using the same data on unemployment 
as in the previous estimates and Feinstein's estimates of exports, 
investment and GOP at constant 1938 prices. The results given in Table 
7.13 indicate that between a quarter and a half of the total variation 
is explained by the equations except for Northern Ireland. As expected 
the coefficient on the export ratio is negative and significant for the 
three southern divisions. For London and the South-East, a 10 per cent 
rise in the export ratio reduces the employment rate ratio by 3 per cent.
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Similar orders of magnitude are found In the positive coefficients for the 
Outer Regions though the coefficient is not significant for Wales. For 
investment the sign pattern is reversed and an increase in the share of 
investment tends to benefit the southern regions relative to the country 
as a whole. For the Outer Regions, the coefficients are generally not 
significant so that the effect is less clear.
Exports appear to be a more important determinant of regional 
differences than investment. Taking a rough average coefficient of -0.2 
for Inner Britain and 0.2 for the Outer Regions suggests that the export 
ratio would have had to be some 17-18 per cent higher in 1929 and a 
third higher in 1936 to bring the two major regions into balance. However, 
too much reliance should not be placed on these results since the export 
ratio is positively correlated with aggregate output. In order to test 
for the independent effects of composition, allowing for cyclical movements 
in the relative employment ratio, an additional term, the log of total 
output, was included. This tended to dominate the equation and reduced 
the significance of the other terms generally changing the sign on the 
export ratio. It seems unlikely that the dependence of regions on 
particular types of markets can be untangled from the differences in 
cyclical sensitivity arising from the spillover of demand into relatively 
high unemployment regions and the induced effect of expansion operating 
within in and between regions.
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7.4 Labour Mobility and Excess Supply of Labour
extent to which particular changes in geographical and industrial 
distribution of employment will lead to persistent imbalances in unemploy­
ment percentages between industries and regions, depends on the degree 
of labour mobility. But only if the resulting maldistribution, by imposing 
labour shortages in some parts of the economy, kept aggregate employment 
lower than otherwise, can lack of mobility be said to have impeded recovery 
and readjustment, if excess supply of labour characterised almost all labour 
markets, then at least over the observed range of variation, it did not 
provide a binding constraint. Even so, it might be desirable to encourage 
migration of labour away from high unemployment areas not only to provide 
an appropriate distribution of labour sources in the event of widespread 
economic recovery but also to mitigate the inequalities of employment 
opportunities which would persist if the recovery failed to occur.
Public policies introduced from the late 1920s onwards had as their 
objective the equalisation of economic opportunities through attempting 
to reduce the high unemployment of the most depressed areas relative to 
the rest of the country. In 1928 a policy of industrial transference 
was introduced in an effort to move workers from depressed to prosperous 
•areas but with the coming of the Special Areas Act in 1934, the emphasis 
shifted towards providing incentives to increasing employment in depressed 
areas rather than moving workers away from them. Though several reasons, 
such as the avoidance of congestion in the more prosperous areas, were 
behind this change of policy, It Is undoubtedly connected with the fact that 
the policy of industrial transference was judged a failure. Prom 1928 to 
1938 in excess of 200,000 workers were transferred, though as many as half 
of these returned to their place of origin1 . In its early stages the 
transfers were quite successful but, from 1929, transferees increasingly
1 Barlow Commission, p. 152, Pollard, 1968 p. 133.
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failed to retain their jobs both because of worsening unemployment, even 
in the most prosperous areas, but also because they were thought to be 
generally less suitable (Dennison, 1939, p. 175-6).
Nevertheless, over the period as a whole, substantial redistribution 
of the insured population took place. In 1923, Inner Britain contained 
46.8% of the insured population* by 1929 this had risen to 49.1% and, by
1938, to 52.3%. These movements closely paralleled the changes In the share 
of total employment which rose from 47.6% in 1923 to 54.5% in 1938 but were
not large enough to reduce the differences In unemployment rates (Dennison,
1939, p. 141).
Insofar as these long term changes were due to migration, the overwhelm­
ing majority was voluntary and unassisted. Differences in unemployment rates 
between areas were clearly an important determinant of migration rates. At 
the county level between 1927 and 1937 the insured population of Buckingham­
shire rose by 62.1% and that of Oxfordshire by 49.7% while that of Glamorgan fell 
4.1Z (Beveridge, 1944, Table 6 p.63). In their study of migration patterns, Makower 
Marshak and Robinson found that there was a close correspondence between the 
percentage of the labour force in a county out migrating and the propor­
tionate difference between its unemployment rate and that of the whole 
country. The finding that migration rates fell by about a third between 
1925-31 and 1931-36 is consistent with migration depending on relative 
employment rates. It suggests that because of increasing dispersion of 
relative unemployment rates at lower aggregate unemployment levels, 
migration would quicken with a rise in levels of activity. According to 
-the estimates, at the observed unemployment rates of 1925-31, it would have 
taken 6 years to equalise unemployment rates while, at those of 1931-6,
It would have taken about 32 years (1939, p. 83).
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It has been suggested that there were severe impediments to mobility 
for a large proportion of the work force and that, as a result, it was 
"much less than might have been anticipated" (Glynn and Oxborrow, 1976, 
p. 155). A study by Daniel of the pattemof migration from Wales into the 
prosperous area of Oxford showed that, among married men, the duration of 
unemployment prior to migration was much greater than for single men but 
not for those without children. The loss of non pecuniary income and 
differences in costs of living provided an impediment to mobility to which 
the differences in unemployment benefit entitlement might also be added 
(1939, p. 169-170). But as Glynn and Oxborrow recognised, "above all the 
fact remained that unemployment was high even in expanding areas and migra­
tion did not necessarily offer any guarantee of employment" (1976, p. 155). 
This appears to have been the case in Oxford. In November 1937, when the 
unemployment rate was about 7Z, about 55Z of those whose insurance books 
originated in other exchange areas were recorded on the claims register. 
Thus, even when workers did move to more prosperous areas, they found 
themselves at a disadvantage compared with the indigenous labour force.
Of a sample of 136 of the Oxford migrants on the register, nearly two 
thirds had become unemployed within the first three months of reaching 
Oxford (Makower et al. 1938, p. 88).
In such areas as Oxford with an employment structure based upon motor 
vehicles and light engineering, imnigrants from Wales and Lancashire would 
have been less likely to possess the appropriate skills. Allowing for
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relative unemployment rates, the size of the catchment area and its 
distance from Oxford, it was found that they were less numerous among 
imnigrants than workers from areas where agriculture and building took a 
larger share of the labour force (Makower et al. 1938, p. 115). Half of 
those in the motor industry at Dagenham whose insurance books originated 
elsewhere were from the North Western Division, while miners from the North- 
East and Wales moved disproportionately to the Kent coalfield and Scots 
focused more on London (Thomas, 1934, p. 225). The transfer of relatively 
unskilled labour from one industry to another was widespread and it is well 
known that migrating miners often found themselves working in building 
and public works. These, together with road transport and other service 
industries in the South were particularly subject to invasion from more 
depressed industries (Beveridge, 1936 p. 374). But in Oxford nearly a 
half of those in the motor industry in 1936 were workers whose insurance 
books were issued in another exchange area - a proportion exceeded only in 
omnibus service among major industries (Makower et al. 1938, p. 113). It 
appears that these were not just intra industry transfers but largely 
recruitment both from other industries and other regions1. It is clear 
that, in the main, the more rapidly growing industries recruited workers 
from industries where similar or related skills were used. Given the overall 
level of unemployment, these were not difficult to attract but the size of 
the pool upon which such industries could have drawn is less clear.
The evidence for labour shortages in the engineering trades in London 
has been examined in some detail by Allen and Thomas. The abnormal position 
of these trades has already been consented upon but, even so, there was
1 Dennison provides examples of a motor factory and a wireless factory 
of whose recruits 45% and 75% respactively had changed their occupation 
on entry (1939) p. 155.
afound to be a relatively plentiful supply of labour with the exception of 
machine shop and tool room and for specific electrical work (1938, p. 110). Of 
sample of 2500 workers placed by the labour exchanges, 54.8% of vacancies 
were filled immediately and another 29.3% within four days*. Although 
the more skilled the trade the longer the delays tended to be, it could 
hardly be argued that these reflected serious labour shortages and, given 
that this market was one of the tightest in the country, it seems unlikely 
that the economy as a whole would have reached binding constraints until 
a considerably higher level of activity had been reached. Substantially 
higher levels of employment would, of course, have engendered higher 
levels of migration but the evidence suggests that to a large extent, this 
would have been forthcoming and that the lags involved were relatively 
short (Makower et al. 1938, p. 110).
These findings suggest that the mere persistence of differences 
in unemployment rates cannot be taken as prima facie evidence of intract­
able labour iambility. There were a number of reasons why, with the levels 
and distribution of activity prevailing,■ unemployment differences did not 
disappear. There were fixed costs involved in geographical mobility 
and, given excess supply of labour even in prosperous areas, combined with 
the fact that Immigrant workers generally had poorer employment prospects 
in the receiving areas than the indigenous workforce, the attractiveness 
of migration tended to Increase as overall levels of activity rose.
• Persistent differences in unemployment rates may also have been the 
result of disequilibrium resulting from the persistent differences in the 
growth rates of employment. High unemployment in a declining industry
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* Zt should also be noted that only about 40% of engineering vacancies 
were filled by the employment exchanges and it seems likely that the easier 
it was to fill a particular vacancy, the less likely that recourse to the 
exchange would be necessary. Hence those vacancies filled through the 
exchanges probably took longer to fill than the average. (Allen • Thomas, 
1939, p.. 272).
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might obscure quite rapid outward transfers, even though the unemployment 
level remained above the average. At the industry level Beveridge 
compared unemployment percentages at 1937 with the growth rates of employ­
ment between 1923 and 1937. Hie lack of a strong relationship led him 
to conclude that "the dominant factor in determining the unemployment 
rate within a particular industry is not the rate at which the demand 
for labour is changing but the organisation of the industry" . He also 
examined the changes over time in unemployment rates at the local level 
in certain trades and found that the differences were as marked in the 
"progressing" as in the depressed industries (1944, p. 52).
Given the availability of data by industry by region, it is possible 
to examine the typical effects on unemployment of employment growth.
This may be attempted using the following equation where the employment 
rate at time t is a function of employment growth in previous years and 
the employment rate at the beginning of the period which is denoted as
The equation is best thought of as having been derived in the following 
way. A change in the unemployment percentage results from different rates 
of change of employment and the labour force. Defining g(L) as the labour 
force growth rata and g(B) as the growth rate of employment, the difference 
between these can.be written as the difference in the log of employment 
rate's at t and s.
ln( (lOO - 0ti)t m *0 + 1«(1 + 9rl > + *2 IntlOO - 0 ^ ) ^  + u ^  (lo)
1
Rearranging
1«
The growth rate of the labour force in rl relative to other markets
(ft.note continued on next page)
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If over the period of observation, no labour force adjustment took place, 
then the variation in employment rates at time t will be exactly accounted 
for by the growth rates of employment and the initial employment rates 
such that ♦2 “ 1. If, at the other extreme, adjustments in labour
supply completely offset the effects of employment change on employment 
rates, then the model predicts 4^ - O. In this case, if the overall change 
in employment rates took the form of a proportionate increase or decrease 
in all rates, then ^  “ 1 but if the change was more than proportionate 
<(>2 > 1; if less than proportionate < 1- The equation was estimated 
for the three periods 1929-32, 1932-36 and 1929-36. Using the data for 
30 industries and nine regions omitting the observations with zero cells 
and estimating using ordinary least squares, gives the results in Table 7.14.
Differences in proportionate employment changes during the recession 
of 1929-32 are reflected to the extent of about a half in employment rates 
in 1932 according to the estimate of The estimated value of 4^ exceeds
footnote 2 continued from previous page
depends on the difference in the growth rate of employment and the initial. • 
deviation of the actual' employment rate from the aggregate.
X. Ir  ® In E "1| Ir  e E _1rl»t m . . - In r**t . n,t ri,a n,s
L ri,s *° ' _1|_ ri,s In En,sj1 ’!“  LL  ri,s Ln,s_|
^  is predicted to be positive and negative. Since national employment
growth and initial employment rate is constant in cross section, these can 
be absorbed into the constant term so that
In _riit
^riiS
where f  o
substituting this into the expression for the employment L rate at time t 
given above yields the equation given in the text where 4^ - 1 - and
♦2 - 1 - ^  and 4o - f - .
fo " *1 E.
lift
n,i - h In
n fi
nil
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Table 7.14
-2
*o ♦l *2 R
1929-32 -1.807 0.495 1.377 0.852
(0.339) (0.023) (0.751)
1932-36 -2.540 0.200 0.433 0.617
(0.096) (0 .022) (0 .022)
1929-36 -0.457 0.072 1.090 0.700
(0.233) (0.013) (0.052)
(Standard errors in parentheses)
one for this period but not significantly so and its significance compared 
with that of employment change indicates that the latter is the dominant 
variable affecting the structure of employment rates in 1932. The picture 
is changed in the recovery of 1932-36 when only a fifth of differences in 
proportionate employment changes are reflected in the structure of 
employment rates in 1936. The relationship between initial and end 
period employment rates becomes substantially stronger but less than 
proportional. For the period as a whole, it is clear that the differential 
declines and subsequent recovery of employment are, to some extent, 
offsetting but the remaining changes in employment structure have very mar­
ginal effects on employment rates. Though and are significantly 
different from zero and one respectively, they are numerically close to 
these values. Thus to a large extent Beveridge's findings are borne out. 
The change in employment structure occurring over the great depression 
had very little impact on the structure of employment rates which 
remained very close to that of 1929.
These findings are not surprising in that differences in employment 
change would be expected to be felt mainly in the short run but only 
give a limited indication of labour mobility. This would obviously differ
7.45
between industries and regions. Thus Beveridge found that "local 
immobility is a greater obstacle than industrial immobility to the adjustment 
of labour demand and supply, ..." (1944, p, 62) and Champernowne that 
"within each area labour flows fairly easily from one industry to another 
causing a levelling of unemployment percentages within the area" (1938, p.104).
This was borne out to a considerable extent by the finding of a 
substantial regional component to unemployment in the shift share analysis 
of section 7.1. An alternative way of examining this phenomenon is to 
see how far changes in the labour force attached to an industry in a 
region responded to changes in industrial and regional employment growth 
respectively. This can be done using the following equation^
In uri.t
"ri.s
n + n. In „ o 1 Er,t ♦ 1, 1» ♦ 1 1» iij*!r,s i,s xi„s
+ u ? (7.11)
Hie change in the labour force attached to a particular industry in an area 
is expected to be positively associated with the growth of employment 
in the region as a whole and the industry as a whole through and r\^ .
The greater is industrial mobility, the larger r\2 and the greater 
regional mobility, the greater r^. tlj again represents adjustment to an 
initial disequilibrium employment rate, an initially high employment rate 
would be expected to lead to a greater increase in the labour force 
attached to the local industry and hence, is expected to be positive. 
Estimating equation 7.U by ordinary least squares and using the same data 
as before, yielded the results given in Table 7.15.
* This is a var iant of aquation (7.10) as can be seen by rafarance to 
footnote 1, p. 7.42.
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Table 15
T) n n n R2o i 2 3
1929-32 0.087 0.070 0.437 -0.251 0.318
(0.013) (0.105) (0.043) (0.129)
1932-36 0.090 -0.117 0.610 0.480 0.306
(0.038) (0.209) (0.070) (0.522)
1929-36 0.046 0.055 0.975 0.059 0.450
(0.029) (0.125) (0.074) (0.206)
(Standard errors in parentheses)
The results offer some support for the findings of Beveridge and 
Champernowne. For 1929-32, ^  is highly significant and is not so that 
within each region the growth of the labour force in an industry is asso­
ciated more closely with the growth of employment in that industry than
in the region. It also appears that, for the recession of 1929-32, changes
, ^
in the labour force attached to an industry in a region are inversely 
correlated with employment rates in 1929. For 1929-32 coefficients »1 
and both change sign but are not significant. Thus in recovery, 
workers appear to have been attracted into labour markets with high 
employment rates in 1932 but did not follow the regional pattern of 
employment growth once differences in industrial employment growth are 
taken into account. Over the period as a whole, as Blight have been 
expected, it is only industrial growth which is important and the other 
coefficients are all very small.
These results have to be interpreted with caution as they tend to 
reflect the earlier findings, namely that the growth of employment in 
any labour market is closely associated with industrial growth and that, 
only in the short run are differences in growth rates reflected in
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unemployment rates. Tims labour force trends In each area tend to 
re^ * c^ very closely the growth trend set by the Industries in that area.
7.5 Unemployment Structure and Economic Policy.
T*le findings of the.preceding sections may be briefly summarised. The 
examination of unemployment data reveals that unemployment was in an 
important sense both regional and Industrial: high unemployment industries 
tended to have high unemployment relative to others in all regions ; in 
high unemployment regions, rates in each industry tended to be higher than 
average. Similar results were obtained for employment growth but here 
individual growth rates were more strongly related to the growth of 
industries than regions. For both high unemployment industries and regions, 
employment rates were found to be cyclically sensitive so that they rose 
more rapidly in booms than those which had lower unemployment on average. 
Finally there is considerable evidence that labour was highly mobile both 
between industries and regions but that mobility tended to increase with 
activity. These findings suggest it may be a serious mistake to define 
and measure seme concept of "structural unemployment" independently of the 
overall level of activity. It suggests that the constraints imposed 
by frictions in the labour market were not so great as to have prevented 
the economy from reaching substantially higher levels of employment than 
were attained in the peaks of 1929 and 1937. If expansion had continued 
along the lines typical in the actual cycles, employment would have grown 
faster in high unemployment industries and regions and labour would have 
moved more readily into those industries and regions where it became 
relatively scarce.
a
This evidence does not directly confront the question of what appro­
priate prescriptions for policy might have been had governments in the 
1930's been conmitted to more expans ionary policies than they were. Concern 
has frequently been expressed that structural problems would have needed 
to be taken into account as part of such a programme and recent discussion 
has drawn attention to Keynes' views on this issue in the later 1930's1.
r
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This has most recently been examined by Peden (1980)
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Writing in the Times in 1937 he gave this warning: "I believe that we 
are approaching, or have reached, the point where there is not much advan­
tage in applying a further general stimulus at the centre. So long as sur­
plus resources were widely diffused between industries and localities, it 
was no great matter at what point in the economic structure the impulse 
of an increased demand was applied. But the evidence grows that ... the 
economic structure is unfortunately rigid and that (for example) building 
activity in the home counties is less effective than one might have hoped 
in decreasing unemployment in the distressed areas. It follows that the 
later stages of recovery require a different technique. To remedy the 
condition of the distressed areas, ad hoc measures are necessary"
(Collected Works, 1982, p. 385). These strictures have been echoed more 
recently by Booth and Glynn who argued that "the interwar unemployment problem 
required a highly complex solution involving a wide range of ad hoc regional 
and industrial measures as well as pump priming at the national level"
(1975, p. 630). Subsequently Glynn and Howells have argued against a 
policy of indiacriminate demand expansion and suggest that "what was required 
was a comprehensive regional policy promoted by the central government to 
ease the transfer from export oriented industries" (1980. p. 43).
In the General Theory, Keynes also put forward the view that expansion 
would eventually have encountered a series of bottlenecks which would limit 
the effects of public policy. The argument presented here suggests that the 
economic structure was not "unfortunately rigid" in that sense though it may 
have seemed that way. The bottlenecks were certainly not encountered to 
any serious extent until the war restored full employment. Had the level 
of demand been increased substantially, allocation would increasingly 
have relied on the price mechanism in addition to the distribution of 
excess supply and demand. The evaluation of these implicetions is beyond 
the scope of this chapter but it is not doubted that it would ultimately
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have engendered some general price rise beyond what was experienced.
The slope of the aggregate supply function would, however, depend on the 
distribution of additional demand and from any inherant failings of the 
policies of re-allocation which were pursued. But there was little chance 
of assisting the recovery of the economy as a whole in the absence of a 
general reflation. Hence, in this context regional policies should be 
regarded as subsidiary to aggregate demand policy and not the other way 
around.
The possible impact of aggregate demand policy was taken up in Chapter 
5 but it is worth briefly reconsidering it from the point of view of the 
regional and industrial imbalance. Had expansion taken the form of 
public works centering on building and civil engineering, then regional 
policies might have become an increasingly relevant consideration. This 
appears to be what Booth and Glynn (1975) and Glynn and Howells (1980) 
had in mind when discussing the efficacy of demand management policies. 
Glynn and Howells argued that since regions tend to be more open than the 
national economy, regional multipliers would generally be lower than the 
natural multiplier. Thus regional multipliers would typically have been 
close to or less than one .
It is not possible to estimate what these would have been without 
knowing something about inter-regional trade - flows. Such figures are not 
available for the interwar economy but Brown (1972, Table 3.12, p. 75) has 
estimated these flows for 1967. On postwar regional definitions, the 
ratios of inter-regional trade (defined as the average of imports and 
exports including overseas trade) to regional GDP ranged from 0.7 to 1.7
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and averaged 1.2. It is likely that the interwar economy was somewhat 
less integrated than that of 1967 and given that there were also fewer re 
regions (as defined by the Ministry of Labour), typical import propensities 
would have been somewhat lower. Nevertheless, we can use the figures to 
perform some (purely illustrative) calculations to get a feel for what 
regional multipliers might typically have been. If we assume that the region 
is typical, then we may take the multiplier expression of Glynn and Howells 
and substitute regional import propensities for the national figure.
Taking these as 0.7, 1.0 and 1.3 gives regional multipliers of 0.92, 0.74 
and 0.63 respectively. These values are very low indeed and, if the 
assumptions are plausible, theyconfirm the suspicion that regional 
multipliers might have been less than one1-.
It must be noted that, of themselves, these low multipliers do
not imply that "regional problems cannot be resolved at the national
level" (Glynn and Howells, 1980, p. 44). Indeed, quite the reverse. The
lower the regional multiplier, the smaller will be the impact of a pound
spent in that region alone given that this results from the openness of the
region. A situation with low regional multipliers tends, therefore, to
be more favourable to a general expansion of demand as against a selective
policy of regional spending which is presumably what is meant by "local
* It may seem that there is en inconsistency in using the values for regional 
trade flows which are larger than one since it is hard to imagine the 
marginal propensity to import to be this large. In this case it is 
implicitly assumed that imports are a function of exports as well as domestic 
spending. To illustrate with the simplest possible case, income can be 
regarded as generated from the following
Y - bY ♦ X - c(bY ♦ X)
where b is the marginal propensity to consume and c the "expenditure” 
import propensity which must be less than one. This gives a multiplier of
wh*ch ®*y be less than one and an import ratio of which exceeds
one if c > 0.5. Since only the ratio is known, this is used in the multiplier 
expression in the normal way so that
Y • bY ♦ X ♦ r£- Y .
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ad hoc solutions".
However, this takes no account of the fact that some regions were 
more open to international rather than interregional exports. Thus a 
public spending programme might have a relatively small direct impact in 
the regions which were, after all, the most depressed even though the 
secondary effects on cyclically sensitive industries and the increased 
prospects for out migration might have helped. But it was argued in 
Chapter 5 that a lower exchange rate would have been a pre-condition 
for demand expansion in the 1920s and a direct corollary of it in the 
1930s. Though the regional effects of export expansion could not be 
clearly distinguished, it seems likely that such a policy would have 
assisted the depressed regions both directly and indirectly.
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8.1
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult to draw very many clear and unqualified conclusions 
from the foregoing chapters. The analysis has been selective but, even so, 
it has been more superficial than is desirable. Thus one important 
conclusion is that there is a need for further work in the area before 
a full picture of the many facets of the labour market can be fully 
understood. It is suggested that such investigation could fruitfully 
follow the approach here which is to measure, quantify and test key 
relationships rather than use the data to selectively illustrate 
qualitative and descriptive arguments. The conclusions drawn at this 
stage are, therefore, in the nature of an interim report and will be 
kept accordingly short.
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the labour market before 1914. The 
period was one of gradual structural change with a regular pattern of 
cyclical fluctuations. This pattern is faithfully reflected in the Trade 
Union unemployment series which show no secular trend and which, despite 
doubts about its representative nature and usefulness as a measure
of the total volume of unemployment appears to be a very sensitive indicator 
of changes in labour market conditions. The growth in wages relative to 
the cost of living index delineates three phases in the rate of improvement 
of working class standards. These trends and the year to year variations 
were largely the result of competitive forces which, though producing 
standards considerably above subsistence for those in the 'primary' 
labour market, left many of those least able to compete in a condition of 
abject poverty.
8.2
During a period as long as 60 years one might have expected important 
changes in the structure and functioning of the labour market to have 
taken place. In a recent article, Tarling and Wilkinson have argued that 
the growth of real and nominal wages before 1914 must be seen in the 
context of the evolution of political and institutional forces and that 
concentration on pure market forces is empty and dangerous (1982, p. 23 ). 
Considerable attention was paid in Chapter 2 to the structure and institu­
tional features of the labour market and the evidence appears to point 
in the opposite direction. Real wages grow most slowly when labour's 
bargaining power, superficially at least, appears to have been strongest. 
Adjustments of wages, hours and conditions took place where they were 
most called for by competitive forces and it was the differing combinations 
of economic forces which called forthe the emergence of different degrees 
of organisation and different forms of collective bargaining. Of themselves 
these did little to alter the economic effects of short term changes or 
to alter the course of long run growth and structural change.
If this view is appropriate, then modern neoclassical models of 
the competitive labour market might be expected to receive support. The 
examination of the time series labour supply function for this period 
has a wider importance in view of the Phillips curve literature whose 
empirical support derives originally from the period. The single equation
model of the inverted Phillips curve receives considerable support from
1 *
the data: it indicates a stable relationship over the whole period to 
1914 and provides a simple rationale for the dynamics of wage Qhange and 
unemployment whichtds represented by the loops around the Phillips curve^ 
had left an unresolved pussle. Further support for the relationship 
emerges when the data is disaggregated into individual unions, though 
the inadequacy of the data still imposes reservations. These are 
particularly acute when attempts are made to assess the quantitative
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significance of of trade union policies of providing out of work benefits. 
All that can usefully be said about this is that at least these are 
more appropriate tests of such influences than those previously performed.
When labour supply and demand functions are estimated jointly, they 
lend support to the view that wages and unemployment can be seen as the 
outcome of a process of short run labour market clearing. The independent 
effect of the cost of living index on the wage and employment disappears 
in the simultaneous model which suggests it may have been acting as a 
proxy for factors determining demand in the single equation model. The 
fact that price change appears not to enter the labour supply function 
lends support to the approach of Lucas (1973) rather than that of Lucas 
and Rapping (1969).
In view of theae results, it is interesting to perform some of the 
tests of a classical model of the labour market suggested by Sargent 
(1973, 1976) in which the Lucas supply function and rational expectations 
are used. The assumptions required are stringent: in addition to an 
unimpeded competitive labour market, a stable process generating wage and 
employment variations must be assumed. In addition, Hall (1980) has 
argued that the Lucas supply function is only appropriate if only local 
information is available and current aggregate wage and price changes are 
not publicly announced. These conditions are largely satisfied for the 
period before 1914 and the tests appear to support Sargent's model rather 
more strongly than Sargent's own tests for the postwar U.S. economy.
If this view of the functioning of the pre-war labour market is 
accepted, it is important to focus on changes in the economic and 
institutional structure occurring between the decade before the war and 
the 1920s. These changes provide at least some insights into the problems 
which beset the interwar economy. Principal among these is the structural
readjustment which was called for by the new trading conditions facing 
the British economy after the war and which were substantially greater 
than those which were faced before 1914. At the same time, particularly 
as a result of new attitudes as to the place of labour in the economy 
developed during the war, new institutions emerged which may have made 
adjustment more difficult. The emergence of centralised collective 
bargaining in almost every sector sanctioned and supported by the state 
and the new criteria established of comparability with living costs and 
wages in other sectors tended to institutionalise relative wage rigidity. 
This is not to say that these institutions were undesirable - it is possible 
that, if left entirely unimpeded, the free reign of market forces might 
have imposed great cost on sections of society, considerably greater 
than anything actually observed in the interwar period.
One important factor in ameliorating distress was the protection 
against utter destitution and poverty afforded by the national insurance 
system. That such a system which had its origins in the liberal reforms 
before the war, became widely extended in 1920 and 1921 must be regarded 
as one of the more fortunate aspects of labour history. Though the 
system of unemployment benefits probably prevented a great deal of 
distress from poverty which might otherwise have occurred , it was not 
as magnanimous as has been suggested by Benjamin and Kochin (1979) and
was by no means successful in eradicating poverty.
» *
Nevertheless, it is possible that by altering the structure of 
labour market incentives, the unemployment insurance system may have 
impeded adjustment and fostered persistent high unemployment. The 
view that high interwar unemployment is largely a statistical artifact 
cannot be sustained. On any realistic comparison, interwar unemployment 
was of a completely different order of magnitude than that in the early
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postwar period or that before 1914. On the other hand, differences 
in the benefit to wage ratio between these different periods do not provide 
support for the view that such differences can be explained by the benefit 
regime.
On these observations and an examination of the structure and character 
of interwar unemployment, the conclusion that the period was characterised 
by persistent involuntary unemployment or labour market excess supply 
seems fully warranted. In this context, the model used by Benjamin and 
Kochin to measure the effects of unemployment benefits is inappropriate 
and must be rejected. Though the single equation model used could be given 
more than one interpretation, it is clear from the way it was used and 
interpreted that it was viewed as an equilibrium model (see Appendix 5A.1). 
In this interpretation, the model only picks up the part of benefit induced 
unemployment which arises from expanding the insured labour force and not 
the effect on employment of altering the equilibrium wage. However, 
in the context of a model where an equation for employment is estimated 
separately, the impact of the benefit to wage ratio seems to have reduced 
employment for a given level of output, rather than to have raised the 
apparent labour supply or insured labour force. Efforts to measure the 
impact of benefits on the level of and changes in the wage rate yielded 
negative results. This evidence is difficult to interpret and, hence, 
further investigation was pursued at the disaggregated level.
The results for industry employment function give strong support to 
the excess supply view of the labour markat since adjustment of employment 
to output was very rapid but the widespread finding of increasing short 
run returns to labour was consistently supported. The results for benefits 
obtained for aggregate employment also receive support at the industry level: 
the benefit to wage ratio shifted employment for a given output level though
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the estimated effects vary widely between industries. These effects 
largely disappear when unconstrained labour demand equations are 
estimated. The results, in general, indicate that it is difficult to 
separate out the individual effects of output, wages, prices and benefits 
on annual data and the wide range of results in other studies supports 
this.
It was felt that more precise estimates of the effects of benefits 
might be obtained from quarterly data which have not previously been used 
in this discussion. The results for employment in Chapter 6 suggest that 
a first differences formulation is appropriate and, in a model which yielded 
significant coefficients, both on the product wage and output, no effect 
for unemployment benefits could be discerned. An examination of the flow 
of workers out of insurance indicated that this was affected by both 
changes in the benefits to wage ratio and rates of disallowance with the 
predicted signs and that these effects can be discerned in an equation 
for quarterly changes in the insured labour force. These results appear 
to accord more closely- with what would have been predicted in most labour 
market models.
It was originally thought that the effect of benefits on employment 
found in annual data might be connected with firms adopting a policy of 
temporary layoffs to give their workers a combination of income from 
employment and benefits. This would maintain thair eligibility for 
benefits and retain a pool of labour for inmediate recall. Equations 
for the temporarily stopped and wholly unemployed yielded results which 
were largely consistent with the equations for employment but failed 
to produce coefficients on the benefit to wage ratio, the disallowance 
rate and the demographic variable which were obtained in the labour 
force aquations.
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Disaggregating by sex and into juveniles and adults does little 
to improve on these results. Ironically, the only equations in which 
significant coefficients are obtained on the benefit to wage ratio are 
in equations for juveniles. This was the group for which Benjamin and 
Kochin claimed that the benefit to wage ratio was too low to have signi­
ficantly affected unemployment. In the quarterly model, however, the 
effect of benefits appears to have been to raise the number temporarily 
stopped and reduce those wholly unemployed.
If the paradigm of non market clearing is appropriate for the 
interwar period, then this automatically raises the issue of how demand 
management policies might have been used to reduce unemployment. It 
has been argued that the philosophy and traditions of public finance 
were deeply rooted and provided an overwhelming resistance to Keynesian 
ideas (Middleton 1982). However, it is still valid to consider the 
implications of such policies even though they were not used. Serious 
proposals were put forward by Lloyd George and Keynes amongst others, 
for reflationary policies and the possible impact of such policies has 
been widely considered.
Recent writers have stressed that such policies would not have been 
feasible because the employment creating impact of public spending 
programmes would have been small. These views are largely based on 
pessimistic conclusions about the sisa of the sample expenditure 
multiplier (Glynn and Howells, 1980, Thomas, 1981). However, apart 
from any misgivings about the propensities used in generating these 
results, two important features have been glossed over. One is that 
fiscal stance was such that any stimulus to demand would have a consider­
able effect on exchequer revenues which would reduce the borrowing
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requirement of a given spending programme. The other is that in such 
an open economy it is necessary to consider public spending and exchange 
rate policy together. In the 1920s, a policy of devaluation could have 
provided scope for the expansion of public spending while, in the 1930's, 
public spending would have helped keep the exchange rate low. The 
importance of exchange rate policy is not just that it would ease the 
budget deficit required by expansionary policies but, also, that it 
would direct additional demand into the depressed exporting areas.
How far the "regional problem" would have imposed constraints on 
possible reflationary policies depends not only on the extent to which 
additional demand would have flowed into depressed industries and areas 
but on the ease with which resources could be reallocated. In the 
accounting context of shift share analysis, unemployment was both 
regional and industrial but it appears that the decline of major 
industries tended to impose high unemployment on other industries in a 
region. But in general, those industries and regions with high 
unemployment rates grew proportionately more than average during times 
of general expansion. Thus, even if demand expansion were largely domestic 
in origin, it is likely that employment would have grown faster in the 
depressed regions.
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that there were not areas and 
ibdustries with significant excess demand for labour which were held 
beck by the industrial and regional maldistribution of the labour force.
Low geographical mobility was due to the fact that the prospects for 
immigrant labour ware poor even in the relatively prosperous areas.
These observations suggest that selective regional policies would not 
have been particularly effactive in tha absenca of a general damand
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reflation. The indication that regional multipliers were relatively 
low strengthens this point and supports the view that domestic demand 
expansion, together with the appropriate exchange rate policy could 
have resulted in significantly higher levels of employment than those 
actually achieved.
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